

Chapter 1

Dharmakīrti against the *pudgala*

1.1. TWO BUDDHIST VERSIONS OF THE SELF AND THE PERSON

1.1.1. Introduction

Be it through textbooks or introductory courses, most of us have once been taught that one of the hallmarks of Indian Buddhism was its way of addressing human existence and at times reality itself as empty and selfless. To be sure, there is still no such thing as a consensus concerning the historical Buddha's position on the self (provided he ever had one), and several scholars contend that the Buddhist denial of a self – a “metaphysical shipwreck” – only came about over time in the writings of self-appointed representatives of “orthodoxy” as a form of *trahison des clercs*.¹ Whatever the case may be, most scholarly introductions depict the monastic intellectual elites as predominantly committed to the doctrine of selflessness and as uncompromisingly defending it against a set of (pseudo-)Buddhist sectarian denominations labelled as “personalist” (*pudgalavādin*, so called because of their acceptance of an enduring and nearly substantial subject of experience, rebirth and liberation). What these introductions generally fail to emphasize, however, is that at least according to the statistics provided by the Chinese scholar and pilgrim Xuanzang (who travelled to and in India in 629–645), one of these denominations, the Sāṃmitīyas, represented about one third (70,000) of the total amount (220,000) of Buddhist monks and institu-

¹ See, e.g., Bhattacharya 1973 and Hulin 2008 (“metaphysical shipwreck” in Bhattacharya 1973: 75; for the sources of this expression [Barth, (C.A.F.) Rhys Davids], see Bhattacharya 1973: 75–76, fn. 8). For an overview and (more) balanced assessment of the canonical materials, see Collins 1982: 65–115 and Schmithausen 2000. For a short historiographical survey, see Collins 1982: 7–12.

tions in seventh-century northern India.² And if this, provided it is true, does certainly not prove that all Sāṃmitīya monastics assented to personalism, it at least suggests that they belonged to a sect whose Abhidharma(-like) scriptures made the existence of the “person” one of its most significant doctrinal features. This is not the all of it, however. To the testimony of Xuanzang, the Mahāyānists formed another third of the whole monastic community (the remaining third being constituted by [Mūla]sarvāstivādins, Sthaviras and Mahāsāṅghikas). Now, the least one can say is that many Mahāyānistic scriptures (*sūtras* and *śāstras* alike) testify to a certain partiality for substantialist accounts of human existence, reality, salvation and buddhahood. As pointed out by Seyfort Ruegg and Bhattacharya, this is the case of the MSA(Bh) and several *sūtras*.³ But the remark applies especially well to the movement(s) that, in scriptures such as the TGSū, the Mahāyānist MPSū, the ŚMDSNSū and the LASū, and in corpora such as the RGV(V), advocated the soteric presence of a *buddha* nature/element or embryo of a *tathāgata* within all sentient beings.⁴ In other words, the Buddhist scholars and practitioners who showed reservations about the strongest versions of selflessness and/or subscribed to “substantializing” doctrines might well have been in much higher number than is generally recognized, something which, taken together with other alleged “heresies” (doctrines akin to *satkāryavāda*, *sphoṭa* and *apauruṣeyatā*, attitudes towards caste, ethics and permanence, etc., not to speak of Buddhist “tantric” symbols and practices), raises fairly interesting questions regarding issues of orthodoxy and heterodoxy – and the non-emic applicability of such concepts – within Indian Buddhism (and Buddhism as a whole).⁵ Symmetrically, those in an intellectual position to

² See below, §1.1.3.1.

³ See Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 370–377 and Bhattacharya 1973: 3–7; see also below, fn. 44, p. 57.

⁴ The issue of the self in the *tathāgatagarbha* traditions of India, Tibet, China, Japan and Thailand is dealt with extensively in Williams 2009: 103–128.

⁵ Or, to put it with Williams (2009: 124), “[o]ne issue is how legislative the teachings of not-Self and dependent origination, or the Mādhyamika idea of emptiness, are for Buddhist identity” (note also Williams 2009: 125 on “the legislative claim of the centrality of the not-Self doctrine for Buddhist identity”). As we shall see, this was already at stake in *sūtras* connected with the *tathāgatagarbha* such as the ŚMDSNSū (see King 1995) and the LASū (see below, §1.1.2.1), and proved to be es-

defend what they (and, more often than not, we and their non-Buddhist challengers) held to be the Buddhist doctrinal orthodoxy regarding the self (Ābhidharmikas such as Vasubandhu, and the Buddhist epistemologists along their line), might have been but a minority (albeit an influential one) within Buddhist institutions.

*1.1.2. The “Immanence of the Absolute,”⁶ or the
tathāgatagarbha as the True Self of Living Beings*

1.1.2.1. There can be no point in attempting to outline here the historical development and doctrinal standpoint(s) of the tradition(s) commonly referred to as the *tathāgatagarbha* or *buddha*-nature strand of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.⁷ The term *tathāgatagarbha* itself – maybe first a *bahuvrīhi* compound soon to be used as a *tatpuruṣa* referring to a separate entity – points to the idea, developed first in different sets of similes,⁸ of an “inherent buddhahood” (Zimmermann 2002: 13), i.e., that all sentient beings possess, own or contain a *tathāgata*, have a

pecially relevant in the “mainstream” scholiasts’ polemics against Buddhist personalism (see below, §1.1.3.1 and fn. 57, p. 65). But this is not without contemporary counterparts, as can be seen in the Japanese debates over the “Critical Buddhism” movement (see the discussions in King 1995: 15–17, Zimmermann 2002: 82–84 and Williams 2009: 122–125) or the Thai polemics around the Dhammakaya movement (see Williams 2009: 125–128).

⁶ Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 44 and 46, Zimmermann 2002: 64.

⁷ On the *tathāgatagarbha*, see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 245–408, Liu 1982, Brown 1991, Zimmermann 2002: 11–92 and Williams 2009: 103–128 (= Chapter 5). As most authors emphasize, the Indian *buddha*-nature movement(s) never developed into (a) philosophical school(s) or “along scholastic lines” (King 1995: 1) in the way early Yogācāra or Madhyamaka did, and can even be shown to have been reluctant to Abhidharma-like argumentation. This might provide *one* reason why its/their dogmatically problematic assertions regarding permanence and the self, contrary to the Pudgalavādins’, were apparently never made the target of sustained criticism on the part of “mainstream” Buddhist scholiasts.

⁸ Concerning the similes as they can be found in the TGSū (and, though in a reorganized form, in the RGV[V]), note the following remark by Zimmermann (2002: 35): “Generally speaking, it is the notion that a precious element, pure in nature, but hidden and unsuspected, truly exists, and while it is covered with impurities, its nature remains unaffected.” On the similes in the Mahāyānist MPSū, see Yamamoto 1973: 181–186 and Liu 1982: 77–82; in the RGV(V), see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 253–257; see also Brown 1991: 125–134.

fully awakened *buddha* as their essence.⁹ Or, according to other, possibly slightly later interpretations, all living beings are believed to possess an “embryo,” a “germ” (*bīja*) or even the “[causal] element”¹⁰ (*dhātu*) of a *tathāgata*. In both cases, this (embryo/germ of a) *tathāgata*, though basically unchangeable, is enwrapped, covered and polluted by the filth of purely adventitious, accidental (*āgantuka*) impurities (*mala*) and defilements (*kleśa*). Provided a full-fledged *tathāgata* is already present in the living beings, the path toward salvation amounts to the gradual manifestation or revelation of this inner nature through a process of purification of the impurities,¹¹ so that “becoming a *buddha* does not involve an essential transformation or generative causal act by which a gap between the state of being hindered by mental de-

⁹ For an analysis of the compound in the TGSū, see Zimmermann 2002: 41–46. The core teaching of this *sūtra* appears in the following passage (quoted in RGVV 73,11–12): *eṣā kulaputra dharmāṇām dharmatā / utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sadaivaite sattvās tathāgatagarbhā iti* /. “Son of good family, the True Nature (*dharmatā*) of the *dharmas* is this: whether or not *tathāgatas* appear in the world, all these sentient beings contain at all times a *tathāgata*.” Translation Zimmermann 2002: 40; for a similar statement in the MPSū (524a28–b1), see Liu 1982: 66. As pointed out by Zimmermann (2002: 40) in the context of the TGSū, a *tatpuruṣa* analysis of this passage would require the translation of *tathāgatagarbhā* as “store(s) of a *tathāgata*” (but by no means “embryo[s] of a *tathāgata*”). Note, however, the following remark by Zimmermann (2002: 45): “As attested by the prevailing use of the word *tathāgatagarbha* in other writings, and in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* itself, as a *tatpuruṣa* compound (the “embryo of a *tathāgata*” as a separate entity), a tendency towards a grammatically non-adjectival use of the term was inherent from earliest times. The title of the *sūtra* further stimulated such an independent understanding, and with the appearance of the concept of *buddha-dhātu* in the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* as more or less a synonym for *tathāgatagarbha*, the temptation to interpret this latter as a *tatpuruṣa* probably proved irresistible.”

¹⁰ Note RGVV 72,10: *tat(= tathāgatatva)prāptaye hetus tathāgatadhātur iti / hetvartho 'tra dhātvarthaḥ* /. “The cause of one’s obtaining this [state of a *tathāgata*] is the *tathāgata*-element. Here the meaning of ‘element’ is that of ‘cause.’”

¹¹ On this “theory of revelation/manifestation,” see Zimmermann 2002: 13–14, 64, 81 (“theory of manifestation of buddhahood over one of pure causation”), and below, fn. 13, p. 41. Note also Zimmermann 2002: 67: “[T]he Pāśupata doctrine of *abhi-vyakti*, which latter concept, namely liberation as the manifestation of the innate Śiva’s perfections through the removal of impurities (*mala*), is strikingly similar.”

filements and that of perfect awakening is bridged.”¹² In case the *tathāgatagarbha* is conceived as residing in sentient beings in an embryonic form, the salvational process will consist in the gradual maturation/ripening, or even causation, of the germinal *tathāgata*.¹³ Whatever the case may be, *all* living beings have the *potential* to, and actually *will* become perfectly awakened *buddhas*, a conception that is likely to derive from, and to provide justification for, the *ekayāna* doctrine put forward in the SDPSū.¹⁴ Now, what is of utmost interest to us

¹² Zimmermann 2002: 62.

¹³ In either of their two main forms, the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings bear overtones of a doctrine similar to the Sāṅkhyas’ *satkāryavāda* (the doctrine according to which the effect pre-exists in its cause, i.e., according to which nothing can be produced that does not already exist before). One of the nine similes of the TGSū (Zimmermann 2002: 63) “affirms the imperishability of the seed, and the fact that the result (*kārya*), namely the tree, is already contained in the seed. It emphasizes that seed and tree are of the same nature [...] The assertion by the authors of the TGS[ū] that the seed already bears the tree within itself certainly accords well with their ‘theory of revelation’ [...] What is decisive for them is the essential oneness of seed and tree. Nothing new has to be added; the complete tree is already found in the seed.” See also Zimmermann 2002: 80 and Liu 1982: 70–77 and 83–86. For other examples of Buddhist *satkāryavāda*, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 138–141; for an early Buddhist reference to Vārṣaganya as a representative of *satkāryavāda*, see Seyfort Ruegg 1963; for early Buddhist critiques of *satkāryavāda* (as entailing eternalism), see Schoening 1995: 1285–287. The Mahāyāna MPSū also contains an interesting passage on (and against) *satkāryavāda* and similar ideas; see Yamamoto 1973: 193–195.

¹⁴ According to the *ekayāna* teaching, there is only one vehicle, i.e., the Mahāyāna, the vehicle to buddhahood (and no distinct *śrāvaka* or *pratyekabuddha* paths). See Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 175–243 and SDPSū 40,13–15: *ekam evāhaṃ śāriputra yānam ārabhya sattvānāṃ dharmaṃ deśayāmi yad idaṃ buddhayānam / na kiñcīc chāriputra dvitīyaṃ vā tṛtīyaṃ vā yānaṃ samvidyate //*. “With reference to only one vehicle, Śāriputra, I teach the *dharma* for living beings, namely, the vehicle of the *buddhas*. Śāriputra, there is not any second or third vehicle.” Translation Zimmermann 1998: 157. According to Zimmermann (2002: 77), “the TGS[ū] can be understood as a text that subsequently provided a theory for the great assertion put forward in its popular predecessor, the *Saddharma-puṇḍarikasūtra*, namely that all living beings will attain buddhahood. Thus while the *Saddharma-puṇḍarikasūtra*, in a religious environment where it was probably not always heartily welcomed, announced that all living beings would eventually attain buddhahood, the TGS[ū], in a successive step, adopted as its task that of working out a justification for this assertion.” Note also Zimmermann 2002: 80: “The story of the *bodhisattva* Sadā-paribhūta [in SDPSū 19, VE/IR] shows that the time for such an assertion may not

is the fact that this hidden (embryo of a) *tathāgata*¹⁵ has been repeatedly described not only as permanent (*nitya*), enduring/stable (*dhruva*), peaceful (*śiva*) and eternal (*śāśvata*),¹⁶ but also as the sentient be-

have been ripe yet – a conclusion supported by descriptions in the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra* of other harsh reactions towards its own propagators from the side of non-Mahāyāna followers. The *TGS[ū]*, in this point, was apparently not held back by any related consideration, zealously promulgating as it did the message of a universal buddhahood present in all living beings.” On the relation between these two *sūtras*, see also Zimmermann 2002: 15, 76, 91; see also Zimmermann 1998: 155–165 (and 1998: 159–161 concerning the story of Sadāparibhūta).

¹⁵ See the excerpt of the ŚMDSNSū quoted in RGVV 45,20–46,4. These epithets can also qualify, e.g., the immaculate buddhahood (*amalaṃ buddhatvam*, RGV 2.29) and the (Tathāgata’s) *dharm*-body (*dharmakāya*, RGVV 54,12–15).

¹⁶ Analogous descriptions occur already in the Mahāyānist MPSū (513a3–4: “How do *bodhisattvas* know the *buddha*-nature? The *buddha*-nature has six aspects. What are these six? [They are:] first, to be eternal, second, to be pure, third, to be real, fourth, to be virtuous, fifth, to be discerned in the future [by everyone], and sixth, to be true.” Translation Liu 1982: 67; on the indestructibility of the *buddhadhātu*, see also Yamamoto 1973: 185 and 186; on its eternity and immutability, see also Yamamoto 1973: 192; on its unproductedness, see also Yamamoto 1973: 195) and the ŚMDSNSū (281a4–6, quoted in RGVV 46,2–4): *na punar bhagavaṃs tathāgata-garbho jāyate vā jīryate vā mriyate vā cyavate votpadyate vā / tat kasmād dhetoḥ / saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaviśayavyativṛtto bhagavaṃs tathāgata-garbho nityo dhruvaḥ śivaḥ śāśvataḥ* /. “But, Lord, the *tathāgata-garbha* is not born, does not get old, does not die, does not pass away to become reborn. What is the reason? The Tathāgata, Lord, is beyond the realm with the characteristic of the conditioned. The *tathāgata-garbha* is permanent, steadfast, peaceful, eternal.” Translation (modified) Wayman/Wayman 1990: 104–105; see also Seyfort Rugg 1969: 363. Note also RGV 1.80–82: *na jāyate na mriyate bādhyate na na jīryate / sa nityatvād dhruvatvāc ca śivatvāc chāśvatatvataḥ // na jāyate sa nityatvād ātmabhāvair manomayaiḥ / acintyapariṇāmena dhruvatvān mriyate na saḥ // vāsanāvyādhībhiḥ sūkṣmair bādhyate na śivatvataḥ / anāsravābhisamskāraiḥ śāśvatatvān na jīryate //*. “Le [*dhātu*] ne naît ni ne meurt, il n’est pas attaqué, et il ne dépérit pas grâce à sa permanence, sa stabilité, sa tranquillité, et son éternité. En raison de sa permanence il ne naît pas dans des existences mentales; en raison de sa stabilité il ne meurt pas par transformation inconcevable; en raison de sa tranquillité il n’est pas attaqué par les maladies subtiles que sont les Imprégnations; et en raison de son éternité il ne dépérit pas à cause des conformations sans impuretés.” Translation Seyfort Rugg 1969: 363. Note also RGV 2.29: *acintyaṃ nityaṃ ca dhruvaṃ atha śivaṃ śāśvatam atha praśāntaṃ ca vyāpi vyapagatavikalpaṃ gaganavat / asaktaṃ sarvatrāprati-ghaparuṣasparśavigataṃ na drśyaṃ na grāhyaṃ śubham api ca buddhatvam ama-lam //*. “La bouddhaté immaculée est impensable, permanente, stable, tranquille, et éternelle; elle est apaisée, compénétrante et exempte de conceptualisation différen-

ings' innermost or supreme self (*[param]ātman*). In other words, as early as the TGSū (which, however, never makes use of *ātman* and related terms), the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings "must be attributed a position within a strand of Buddhism which does not conceal its favor for the concept of a positive continuous subject."¹⁷ This is the case in the Mahāyānist MPSū, which, at least as far as its first part is concerned, is replete with statements to the effect that the *tathāgatagarbha* or the *buddhadhātu* is nothing but the true self.¹⁸ This is also the case of the ŚMDSNSū and the RGV(V), where the notion of a perfection of self (*ātmapāramitā*) characterizing the *buddha*-nature plays a key doctrinal

ciatrice, à l'instar de l'espace vide; sans attachement et partout exempte du contact grossier en tant que sans résistance, elle n'est ni visible ni saisissable, et elle est bonne." Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 362.

¹⁷ Zimmermann 2002: 15. According to Zimmermann (2002: 81), "that the TGS[ū] is not an isolated case of a relatively early Mahāyāna work propagating a positive, enduring constituent in living beings is shown, for example, by the rewording of the verses of the *Gaganagañjasūtra* in the oldest stratum of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. There it is the mind's innate nature (*cittaprakṛti*) which is compared to 'space,' being described as 'luminous,' 'without cause and condition,' and 'without origination and destruction.'" Note also Zimmermann 2002: 83: "[T]he TGS[ū] seems to continue a tradition in Indian Buddhism which was based on a positive use of the concept of 'person' and was not committed to a one-sided denial of a self. From early times on, it seems, this positive strand co-existed with the majority of schools which categorically rejected the existence of a self."

¹⁸ On the doctrine(s) of the self in the Mahāyāna MPSū, see Liu 1982: 71 and 77–78, Fujii 1991, Fujii 1993 and Williams 2009: 108–109. Note the following excerpts from section 8.12: "The Buddha said: 'O good man! 'Self' means *tathāgatagarbha*. Every being has the *buddha*-nature. This is self. Such a self is, since the very beginning, under cover of innumerable illusions. This is why man cannot see it." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 181. "The nature of self is none but the undisclosed storehouse of the Tathāgata. Such a storehouse can never be broken, put to fire, or made away with." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 185. "The true self of the *buddha*-nature is like the diamond which cannot be crushed out." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 186. "The nature/ Of the three refuges is that of self. If one knows/ Clearly that the nature of self has the *buddha*-nature,/ Such a one well enters the undisclosed house./ One who knows of self and what belongs to self/ Comes already out of the world." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 187. "The nature of self and the *buddha*-nature/ Do not differ." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 189. "O good man! The true self about which the Tathāgata speaks today is the *buddha*-nature." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 200.

and exegetic role.¹⁹ And such a teaching can also be found in at least one stanza from the *Sagāthaka* of the LASū:

And the embryo(/essence) of a *tathāgata* is [only] to be cognized through [one's] personal cognition; it is the [true] self [and] is characterized by purity; it is beyond the domain of the reasoners.²⁰

1.1.2.2.1. To the best of our knowledge, neither did the Buddhist scholiasts ever criticise this identification as the outcome of a substantialist heresy nor did the non-Buddhists unmask it as a Buddhist recognition of the self. As pointed out by Zimmermann (2002: 83, fn. 175), however, the LASū contains at least one important statement to the effect that the proponents of the *buddha*-nature were aware of the risk of being accused of siding with the allodoxes. Those advocating the *buddha*-nature consequently felt compelled to provide hermeneutic strategies in order to neutralize such (at least potential) reproaches.²¹ Here is the famous passage presenting Mahāmati's question to the Buddha:

Then the *bodhisattva*, the great being Mahāmati said the following to the Blessed One: "But in a *sūtra*-passage, the Blessed One has expounded the *tathāgata*garbha. And [there] you have, so it is said (*kila*), presented this [*tathāgata*garbha] as [being] pure of all eternity due to [its] naturally radiant purity; [there,] the Blessed One has presented [this *tathāgata*garbha] as the bearer of the thirty two characteristics [of a great being], as contained in the body of all sentient beings, as enwrapped in the cover of the [five] constituents, [eighteen] elements and [twelve sensory] bases – just as a jewel of great price and value is enwrapped in a polluted cover –, as overpowered by desire,

¹⁹ See below, §1.1.2.3.

²⁰ LASū 10.746: *pratyātmagatigamyāś ca ātmā vai śuddhilakṣaṇaḥ / garbhas tathāgatasyāsau tārikikāṇām agocaraḥ* //. Needless to say, this stanza is liable to several interpretations. Note also LASū 10.760: *yathā hi garbho garbhīṇyām^a vidyate na ca dṛśyate / ātmā hi tadvat skandheṣv ayuktijñā na paśyati* //. [^a *garbhīṇyām* em. : *garbhīṇyā* Ed.] "For, just as an(/the) embryo exists in a pregnant woman but is not [directly] perceived, the self [exists] in the constituents, [although] he who does not know [the right ways of] reasoning (*ayuktijñā*) does not see [it]." Note that according to the LASū, the *tathāgata*garbha is to be equated with the *ālayavijñāna* (see, e.g., LASū 221,12–13: *tathāgata*garbhasaṃśabdita ālayavijñāne; LASū 222,9–10: *ālayavijñānasamśabditas tathāgata*garbhaḥ); see Brown 1991: 179–185.

²¹ On these hermeneutic strategies regarding the self, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 17–55 (= Chapter 1).

aversion and delusion and polluted by the filth of [false] imagination, as permanent, enduring, peaceful and eternal. In which sense (*katham*), then, O Blessed One, does this doctrine of the *tathāgata* differ from the outsiders' doctrine(s) of the self? [For,] O Blessed One, the outsiders too teach (a) doctrine(s) of the self [which present(s) it] as an agent [that is] permanent, devoid of qualities, all-pervading [and] imperishable."²²

Thus according to Mahāmati, the *tathāgata* doctrine spelt out in other *sūtras* (one may think here of the ŚMDSNSū and the MPSū) comes very close to the outsiders' *ātman* theory in construing the *buddha*-nature as a bearer of – and maybe an agent behind – psycho-physical reality, as the locus of auspicious qualities, as naturally pure and radiant in spite of its being wrapped up in and polluted by adventitious defilements, and as permanent, enduring and eternal. Here is the Buddha's suggestive reply to Mahāmati's question:

The Blessed One said: "O Mahāmati, my teaching of the *tathāgata* does indeed differ from the outsiders' doctrine(s) of the self. Rather, O Mahāmati, the *tathāgatas* teach [that] the meaning of words (*padārtha* : *tshig gi don*) such as 'emptiness,' 'tetralemma,' '*nirvāṇa*,' 'non-origination,' 'signless' and 'unfocused' is the *tathāgata*, O Mahāmati; [and in so doing,] the *tathāgatas*, *arhats* [and] perfectly awakened ones teach something (*gocara*) non-conceptual and non-phenomenal (*nirābhāsa*) by means of (*mukhopadeśena*) the *tathāgata* so that the immature [beings] may get rid of the state of being terrified by selflessness. But the *bodhisattvas*, the great beings which belong to the future and the present should not, O Mahāmati, take this [*tathāgata*] for the self. For example, O Mahāmati, a potter produces various

²² LASū 77,13–78,4: *atha khalu mahāmatir bodhisattvo mahāsattvo bhagavantam etad avocāt / tathāgataḥ punar bhagavatā sūtrāntapāṭhe 'nuvarṇitaḥ / sa ca kila tvayā prakṛtiprabhāsvavaraviśuddhyādiviśuddha eva varṇyate / dvātriṃśallakṣaṇadharaḥ sarvasattvadehāntargato mahārghamūlyaratnaṃ malina^avastra^bpariveṣṭitam iva skandhadhātvaśāśvatā^c bhagavatā varṇitaḥ / tat katham ayaṃ bhagavaṃs tīrthakarātmavādatulyas tathāgataḥ bhavādo na bhavati / tīrthakarāpi bhagavan nityaḥ kartā nirguṇo vibhūr avyaya ity ātmavādopadarśanaṃ kurvanti /* [^a *ratnaṃ malina*° em. : *raktamalina*° Ed. ^b *vastra*° em. (Tib. *gos*) : *vastu*° Ed. ^c *rāga dveṣamohābhūtaparikalpamalamalino* em. (Tib. *'dod chags dan ṣe sdañ dan gti mug gis zil gyis non pa yōṅs su rtog pa'i dri mas dri ma can du gyur pa*) : *rāga dveṣamohābhūtaparikalpamalamalino* Ed.] This passage is quoted by Candrakīrti in MAV 196,12–197,5.

vessels out of a single mass of earth particles (*paramāṇu*), [and this] by means of [his] hands, art, stick, water, thread and effort. In the same way, O Mahāmati, the *tathāgatas* teach this very selflessness of the *dharma*s, which is beyond all the characteristics of conceptual construction, either by teaching the embryo [of a *tathāgata*] or by teaching selflessness, as the potter [does], by way of various lexical and phonetic modalities conforming to insight and skill in means. For this reason, O Mahāmati, the teaching of the *tathāgata-garbha* differs from the outsiders' teaching of the self. Thus by teaching the *tathāgatagarbha*, [the *tathāgatas*] teach (*°upadeśena nirdiśanti*) the *tathāgatagarbha* in order to attract the outsiders who adhere to the doctrine(s) of the self. How indeed could they quickly awaken to the supreme perfect awakening, [those persons] whose thought (*āśaya*) has fallen into the false view [consisting in] the erroneous concept of the self [and] who possess a thought that has fallen from the domain of the three [doors to] liberation? It is for this purpose, O Mahāmati, that the *tathāgatas*, *arhats* [and] perfectly awakened ones teach the *tathāgatagarbha*. Therefore, this [teaching of theirs] differs from the outsiders' doctrine(s) of the self. And hence, O Mahāmati, you ought to follow selflessness which is [nothing but] the *tathāgata-garbha* in order to go beyond the outsiders' false view(s)." Then, on this occasion, the Blessed One spoke the following stanza: "The person, the series, the constituents, the conditions, the atoms, matter, God, the agent, [all those] are conceived as mind-only."²³

²³ LASū 78,5–79,9: *bhagavān āha / na hi mahāmate tīrthakarātmavādatulyo mama tathāgatagarbhopadeśaḥ / kiṃ tu mahāmate tathāgatāḥ śūnyatābhūtakoṭinirvāṇānutpādānimittāpraṇihitādyānām mahāmate padārthhānām tathāgatagarbhopadeśaḥ kṛtvā tathāgatā arhantaḥ samyaksambuddhā bālānām nairātmyasantrāsapada-vivarjanārthaṃ^a nirvikalpaka^bnirābhāsagocaraṃ tathāgatagarbha mukhopadeśena deśayanti / na cātra mahāmate 'nāgatapratyutpannaḥ bodhisattvair mahāsattvair ātmābhīniveśaḥ kartavyaḥ / tad yathā mahāmate kumbhakāra ekasmān mṛtparamāṇurāśer vividhāni bhāṇḍāni karoti hastaśilpadaṇḍodakasūtraprayatnayogāt / evam eva mahāmate tathāgatās tad eva dharmanairātmyaṃ sarvavikalpalakṣaṇa-vinivṛttaṃ vividhaiḥ prajñopāyakaśālyayogair garbhopadeśena^c vā nairātmyopadeśena vā kumbhakāravac citraiḥ padavyaṇjanaparyāyair deśayante / etasmāt kāraṇān mahāmate tīrthakarātmavādo padeśatulyas tathāgatagarbhopadeśo na bhavati / evaṃ hi mahāmate tathāgatagarbhopadeśam ātmavādābhīniviṣṭānām tīrthakarāṇām ākarṣaṇārthaṃ tathāgatagarbhopadeśena nirdiśanti^d / katham vatābhūtātmavikalpadṛṣṭipatitāśayā vimokṣatrayagocarapatitāśayopetāḥ kṣipram anuttarām abhisambodhim abhisambudhyerann iti / etadārthaṃ mahāmate tathāgatā arhantaḥ samyaksambuddhās tathāgatagarbhopadeśaṃ kurvanti / ata etan na bha-*

1.1.2.2.2. Ordinary persons and outsiders alike stick to erroneous conceptions of the self and are at odds with the apparently nihilistic doctrine of selflessness. Both in order to alleviate their fear of selflessness and to attract them to (Mahāyāna) Buddhism, the *buddhas* teach the purportedly substantialist doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha*. In other words, the *tathāgatagarbha* dispensation is nothing but a rhetorical device reflecting skill in means and designed primarily to proselytize (*ākarṣaṇa*) the non-Buddhists. Such was also Bhāviveka's and Candrakīrti's overall interpretation of the *buddha*-nature teachings.²⁴ Paradigmatic instances of this proselytic concern are already to be found in some of the Mahāyānist MPSū's own statements regarding the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, most notably in a dialogue between the Buddha and (the) six allodox masters:

What is called "self" is the *tathāgata*. Why is it so? The [*buddha*]-Body (*sku*) being infinite is free from the blemish of doubt, and it neither acts nor grasps, so that it is said to be "permanent." In virtue of non-production and non-cessation (*anutpāda*, *anirodha*) it is said to be "blissful" (*sukha*). In virtue of the absence of the impurities of *kleśa* it is said to be "very pure" (*pariśuddha*, *viśuddha*). In virtue of the absence of ten marks, it is said to be "Empty"

vati tīrthakarātmavādatulyam / tasmāt tarhi mahāmate tīrthakaradṛṣṭivivṛttyartham tathāgatānairātmyagarbhānusāriṇā^e ca te bhavitavyam / atha khalu bhagavāms tasyām velāyām imām gāthām abhāṣata / pudgalaḥ santatiḥ skandhāḥ pratyayā anavas tathā / pradhānam īśvaraḥ kartā cittamātram vikalpyate // [^a °vivarjanārtham em. (Editor's variant in fn. 4, p. 78) : °vivarjitārtham Ed. ^b Note Tib. rnam par mi rtog pa'i gnas (*nirvikalpapakapada?) for nirvikalpaka° Ed. ^c Note Tib. de bžin gśegs pa'i sñiñ por bstan pa (*tathāgatagarbhopadeśena) for garbhopadeśena Ed. ^d Note Tib. blo gros chen po de ltar de bžin gśegs pa rnam kyī mu stegs byed bdag tu smra ba la mñon par žen pa rnam drañ ba'i phyir de bžin gśegs pa'i sñiñ por bstan pas de bžin gśegs pa'i sñiñ po ston te /. ^e tathāgatagarbhanairātmyānusāriṇā em. (Tib. de bžin gśegs pa'i sñiñ po bdag med pa'i rjes su 'jug pa) : tathāgatānairātmyagarbhānusāriṇā Ed.] This passage is quoted by Candrakīrti in MAV 197,5–198,10.

²⁴ After quoting the LASū passages considered above (see fn. 22, p. 45, and fn. 23, p. 46), Candrakīrti explains (MAV 198,13–16) that *sūtra* texts such as these, although they are interpreted by the Vijñānavādins as of definitive meaning (*nītārtha*), contain in fact explicit statements to the effect that they ought to be understood as being of an intentional meaning (*neyārtha*); on this point, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 27–28. For a similar strategy in Bhāviveka's TJ (169a7–b6), see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 28 and 40; for a brief discussion of, and references to, Tsoñ kha pa's and Bu ston's attitudes, see respectively Williams 2009: 113 and Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 22–23, fn. 9.

(*śūnya*). Consequently, the *tathāgata* is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, Empty and without marks. – The *tīrthikas* [then] said: “If the *tathāgata* is Empty because he/it is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, and without marks, this is indeed so! And knowing that the *dharma* taught by Gautama is also not Empty (*stoñ pa ma yin pa*), we accept and retain it.” Many *tīrthikas* then took to religion in the Teaching of the Buddha with their minds full of faith.²⁵

At an earlier point, the same MPSū records the following dialogue between allodox wandering ascetics and the Buddha:

“If only Gautama did not teach a nihilistic view (*ucchedadṛṣṭi*), we would accept instruction and the discipline (*śīla*) from him.” – [The Buddha thereupon observes:] “I then knew the thoughts of these wandering ascetics (*parivṛājakas*) [...] I said to them: ‘Why do you think that I teach a nihilistic view?’ – The wandering ascetics answered: ‘Gautama, in all the *sūtras* you have said that there is no self in all living beings. If you thus say that no self exists, how can that not be a nihilistic view? If no self exists, who will bind himself by discipline and who will infringe it?’ – Bhagavat replied: ‘I have not said that no self exists in all living beings. If I have always said that the *buddha*-nature (*sañs rgyas kyi rañ bžin*) exists in all living beings, is this very *buddha*-nature then not the self? Thus I do not teach a nihilistic theory. If, because one does not see the *buddha*-nature of all sentient beings, one asserts the not permanent, the not self, the not blissful, and the not very pure, it is said that one teaches nihilism.’” Then, after the ascetics had heard the explanation that this *buddha*-nature is self, they all produced the thought (*citta*) directed toward supreme and perfect Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*). And having at that moment entered religious life (*parivraj-*), they exerted themselves on the path of Awakening (*bodhimārga*) [...] This *buddha*-nature

²⁵ MPSū Ņu 151b2–5: *gañ bdag ces bya ba de ni de bžin gšegs pa yin no // de ci'i phyir že na / sku mtha' yas pa the tshom gyi dra ba med pa / mi byed mi len pa'i phyir rtag pa zes bya / mi skye mi 'gog pa'i phyir bde ba zes bya / ñon moñs pa'i dri ma med pa'i phyir yoñs su dag pa zes bya / mtshan ñid bcu med pa'i phyir stoñ pa zes bya ste / de bas na de bžin gšegs pa ni rtag pa dañ bde ba dañ bdag dañ yoñs su dag pa / stoñ pa / mtshan ma med pa'o // mu stegs can gyis gsol ba / gal te de bžin gšegs pa rtag pa dañ bde ba dañ bdag dañ yoñs su dag pa dañ mtshan ma med pa'i phyir stoñ na lta / gau ta mas gsuñs pa'i chos kyañ stoñ pa ma yin par rig ste / de bas na bdag cag gis spyi bos blañs te bzuñs su gzuñ ño zes gsol nas de'i tshe mu stegs can tshad med pa rnams sañs rgyas kyi bstan pa la dad pa'i sems kyi rab tu byuñ ño //*. Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 22.

is not in reality *ātman*, and it is for the sake of sentient beings that a self is spoken of. Whereas in virtue of the existence of causes and conditions the Tathāgata has spoken of not-self (*bdag med pa*) as self, in reality there is no self. Though he has spoken thus, this was no untruth either. It is because of the existence of causes and conditions that it is said that the self is not-self. Whereas self exists in reality, it is with a view to the world of living beings (*loka*) that it has been said that there is no self. But that was no untruth. The *buddha*-nature is not-self (*bdag med de*); and if the Tathāgata has spoken of “self,” this is because a designation has been employed (*btags pa yin pa'i phyir*).²⁶

Whatever their historical relevance, these narratives and dialogues would seem to give weight to Zimmermann's hypothesis that in the TGSū,

[o]ne of the authors' goals may have been to widen the circle of Mahāyāna followers by announcing that non-Mahāyāna Buddhists and even non-Budd-

²⁶ MPSū Ņu 96b6–97a8: *gal te gau ta ma 'di chad par lta ba mi ston na bdag cag de la luñ dañ tshul khriṃs mnod do źes smras so // [...] kun du rgyu de dag gi bsaṃ pa mkhyen nas kun du rgyu de dag la 'di skad ces bka' stsal to // ci'i phyir na la chad par lta ba ston pa yin no sñam du sems / kun du rgyu de dag gis gsol ba / gau ta ma khyod kyis mdo sde kun las sems can thams cad la bdag med do źes bśad de / de ltar bdag med do źes bśad na ci'i phyir chad par lta ba ma yin / gal te bdag med na gañ gis tshul khriṃs sdom žiñ gañ gis tshul khriṃs bśig par 'gyur / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / des ni sems can thams cad la bdag med do źes ma bśad do // nas ni rtag tu sems can thams cad la sañs rgyas kyī rañ bžin yod do źes bśad na sañs rgyas kyī rañ bžin de ñid bdag ma yin nam / don de lta bas na na chad par lta ba mi ston te / sems can thams cad kyī sañs rgyas kyī rañ bžin ma mthoñ bas rtag pa med pa dañ bdag med pa dañ bde ba med pa dañ yoñs su dag pa med de / gañ de skad du smra ba de ni chad par lta ba ston pa źes bya'o // de'i tshe kun du rgyu de dag sañs rgyas kyī rañ bžin ñid bdag yin no źes bśad pa thos nas thams cad bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs pa'i byañ chub tu sems bskyed de / de'i mod la rab tu byuñ nas byañ chub kyī lam la nan tan byed par gyur to // [...] sañs rgyas kyī rañ bžin yañ dag par na bdag ma yin te / sems can kyī phyir bdag ces bśad do // [...] rgyu dañ rkyen yod pa'i phyir de bžin gśegs pas bdag med pa la bdag tu bśad mod kyī yañ dag par na bdag med do // de ltar bśad mod kyī brdzun pa yañ ma yin no // [...] rgyu dañ rkyen yod pas bdag la bdag med par 'chad de yañ dag par na bdag yod kyañ 'jig rten gyi phyir bdag med par bśad mod kyī yañ brdzun pa ma yin no // sañs rgyas kyī rañ bžin ni bdag med de // de bžin gśegs pas bdag ces bśad pa ni btags pa yin pa'i phyir ro //* Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 22–23. On this passage, see also Williams 2009: 108 and Liu 1982: 87–88.

hists were in possession of the *buddha*-nature. In this way, they could count on facilitating their conversion to Mahāyāna.²⁷

At any rate, the *tathāgatagarbha* literature displays sufficient evidence to the effect that the proponents of the doctrine(s) (1) were aware of its/their similarity with the non-Buddhists' theories of a self, (2) tried their best in order to neutralize this suspicion (3) by discarding these accounts (see below, §1.1.2.5, and fn. 47, p. 60) and/or (4) by presenting the *tathāgatagarbha* dispensation as an expedient device. And as we shall see below (§1.1.2.3.1), they also worked out a complex reinterpretation of the four wrong notions (*viparyāsa*).

1.1.2.2.3. Moreover, as noted by Zimmermann again, the TGSū remains entirely silent on emptiness, a fact that accords well with its substantialist leaning. Now, if most of the *tathāgatagarbha* scriptures do in fact elaborate on *śūnyatā*, and at that in a very original way,²⁸ they also consistently present emptiness and selflessness as mere *upāyas* designed to bring one's excessive clinging to (false conceptions of) the self, false

²⁷ Zimmermann 2002: 76. Note also Zimmermann 2002: 15: "One of the motives could thus have been to attract to religious practice hitherto neglected segments of the Buddhist community, or even groups from outside it."

²⁸ On the conceptions of emptiness to be found in *tathāgatagarbha* (and, at least partly, early Yogācāra) literature (later to give rise to the so-called *gāṇi ston*, "other-empty," see first Williams 2009: 112–115), see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 319–328. The most characteristic features of the *tathāgatagarbha* notion of emptiness are encapsulated in RGV 1.154–155: *nāpaneyam ataḥ kiñcid upaneyam na kiñcana / draṣṭavyam bhūtato bhūtaṁ bhūtadarśi vimucyate // śūnya āgantukair dhātuḥ savi-nirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ / aśūnyo 'nuttarair dharmair avinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ //*. "Nothing is to be taken away from it, nothing is to be added to it. The real must be seen as it really is, [and] the one who sees the real is liberated. The [*tathāgata*]-element is empty of [those *dharmas* that] are adventitious [and] characterized as separable, [but] it is not empty of [those] supreme *dharmas* [that are] characterized as inseparable." On this passage, see also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 313, King 1995: 9 and Williams 2009: 111. In short (Williams 2009: 111), "[t]he real meaning of emptiness [...] is that one thing lacks another. What remains, as with the Yogācāra, is really there. In this sense the *buddha*-nature is indeed empty. It is empty of adventitious defilements which simply do not exist at all from the point of view of its own innate purity. On the other hand, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* states that the *tathāgatagarbha* is not empty in the sense that it is itself 'like an illusion.' This suggests that the *tathāgatagarbha* is not (on the Mādhyamika model) empty of its own intrinsic existence." See also King 1995: 10.

views and defilements to quiescence. In other words, if the *tathāgata-garbha* teachings are meant as an expedient device aimed at proselytizing the substantialist non-Buddhists, emptiness and selflessness aim at diverting the “converted” from false conceptions of, and excessive attachment to the self, as well as the concomitant defilements. One of the earliest witnesses to this attitude is the Mahāyānist MPSū, in which the following assertion is found:

All common mortals continuously and one after the other abide in wrong views. In order to cut off wrong views from them, the Tathāgata shows and speaks about no-self.²⁹

Elsewhere, the same text claims:

To save beings, he [= the Tathāgata, VE/IR] gives them the law of no-self. Having thus practised the Way, the beings make away with the mind that clings to self and gain *nirvāṇa*. All this is to make away with the wrong concept of the people, to show them the way and make them stand above, to show them that they stick to self, that what goes in the world is all false and not true, and make them practise no-self and purify their own self.³⁰

A similar doctrine appears in the RGV:

Having thus said that every knowable [thing], wherever it occurs, is in every respect empty [and] similar to a cloud, a dream or a magical creation, why do the *buddhas* say, in this [connection], that there is a *buddha*-element in every living being? [This they have] said so that those who possess the five defects [consisting in having] a dejected mind, despising inferior living beings, be-

²⁹ Translation Yamamoto 1973: 200.

³⁰ Translation Yamamoto 1973: 182. Note also: “One with wisdom discriminates things and does not say that all are non-eternal. Why? Because man possesses the seed of the *buddha*-nature. When no-self is talked about, common mortals say that there must not be self in the Buddhist teaching. One who is wise should know that no-self is a temporary existence and is not true. Knowing thus, one should not have doubt. When the undisclosed *tathāgata-garbha* is stated as empty and quiet, common mortals will think of ceasing and extinction.” Translation Yamamoto 1973: 192. And further: “O World-honoured One! The unholy common mortals possess the nature of common mortals and they say that they possess a self.” Translation Yamamoto 1973: 199.

lieving(/grasping) unreal [things], negating real factors and [having] excessive attachment to the self, may get rid of them.³¹

As we can see, *sūtra* and *śāstra* are in close agreement: emptiness and selflessness must be regarded as provisional means designed to cure false views (*dṛṣṭi*) and wrong notions (*viparyāsa*). But as our sources make clear, *śūnyatā* and *nairātmya* ought, first, not to be clung to, and second, to be reversed/inverted so that one may gain access to the true characteristics of the absolute. We are thus facing a situation in which *both* the substantialist *tathāgatagarbha* teaching *and* selflessness are seen as *upāyas*. This reflects King's "doctrinal tensions" as they find expression in the ŚMDSNSū: on the one hand, the *tathāgatagarbha* is denied the status of a self conceived according to the model of the outsiders';³² on the other hand, it is believed and taught to be characterized by an *ātmapāramitā*.³³

³¹ RGV 1.156–157: *śūnyaṃ sarvaṃ sarvathā tatra tatra jñeyaṃ meghasvapnamāyā-kṛtābhaṃ / ity uktvaivaṃ buddhadhātuh punaḥ kiṃ sattve sattve 'stīti buddhair ihoktam // līnaṃ cittaṃ hīnasattveṣv avajāñbhūtagrāho bhūtheadharmāpavādaḥ / ātmasnehaś cādhiḥ pañca doṣā yeṣāṃ teṣāṃ tatprahāṇārtham uktam //*. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 262 and 317, and Williams 2009: 111–112; see also RGV 2.57, where *nairātmya* is regarded as an *upāya*, and the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* quoted in RGVV 3,15–16 (see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 317–318, fn. 1).

³² ŚMDSNSū (281b4–6): "Lord, the *tathāgatagarbha* is neither self nor sentient being, nor soul, nor personality. The *tathāgatagarbha* is not the domain of beings who fall into the belief in a real personality." Translation Wayman/Wayman 1990: 106; see also King 1995: 3. For the Tibetan text and the broader context of this passage, see below, fn. 49, p. 62.

³³ ŚMDSNSū (280a6–b1, quoted in RGVV 31,2–4): *bcom ldan 'das sems can rnam de bzin gsegs pa la dad pas rtag par 'du śes pa dañ bde bar 'du śes pa dañ bdag tu 'du śes pa dañ gtsaṅ bar 'du śes pa'i sems can dag ni bcom ldan 'das phyin ci log tu 'gyur ba ma lags te / bcom ldan 'das sems can de dag ni yañ dag pa'i lta ba can du 'du 'gyur ba lags so // de ci'i slad du ze na / bcom ldan 'das de bzin gsegs pa'i chos kyi sku ñid rtag pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa dañ bde ba'i pha rol tu phyin pa dañ bdag gi pha rol tu phyin pa dañ gtsaṅ ba'i pha rol tu phyin pa lags pa'i slad du'o //*. "When sentient beings have faith in the Tathāgata and those sentient beings conceive [him] as permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure, they do not go astray. Those sentient beings have the right view. Why so? Because the *dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata has the perfection of permanence, the perfection of pleasure, the perfection of self, the perfection of purity." Translation (modified) Wayman/Wayman 1990: 102; see also King 1995: 3. To be compared with the ŚMDSNSū passage of RGVV 31,2–4, quoted below, fn.

1.1.2.3.1. In order to understand this, we have to take a closer look at a very interesting doctrine that can be found in the Mahāyānist MPSū,³⁴ the ŚMDSNSū and the RGV(V). Relying on the *sūtra* (MPSū) materials, Fujii refers to this doctrine as the “double denial of the four illusions” (1993: 29), while Seyfort Ruegg calls it the theory of the “contrecar-rants par inversion de l’erreur quadruple” (*caturvidhaviparyāsa*[*viparyaya*] *pratipakṣa*, RGV 1.36, RGVV 30,10).³⁵ Let us consider first the following excerpt from the ŚMDSNSū:

[Ordinary] living beings, O Blessed One, are in error (*viparyasta*) with regard to the five constituents which are clung to when [they] cling to them, [for] they identify the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasurable, the selfless as self, [and what is] bad as good. [But,] O Blessed One, all the *śrāvaka*s and *pratyekabuddhas* are no less in error with regard to the Tathāgata’s *dharma*-body, which remains uncognized (*adṛṣṭapūrva*) through(/because of) [their] knowledge of emptiness [and is] the object of an omniscient’s knowledge [only]. Those living beings, O Blessed One, would not be in error who, true sons of the Blessed One, would identify [the Tathāgata’s *dharma*-body] as permanent, self, pleasurable [and] good; these, O Blessed One, would see correctly. – Why? – [Because,] O Blessed One, the very *dharma*-body of the *tathāgatas* possesses the perfection of the permanent, the perfection of the pleasurable, the perfection of the self, [and] the perfection of the good. Those living beings who see the Tathāgata’s *dharma*-body in this way, O Blessed One, see [it] correctly. [And] those who see [it] correctly are the true sons of the Blessed One.³⁶

36, p. 53. On the *ātmapāramitā*, see also Brown 1991: 81–90 (and more generally 72–100 on the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine of the four *pāramitās*).

³⁴ See Fujii 1993.

³⁵ On the four wrong notions/misconceptions (*viparyāsa*), see, e.g., AKBh_{Pr} 283,5–7, Conze 1962, Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 377–380.

³⁶ ŚMDSNSū (280a4–b3, quoted in RGVV 30,19–31,6): *viparyastā bhagavan sattvā upātteṣu pañcasūpādānaskandheṣu / te bhavanty anitye nityasañjñīnaḥ / duḥkhe sukhasañjñīnaḥ / anātmāny ātmasañjñīnaḥ / aśubhe śubhasañjñīnaḥ / sarvaśrāvaka-pratyekabuddhā api bhagavan śūnyatājñānenādṛṣṭapūrve sarvajñajñānaviṣaye tathāgata dharmakāye viparyastāḥ / ye bhagavan sattvāḥ syur bhagavataḥ putrā aurasā nityasañjñīna ātmasañjñīnaḥ sukhasañjñīnaḥ śubhasañjñīnas te bhagavan sattvāḥ syur aviparyastāḥ / syus te bhagavan samyagdarśīnaḥ / tat kasmād dhetoḥ / tathāgata dharmakāya eva bhagavan nityapāramitā sukhapāramitātmāpāramitā śubhapāramitā / ye bhagavan sattvās tathāgata dharmakāyam evaṃ paśyanti te*

As we can see, the *śrāvakas* and the *pratyekabuddhas* are as mistaken with regard to the characteristics of the unconditioned as the ordinary living beings are with regard to the true features of the conditioned. In other words, the *śrāvakas'* and *pratyekabuddhas'* views on reality (impermanence, emptiness, selflessness, painfulness), which are traditionally held to lead to salvation and are contrary to those of the ordinary living beings, are themselves to be counteracted in order to match ultimate reality.³⁷ The RGVV spells it out in a very systematic way:

Identifying (*sañjñā*) an impermanent thing such as corporeality as being permanent (*nityam itī*), a painful [thing] as being pleasurable, a selfless [thing] as being a self, [and] a bad [thing] as being good, this is [what we] call the four wrong notions (*caturvidho viparyāsaḥ*). [Now,] since it is the contrary of these [four wrong notions], the right notion (*aviparyāsa*) itself is fourfold. – What [do these] four [right notions consist of]? – Identifying this very thing, corporeality, etc., as [being] impermanent, painful, selfless, and bad, this is [what we] call the contrary of the four wrong notions. But with reference to the Tathāgata's *dharma*-body, which is characterized as permanent, etc., [we] regard (*abhipreta*) as wrong notions these very [four right notions] whose counterpart (*pratīpakṣa*) constitutes (*vyavasthāpita*) the fourfold (*caturākāra*) perfection of (in) good qualities of the Tathāgata's *dharma*-body, i.e., perfection of the permanent, perfection of the pleasurable, perfection of the self, [and] perfection of the good.³⁸

samyak paśyanti / ye samyak paśyanti te bhagavataḥ putrā aurasāḥ [...] /. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 269 and 365–366, and Bhattacharya 1973: 5–6.

³⁷ Note Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 311 (following RGVV 74,5–76,17): “Suivant la RGVV (1.153) les facteurs qui entravent la compréhension (*adhiḡama*) de la Réalité sont la chute dans la vue personnaliste (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*), l'attachement à l'erreur (*viparyāsa*), et la perturbation de l'esprit par (la vue spéculative, *dr̥ṣṭi*, relative à) la *śūnyatā*; ainsi les personnes ordinaires engouées de la *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, les *śrāvaka* et les *pratyekabuddha* attachés aux notions de l'impermanence, du non-soi, de la douleur, et de l'impur, et les jeunes *bodhisattva* qui ne connaissent pas encore le véritable sens profond de la Vacuité n'arrivent pas – temporairement – à comprendre la Réalité.”

³⁸ RGVV 30,11–18: *yā rūpādike vastuny anitye nityam iti sañjñā / duḥkhe sukham iti / anātmāny ātmeti / aśubhe śubham iti sañjñā / ayam ucyate caturvidho viparyāsaḥ / etadviparyayeṇa caturvidha evāviparyāso veditavyaḥ / katamaś caturvidhaḥ / yā tasminn eva rūpādike vastuny anityasañjñā / duḥkhasañjñā / anātmasañjñā / aśubhasañjñā / ayam ucyate caturvidhaviparyāsaviparyayaḥ / sa khalv eṣa nityādila-*

The “double denial of four illusions” consists, then, in rejecting both the outsiders’ and the *śrāvakas/pratyekabuddhas*’ conceptions of reality as erroneous. Note that this does not amount to reverting to the ordinary persons’ wrong notions, for, as we shall see below, the true characterization of the absolute as a self has nothing in common with the outsiders’ speculations on the *ātman*.

1.1.2.3.2. As we have seen, the Tathāgata’s body of the law is characterized by four perfections of(/in) good qualities (*guṇapāramitā*) – permanent, pleasurable, self, good. Now, the realization (*adhigama*) of these perfections, which amounts to the purification of one’s *tathāgatadhātu*, is the result (*phala*) of four kinds of cultivation (*bhāvanā*) that are presented as the four properties (*dharma*) of a *bodhisattva*’s soteric practice and as counteracting the characteristic attitudes and wrong notions of four kinds of persons – *icchantikas*³⁹ (*śuciviparyāsa*), outsiders (*ātmaviparyāsa*), *śrāvaka(yānika)s* (*sukhaviparyāsa*), and *pratyekabuddha(yāniya)s* (*nityaviparyāsa*). By cultivating faithful conviction (*adhimuktī*) in the Mahāyānistic law (*mahāyānadharma*), a *bodhisattva* counteracts the delight (*abhiratī*) in the impure (*aśuci*) *saṃsāra* that is characteristic of the *icchantikas* (who are hostile to the *mahāyānadharma*) and realizes the *śubhapāramitā* (RGVV 31,8–10). By cultivating the perfection of insight (*prajñāpāramitā*), a *bodhisattva* counteracts the delight of believing in an unreal self (*asadātmagraha*) that is characteristic of the outsiders (*anyatīrthya*, who see a self in the five constituents that are clung to – *pañcasūpādānaskandheṣv ātmadarśinām*), and realizes the *ātmāpāramitā* (RGVV 31,10–16). By cultivating psychic concentrations, a *bodhisattva* counteracts delight in the mere cessation of *saṃsāric* suffering (*saṃsāraduḥkhopaśamamātra*) that is characteristic of the *śrāvakas* (who are afraid of suffering in *saṃsāra* – *saṃsāraduḥkhabhīru*) and realizes the *sukhapāramitā* (RGVV 31,16–32,2). Finally, by cultivating great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), a *bodhisattva* counteracts delight in loneliness (*asaṃsargavihā-*

kṣaṇam tathāgatadharmakāyam adhikṛtyeḥa viparyāso ’bhipreto yasya pratipakṣeṇa caturākārā tathāgatadharmakāyaguṇapāramitā vyavasthāpitā / tad yathā nityapāramitā sukhapāramitātmāpāramitā śubhapāramiteti /. See also Seyfort Rugg 1969: 365 and Bhattacharya 1973: 5.

³⁹ On the *icchantikas* or “no-hoppers” (Williams 2009: 107), “decadents” (Williams 2009: 98), see Seyfort Rugg 1969: 75–76, Liu 1984 and Karashima 2006.

ra), which is characteristic of the *pratyekabuddhas* (who are indifferent to the good of ordinary living beings – *sattvārthanirapekṣa*) and realizes the *nityapāramitā* (“because from the origin of *saṃsāra*, he is constantly and uninterruptedly attached to [his] eagerness for the good of [all] living beings”⁴⁰).

1.1.2.4. The reversal of the wrong notions that are characteristic of the *śrāvakas* and the *pratyekabuddhas* (*nairātmya* → *ātman*) does not amount to a return to, or a recognition of, the outsiders’ views on the self. Consider the following passage from the RGVV:

All the outsiders indeed regard a thing such as corporeality, which does not have this nature, as a self. But this thing is invariably (*sarvakālam*) not a self, for it is contradicted by the definition of the self as it is recognized by these [outsiders]. On the contrary, the Tathāgata has reached the other(/opposite) shore of the selflessness of all factors thanks to [his] objective knowledge. And since this selflessness is not contradicted by the definition of the self as he perceives it, it is invariably admitted to be the self, for it is selflessness that is called the self, as one says “fixed on account of non-fixation.”⁴¹

As we have seen, the outsiders regard the self as existing in the constituents, i.e., take real things (*vastu*) such as corporeality to be the self, and speculate on its nature and even its size.⁴² Now according to the

⁴⁰ RGVV 32,2–5: *satatasamitam ā saṃsārāt sattvārthapaligodhupaliguddhatvāt* / . [^a *paligodhupaliguddhatvāt* em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : *phaligodhapariśuddhatvāt* Ed.] On *paligodha* and *paliguddha*, see BHSD 337b s.v.

⁴¹ RGVV 31,12–16: *sarve hy anyatīrthyā rūpādikam atatsvabhāvaṃ vastv ātmety upagatāḥ / tac caiṣaṃ vastu yathāgraham ātmalakṣaṇena viśaṃvāditatvāt*^a *sarvakālam anātmā / tathāgataḥ punar yathābhūtajñānena sarvadarmanairātmyaparapāram abhiprāptaḥ / tac cāsyā nairātmyam ātmalakṣaṇena*^b *yathādarśanam a viśaṃvāditvāt*^c *sarvakālam ātmābhipreto nairātmyam evātmety*^d *kṛtvā / yathoktaṃ sthito ’sthānayogeneti* / . [^a *viśaṃvāditatvāt* em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : *viśaṃvāditvāt* Ed. ^b *ātmalakṣaṇena* em. (Bhattacharya 1973: 6, fn. 5) : *anātmalakṣaṇena* Ed., Tib. ^c To be read *viśaṃvāditatvāt* (see Schmithausen 1971: 143)? ^d *ātmety* em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : *ātmani* Ed.] On this passage, see also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 366–367, Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 24–25 and Bhattacharya 1973: 6; on (*su*)*sthito* ’*sthānayogena* (“standing by way of no standing,” Williams 2009: 112), see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 367, fn. 1 and Bhattacharya 1973: 6, fn. 6.

⁴² Note Fujii 1993: 29: “[T]he *sūtra* says the past *anātmanvāda* [sic] was only an *upāya* to eliminate the wrong thought about the *ātman* which is common in the ordinary world, but in the fact the *ātman* exists originally. Then what is difference

RGVV, this does not even conform to these outsiders' versions of the self (which may be tentatively held to include properties such as permanence and all-pervasiveness⁴³). Rather, what *does* conform to the true definition of the self is nothing but selflessness.⁴⁴ But does such a

between the *ātman* the *sūtra* asserts and the one non-buddhist philosophers assert? The *sūtra* says that the *ātman* the Buddha preaches is not like the ordinary thought, for example, the *ātman* is like a poppy seed or largeness of one's thumb and so on." According to MSAVBh *Tsi* D177a6/P208b1–2, although the living beings (**sattva*) cultivate the view of a self (**ātmadr̥ṣṭi*) and are only familiar with the self through its name (**nāmamātra*), they cannot reach liberation (**mokṣa*; **apavarga*; **nirvāṇa*) because they do not really see the self, which has the size of a thumb (**aṅguṣṭhamātra*) or the size of a mustard-seed (**sarṣapamātra*). The Blessed One has taught the *pudgala* so that the living beings, by seeing this tiny self, may achieve liberation. Sthiramati alludes here to Upaniṣadic speculations about the size of the *ātman*: *aṅguṣṭhamātra* in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 4.12; *sarṣapa* in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.14.3. For a similar discussion in the context of the polemic against the Pudgalavādin, see *Traité* II.744 and fn. 1; on *sarṣapa*, see also Venkataramanan 1953: 189.

⁴³ See above, fn. 22, p.45.

⁴⁴ Note that the MPSū and the RGV(V) are by no means the only Buddhist texts emphasizing the identity or at least correlation between selflessness and the self (see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 370–377). This is notoriously the case of MSA 9.23: *śū-nyatāyām viśuddhāyām nairātmyātmāgralābhataḥ / buddhāḥ śuddhātmalābhitvād gatā ātmamahātmatām* //. "In pure emptiness(once emptiness has been purified), [the *buddhas*] obtain the supreme self [consisting] of selflessness; therefore, since they obtain a pure self, the *buddhas* reach the greatness of the self." See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 371 and Bhattacharya 1973: 4. MSABh 38,1–4 ad loc.: *tatra cānāsrave dhātau buddhānām paramātmā nirdiśyate / kiṃ kāraṇam / agranairātmyātmakativāt / agraṃ nairātmyam viśuddhā tathatā sā ca buddhānām ātmā svabhāvārthena tasyām viśuddhāyām agraṃ nairātmyam ātmānam buddhā labhante śuddham / ataḥ śuddhātmalābhitvād buddhā ātmamahātmyam prāptāḥ* [...]. [° Note MSAVBh *Mi* D119a4: *bdag med pa'i mchog thob pa'i phyir.*] "And here is taught the *buddhas*' supreme (*parama*) self in the undefiled element. – Why [is this self supreme]? – Because it consists (*ātmaka*) in the supreme (*agra*) selflessness. The supreme selflessness is [nothing but] the pure (*viśuddha*) thusness, and this [pure thusness] is the self of the *buddhas* in the sense of their own-being. [And] once it is purified (*viśuddha*), the *buddhas* obtain the supreme selflessness, [their] pure (*śuddha*) self. Therefore, because they obtain [their] pure self, the *buddhas* reach the greatness of the self." See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 371 and Bhattacharya 1973: 4. According to Sthiramati (MSAVBh *Mi* D119a4–5), "supreme selflessness" is to be understood as including both *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya*. Note also Sthiramati's (MSAVBh *Mi* D119a5–7) explanation of "self": *bdag ces bya ba'i sgra 'di ni skabs gcig tu mu stegs pas yonṣ su brtags pa'i bdag ñid la yaṅ bya bar 'dren te / 'di ltar bdag dan*

teaching amount to a positive or “kataphatic” (Seyfort Ruegg) description of the absolute? Certainly not, granting the RGV’s definition of the four *guṇapāramitās*:

Indeed, the [Tathāgata’s *dharma*-body] is pure (*śuci*) because it is naturally pure (*śuddha*) [and] because of the elimination of the impregnations; it is the supreme self because [in it] the [conceptual] proliferation [positing] self and selflessness has come to complete quiescence; it is pleasurable because of the cessation of the mental constituents and their causes; [finally,] it is permanent because of the penetration into the equality of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.⁴⁵

In other words, the purpose of the RGV(V) might well be, not to hypos-tasize selflessness, but to account for the absolute in a paradoxical or apophatic way: far from substituting a positive (supreme) self to selflessness, the RGV(V) seems to “indicate” the absolute as transcending the purely conceptual distinction between self and selflessness, thus emphasizing non-duality (*advaya*, beyond conceptually constructed dichotomies) and the middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*).⁴⁶

sems can dan srog ces bya ba la sogs pa'o // bdag ces bya ba'i sgra 'di ni skabs gcig tu chos kyī rañ bžin la yañ bya bar 'dren te / me ni dro ba'i mtshan ñid ces bya ste / dro ba'i rañ bžin žes bya ba'i don to // sa sra ba'i bdag ñid ces bya ba bśad na / sra ba'i rañ bžin žes bya ba'i don to // 'di'i skabs bdag ces bya ba'i sgra rañ bžin gi don du drañ ste / sañs rgyas rñams ni bdag med pa'i rañ bžin du gyur pas bdag gi mchog thob pa žes bya'o //. “The word ‘self’ [can] be employed in the sense of the self that is postulated (**parikalpita*) by the outsiders, as [in] ‘self,’ ‘[substantial] living being’ (**sattva*), ‘life principle’ (**jīva*), etc. [But] the word ‘self’ [can] also be employed in the sense of the nature (**svabhāva*?) of the factors (**dharma*): ‘Fire has heat for [its] characteristic (**uṣmalakṣaṇa*?)’ means that it has heat for [its] nature (**uṣma-svabhāva*?). [In the same way,] to say that earth consists in solidity (**kharātmaka*?) means that it has solidity for [its] nature (**kharasvabhāva*?). In the present context, ‘self’ has the meaning of ‘nature’ (**svabhāvārtha*): since they partake of the nature of selflessness, the *buddhas* obtain the supreme self.” On the characteristics/natures of the four great elements, see below, fn. 95–96, p. 74.

⁴⁵ RGV 1.37–38: *sa hi prakṛtiśuddhatvād vāsanāpagamāc chuciḥ / paramātmātmā-nairātmyaprapañcavyupa^aśāntitaḥ // sukho manomayaskandhataddhetuvinivṛtti-taḥ / nityaḥ saṃsāranirvāṇasamatāprativedhataḥ //*. [^a °vyupa° em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : °kṣaya° Ed.] See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 250–251 and 369.

⁴⁶ Regarding the Mahāyānist MPSū, note Fujii 1993: 29: “Thus the *sūtra* asserts the *ātman* positively, but at the same time takes cautions against the view leading to one extreme, namely, *ātman-vāda* or *anātman-vāda*. So the *sūtra* explains an identity between *ātman* and *anātman*. The *sūtra* says the *ātman* is nothing but the

1.1.2.5. The *tathāgatagarbha* literature bears strong overtones of a substantialist account of human nature, salvation, and the absolute. The *buddha*-nature is regularly described in terms of (supreme) self; key Buddhist concepts such as emptiness and selflessness either play a marginal role, or are relegated to mere expedient devices, or reworked so as to allow for seemingly positive descriptions of the absolute; the most prominent *sūtras* and *śāstras* of this tradition do not hesitate to claim for a relativization, and more often than not an *Aufhebung*, of the traditional Buddhist doctrine of the four wrong notions. But by defin-

anātman and the *anātman* is also nothing but the *ātman*, and by transcending the two extremes one can realize the middle path.” Note also the Mahāyānist MPSū’s (526a2–6) interesting use of the tetralemma in this connection: “Good sons! The *buddha*-nature is matter, non-matter, and neither matter nor non-matter. It is with marks, without marks, and neither with marks nor without marks. It is one, not one, and neither one nor not one. It is neither permanent, nor impermanent, nor neither permanent nor impermanent. It is being, non-being, and neither being nor non-being. It is finite, infinite, and neither finite nor infinite. It is cause, effect, and neither cause nor effect.” Translation Liu 1962: 69. Note also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 369: “Cette notion des *pāramitā* dont le *dharmakāya* se ‘constitue’ (*prabhāvita*) est donc remarquable puisqu’elle paraît aboutir elle aussi à une conception positive et quasi substantialiste de l’Absolu. Mais il ne semble pas que ces *pāramitā* soient des attributs concrets qualifiant un absolu hypostasié et substantiel puisqu’elles se posent par un procédé d’inversion qui contrecarre la méprise consistant à traiter le *dharmakāya* comme un quelconque *dharma* mondain; et elles se présentent par conséquent simplement comme le contraire de ce qui, sur le plan mondain, a constitué la méprise quadruple [...] Dans ces conditions, il serait difficile de soutenir que le *paramātman* du RGV (1.37) est un *ātman* existant en soi comme une entité, car il répond précisément à la tranquillité (*śānti*) qui résulte de l’épuisement du développement discursif consistant en la dichotomie du soi et du non-soi (1.37). Et si l’on a parlé d’un tel *paramātman* ‘en faisant du *nairātmya* un soi’ (*nairātmyam ātmani kṛtvā* [see above, fn. 41^d, p. 56, VE/IR]), cette façon de parler – comme l’énoncé antiphrastique de la Prajñāpāramitā ‘fixé sous le rapport de la non-fixation’ (*susthito ’sthānayogena*) – est employée précisément parce qu’elle tient au paradoxe; c’est d’ailleurs ainsi qu’elle fait ressortir la nature vraiment inexprimable de l’Absolu incomposé (*asaṃskṛta*), qu’on regarde, dans le ‘discursus’, comme le contraire du composé (*saṃskṛta*).” Note also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 376: “De ces considérations il semble ressortir qu’il n’est pas question, dans les textes faisant état du *nitya* et de l’*ātman*, d’un enseignement de tendance nécessairement substantialiste ou quasi vedântique qui, en se donnant pour supérieur à l’enseignement bouddhique fondamental de l’impermanence et du *nairātmya*, chercherait à se substituer à celui-ci, mais bien plutôt d’un procédé servant à ‘indiquer’ la Réalité inexprimable.” On the middle way, see also below, §1.1.2.5.

ing the (supreme) self in terms of selflessness, both *sūtra* and *śāstra* sources seem to advocate a paradoxical and apophatic approach to the absolute rather than a purely substantialist one. Whatever the case may be, however, it seems nearly certain that the proponents of the *tathāgatagarbha* did not hold the strongest and allegedly “definitive” versions of emptiness and selflessness to provide a satisfactory account of human experience and the unconditioned. In order to make their point, they developed new conceptions of the relationships between conditioned and unconditioned reality, trying to show that true descriptions of the latter were beyond the mere negation of ordinary views concerning the former. In so doing, they endeavoured to conceptualize their *buddha*-nature in such a way that it could be true to the old Buddhist ideal of the middle way between annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*), viz. negating or affirming (the positive existence of) a self, and even provided arguments for it:

If what is called “self” were an eternally permanent (*kūṭasthanīya*) *dharma*, there would be no freedom from suffering (*duḥkha*). And if what is called “self” did not exist, pure religious conduct (*brahmacarya*) would be of no avail [...] It is to be known that the *buddha*-nature is the middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*) altogether free from the two extremes (*antadvaya*) [...] Non-duality is reality: by nature self and not-self are without duality (*gñis su med pa*). The Lord Buddha has thus affirmed that the meaning of the *tathāgatagarbha* is unfathomable [...] In the *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra* also I have already taught that self and not-self are without duality by characteristic.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ MPSū Ju 126b1–2, 126b8–127a1, 128a3, 128a6: *ci ste bdag ces bya ba ther zug du rtag pa'i chos yin na ni sdug bsñal dan bral bar mi 'gyur ro // gal te bdag ces bya ba med na ni tshañs par spyod pa dag phan 'dogs med par 'gyur ro // [...] sañs rgyas kyi rañ bñin ni lam dbu ma mtha' gñis dan yoñs su bral ba yin par rig par bya'o // [...] gñis su med pa ñid ni yañ dag pa ñid do // de bñin gśegs pa'i sñiñ po'i don ni de ltar dpag tu med [...] sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyis yoñs su bsdags pa [...] ñas sñon 'phags pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa chen po'i mdo las kyañ bdag dan bdag med pa'i mtshan ñid kyis gñis su med par bstan to //*. Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 23–24. Note also MPSū Ņu 92a1–2: *thams cad stoñ par mthoñ la / stoñ pa ma yin pa mi mthoñ ba ni lam dbu ma źes mi bya / thams cad bdag med pa'i bar du mthoñ la bdag mi mthoñ ba ni lam dbu ma źes mi bya'o // lam dbu ma źes bya ba ni sañs rgyas kyi rañ bñin no //*. “When one sees that all is Empty, failure to see the non-Empty will not be called the Middle Way. When one sees all up to [the limit of] non-self, failure to see the self will not be called the Middle Way. What is called ‘Middle Way’

As Seyfort Ruegg has it,

for the canonical texts teaching the *tathāgata* *garbha* and *buddha*-nature, the middle way eschewing both eternalism and nihilism remained valid. And the affirmation of an absolute or *ātman* opposed to *anātman* or *nairātmya* in a dichotomously conceptualized binary pair (*vikalpa*) based on discursive proliferation (*prapañca*) would, therefore, be no more acceptable than the purely nihilistic position of a dogmatic denial of the absolute.⁴⁸

is *buddha*-nature." Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 24. On the middle way, see also RGVV 34,20–35,2: *anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti ced bhagavan paśyeta sāśya syād uchadavṛttiḥ / sāśya syān na samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ / nityaṃ nirvāṇam iti ced bhagavan paśyeta sāśya syāc chāśvatadr̥ṣṭiḥ / sāśya syān na samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ* /. "If [someone] saw that all conditioned [factors] are impermanent, this [person], O Blessed One, would [fall into] the false view of annihilationism [and thus] would not have the right view. [But] if [someone] saw that *nirvāṇa* is permanent, this [person] would [fall into] the false view of eternalism [and thus] would not have the correct view." Needless to say, any account of the middle way between extremes is bound to neutralize both views, and this is something the MPSū does not fail to do, as the following excerpt (MPSū Ņu 151a7–b2) testifies concerning *śāśvatavāda*: *ston pa drug gis gsol ba / gau ta ma gal te bdag med na sus dge ba dañ mi dge ba byed par 'gyur / bcom ldan 'das kyi bka' stsal pa / gal te bdag ces bya ba des byed na rtag pa zes bya bar ruñ ñam / de ste rtag pa yin na / res 'ga' ni dge ba byed la / res 'ga' ni mi dge ba byed / gal te dge ba dañ mi dge ba byed pa'i dus yod na / ci ste bdag ni mtha' yas zes smra / gal te bdag gis byed pa žig yin na / ci'i phyir mi dge ba'i chos spyod / da ltar bdag de byed pa yin / ses pa yin na ci'i phyir sems can la bdag med pa the tshom skye bar 'gyur / de lta bas na mu stegs can gyi chos la ni ñes par bdag med do //*. "The six [*tīrthika*]-masters asked: 'Gautama, if the self (*ātman*) does not exist, who will do good and evil?' – Bhagavat replied: 'If what is called 'self' does [it], can one say [of this 'self,' as the *tīrthikas* do] that it is 'permanent' (*nitya*)? And if it is permanent, does it sometimes do good and sometimes evil? If there is a moment when it does both good and evil, will it be said that the self is 'infinite'? If it is the self that acts, why does it do something evil? If it is the self that acts, and if [this self] is knowledge, how is it that doubt arises about the non-existence of the self? Hence, as concerns the *tīrthika* doctrine, the self certainly does not exist." Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 21. For arguments against the self in the MPSū, see Yamamoto 1973: 182–183.

⁴⁸ Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 41; see also Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 25–26. On the middle way in the Mahāyānist MPSū, see Liu 1982: 73–74, quoting MPSū 572b18–23: "Thus, [we maintain that with respect to sentient beings,] the *buddha*-nature is neither existent nor non-existent, [or] is both existent and non-existent. Why do we say that the *buddha*-nature is existent? Because all [sentient beings] will have it [in the future]. Since sentient beings will continue [to pass from one life to another] without

Now, the same applies *mutatis mutandis* to the Buddhist personalists, for whom selflessness does not provide a satisfactory account of human experience (memory, rebirth, moral responsibility, salvation, etc.),⁴⁹ and who also endeavoured, though with different hermeneutic

interruption like the flame of a lamp until they achieve the most perfect enlightenment, we say that [with respect to sentient beings, the *buddha*-nature] is existent. Why do we say that the *buddha*-nature is non-existent? We say that [the *buddha*-nature with respect to sentient beings] is non-existent, because all sentient beings do not yet have [the excellence of] being eternal, blissful, personal and pure, characteristic of all *buddhadharmas*. The union of [the two aspects of] existence and non-existence is the middle way."

⁴⁹ In spite of their substantialist leaning, the proponents of the *buddha*-nature seem to have been much less inclined than the Pudgalavādins to shape their *tathāgata-garbha* along lines echoing the non-Buddhists' *ātman* (on this point, see below, §1.1.3.5 and fn. 112, p. 82). Two reasons at least can be adduced in order to account for this difference. First, the (early) exponents of the *buddha*-nature were almost certainly not Abhidharma scholars concerned with harmonizing their teachings with traditional dogmatic systems (and even less so with demonstrating their tenets). Second, and contrary to the *pudgala*, the *tathāgata-garbha* is not aimed primarily at accounting for those psychophysical, ethical and eschatological functions and events that were, in the opinion of the Buddhist Personalists as well as the non-Buddhists, left unanswered by the *skandhamātra* doctrine; rather, the *buddha*-nature is designed to justify universal salvation and provide an account of the unconditioned. However, one should be wary of overestimating this distinction, for early *tathāgata-garbha* literature also supplies texts suggesting that the *buddha*-element "fulfils several of the requirements of a Self in the Indian tradition" (Williams 2009: 108). Let us quote here but two witnesses to this tendency. According to the ŚMDSNSū (281a8–b6), "if there were no *tathāgata-garbha*, there would be neither aversion towards suffering nor longing, eagerness, and aspiration towards *nirvāṇa*. What is the reason? Whatever be these six perceptions (**vijñāna*), and whatever be this [other] perception, these seven natures (**dharma*) are unfixed (**asthita?*), momentary (**kṣaṇika?*), and lack experience of suffering (**duḥ-khānubhava?*); hence these natures are unfit for aversion towards suffering or for longing, eagerness, and aspiration towards *nirvāṇa*. Lord, the *tathāgata-garbha* has ultimate existence without beginning or end, has an unborn and undying nature, and experiences suffering; hence it is worthy of the *tathāgata-garbha* to have aversion towards suffering as well as longing, eagerness, and aspiration towards *nirvāṇa*. Lord, the *tathāgata-garbha* is neither self (**ātman*) nor sentient being (**sat-tva*), nor soul (**jīva*), nor personality (**pudgala*). The *tathāgata-garbha* is not the domain (**gocara*) of beings who fall into the belief in a real personality (**satkāya-dṛṣṭipatita*)."
(*gal te de bžin gśegs pa'i sñiñ po ma mchis na ni sdug bsñal la skyo ba dañ mya ñan las 'das pa la 'dod ciñ don du gñer ba dañ smon pa yañ ma mchis par 'gyur ro // de ci'i slad du že na / bcom ldan 'das rnam par śes pa drug po gañ lags pa*

(e.g., selflessness as an *upāya*), argumentative (refutation of both the self and selflessness) and dogmatic strategies, to transcend the traditional dichotomy between *saṃskṛta*- and *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* by creating a third category – the *avaktavya* – for their “person.” According to them, this was the price to pay in order to be true to the middle way as it had been indicated by the Buddha’s refusal to answer the questions of Vacchagotta/Vatsa(sa)gotra.⁵⁰

’di dag dañ bcom ldan ’das ’di ltar chos bdun po ’di dag ni mi gnas pa dañ skad cig pa dañ sdug bsñal rnams myoñ ba ma lags pas chos de dag ni sdug bsñal la skyo ba dañ mya ñan las ’das pa la ’dod ciñ don du gñer ba smon par mi rigs so // bcom ldan ’das de bžin gśegs pa’i sñiñ po ni thog ma dañ tha ma ma mchis pa’i mthar mchis pa dañ mi skye ba dañ mi ’gag pa’i chos ciñ sdug bsñal myoñ ba lags pas / de bcom ldan ’das de bžin gśegs pa’i sñiñ po de ni sdug bsñal la yañ skyo ba dañ mya ñan las ’das pa la yañ ’dod ciñ don du gñer ba dañ smon par ’os so // bcom ldan ’das de bžin gśegs pa’i sñiñ po bdag ma lags / sems can ma lags / srog ma lags / gañ zag ma lags te / bcom ldan ’das de bžin gśegs pa’i sñiñ po ni sems can ’jig tshogs la lta bar ltuñ ba dag [...] [gi] spyod yul ma lags so //. Translation Wayman/Wayman 1990: 105–106; the Sanskrit reconstructions in brackets are ours.) In this passage, the *vijñānas* are sharply contrasted with the permanent *tathāgatagarbha*: because of their transient character, the former are not in a position to store experience of suffering or aspiration to the cessation of suffering. In other words, something is needed in order to bridge or synthesize these purely momentary perceptions, and this function of the *buddha*-nature is reminiscent of both Pudgalavādin and Ātmavādin doctrines. In the LASū (220,2–5), the *bodhisattva* Mahāmatī asks the following question to the Buddha: “May the Blessed One, may the Sugata teach me about the existence and the cessation of the [five] constituents, the [eighteen] elements and the [twelve sensory] bases. [For] if there is no self, what is it that exists, or what is it that ceases? And(/now) the immature [living beings], who rely on existence and cessation, do not know *nirvāṇa* because they fail to understand the exhaustion of suffering.” (*deśayatu me bhagavān deśayatu me sugataḥ skandhadhātvāyatanānāṃ pravṛttinivṛttim / asaty ātmani kasya pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā bālāś ca pravṛttinivṛtty-āśritā duḥkhakṣayānavabodhān nirvāṇaṃ na prajānanti /*.) For the Buddha’s lengthy answer, see LASū 220,9–221,1.

⁵⁰ Note that the *avyākṛtavastus* (see below, fn. 61, p. 66) were also resorted to by the proponents of the *buddha*-nature, as the Mahāyānist MPSū (596c–597b, see Liu 1982: 82–83) testifies. And this they seem to have done in exactly the same spirit as the Pudgalavādins.

1.1.3. On Pudgalavāda Buddhism

1.1.3.1. According to Bareau, the Vātsīputrīya sect branched off from the Sthavira group of early Buddhism some time during the first half of the third century BCE.⁵¹ Around the turn of the Common Era, the Vātsīputrīya movement gave rise to four sub-sects: the Bhadrayānīyas, the Dharmottariyas, the Śaṅṇagarikas (or Śaṇḍagirikas) and the Sāṃmitīyas (or Sāṃmatīyas).⁵² Except for the Śaṅṇagarikas, these sub-sects are attested epigraphically from the second century CE on: in Mathurā and Sārnāth (Sāṃmitīyas, respectively second and fourth century CE), in Karle and Junnar (Dharmottariyas, second century CE), in Nāsik and Kanheri (Bhadrayānīyas, second century CE).⁵³ While the history and ideas of the first three sub-sects are shrouded in mystery, it seems very likely that the Sāṃmitīyas gained prominence and eventually eclipsed even the mother-sect, the Vātsīputrīyas.⁵⁴ And if the testimony of the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing is to be trusted, by the seventh century CE, the Sāṃmitīyas had become by far the numerically most important group among the few surviving non-Mahāyānist denominations (Sarvāstivādins, Sthaviras). Their area of influence extended from the lower Indus to the lower Ganges with nearly hegemonic strongholds in Sindh (about 100 monasteries and 10,000 monks), Mālava (about 100 monasteries and 20,000 monks) and, most importantly perhaps, Valabhī, where a huge monastic complex (*viḥāraṇḍala*) and intellectual centre flourished from the beginning of the sixth century onwards under Maitraka patronage.⁵⁵ Interestingly enough, certain among the doctrines of this important Buddhist denomination

⁵¹ See Bareau 1955: 33 and 114.

⁵² For a legendary account of this schism, see Bareau 1955: 122–123, Priestley 1999: 36–37 and Lusthaus 2009: 285.

⁵³ See Bareau 1955: 36. For references, see Bareau 1955: 122, fn. 2–3, 127, fn. 4, and 128, fn. 4.

⁵⁴ Note Yaśomitra's (AKVy 699,3) explanation of *vātsīputrīya*: *vātsīputrīyā āryasāṃmatīyāḥ*.

⁵⁵ See Bareau 1955: 36 and 121–122. All in all, the Sāṃmitīya sect amounted to about 65,000 monks and 1,000 monasteries (16,000/500 for the Sarvāstivādins, 20,000/200 for the Sthaviras), only next to the Mahāyānists (about 70,000 monks). Granting that the total amount of monks was 220,000, the Sāṃmitīyas formed about one third of the entire community.

have been regarded consistently by most other Buddhist groups (or, to put it more cautiously, by most institution-based and non-tantric Buddhist scholiasts and philosophers) as a *heresy* – a deviation – known as “personalism” (*pudgalavāda*).⁵⁶ In other words, whatever the representativity of personalism within the Sāṃmitīya monastic communities, the most powerful among the non-Mahāyānist denominations was deemed heretic by most of its coreligionists.⁵⁷ During centuries, from Devaśarman to Kamalaśīla, the intellectual elite of most other groups and/or schools (Theravādins, Vaibhāṣikas, Mādhyamikas, Yogācāras, Sautrāntikas, “epistemologists,” etc.) shaped ever more sophisticated arguments against the Vātsīputrīya and/or Sāṃmitīya Pudgalavāda. But what did these Buddhist personalists – apparently a contradiction in terms – believe?⁵⁸

1.1.3.2. Although what the historical Buddha actually taught seems to remain out of scholarly reach, it is notorious that Śākyamuni has been

⁵⁶ On this translation, see Collins 1982: 162 and Chau 1984: 7. Note that the expressions “Pudgalavādin/Pudgalavāda” (in much the same way as “Hīnayāna” and “Śrāvakayāna”) refer neither to an institutional sect nor to a doctrinal school, but rather to the representatives of a set of doctrines based on the notion of *pudgala* and always through the lenses of their opponents. To the best of our knowledge, no Indian Buddhist thinker has ever used this rather deprecative label as a self-designation. On the uses of *puggala* in the Pali canon, see Collins’ insightful remarks in Collins 1982: 160–165.

⁵⁷ If the term is appropriate at all under such circumstances, for the Buddhists of all persuasions who thought of themselves as “orthodox” (i.e., non-Pudgalavādins) held contradictory opinions on the question whether the Pudgalavādins were Buddhists or not. “Coreligionists” (*svayūthyā*) appears in MSAVBh (Tsi D163a1–4/P191b2–6; see Eltschinger 2010a: 307–308, fn. 53), MAV 244,8 and 286,12, and “Buddhist” (*bauddha*) in MSAVBh (Tsi D166a6–7/P195a8–b2; see Eltschinger 2010a: 314, fn. 72) and AKVy 699,4–5. But to authors such as Vasubandhu, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prajñākaramati, the Pudgalavādins are at best “pseudo-Buddhists” (*saugataṃmanya*) and “outsiders from within” (*antaścaraṭīrthika*). See AKBh_{Pr} 472,13–15/AKBh_{LE} 120,2–5, TS 336 and BCAP_{Sh} 328,28–329,1; see also the texts discussed in *Kośa* V.228. The YBhū’s (129,7, see below, fn. 111, p. 79) deserves closer inspection.

⁵⁸ On the doctrines of the Pudgalavādins, see Venkataramanan 1953, Bareau 1955: 114–130, Chau 1984, Chau 1987, Priestley 1999, Walser 2005: 199–208, Lusthaus 2009. On their literature, see Venkataramanan 1953, Bareau 1955: 115 and 122, Chau 1984: 7–8, Chau 1987: 34–35 and 43–44, Buswell 1999, Lusthaus 2009: 278–285. Priestley 1999: 43–52 (= Chapter 3) provides the best overview to date.

ascribed various and at times contradictory views on the self, ranging from Upaniṣadic to pragmatic, agnostic and even nihilist theses.⁵⁹ The extant Pali and Chinese canons as well as many Sanskrit quotations repeatedly show the Buddha in dialogue with the ascetic wanderer Vacchagotta/Vatsa(sa)gotra.⁶⁰ According to these accounts, the Buddha refused to commit himself on a set of ten or fourteen points including the question whether the soul (*jīva*) is the same as or different from the body – let us say the five constituents (*skandha*) – and which came to be known as the “unsettled(/unanswered) matters” (*avyākṛtavastu*).⁶¹ The texts in our possession account for the Buddha’s silence in various ways: as reflecting the Buddha’s “pragmatic” stance (as the simile of the arrow would testify to),⁶² as emphasizing the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism⁶³ and dismissing the question as irrelevant (as the similes of the son of a barren woman or the hair of a tortoise suggest).⁶⁴ According to these testimonies, the Buddha’s silence *could* be interpreted as suggesting that the soul is neither identical to nor distinct from the body/constituents, thus seemingly leaving the door open for the existence (whatever this may mean) of a self.⁶⁵ Now,

⁵⁹ See above, fn. 1, p. 37.

⁶⁰ See, e.g., MN I.483–489 (no. 72, *Aggivacchagottasutta*), MN I.489–497 (no. 73, *Mahāvaccagottasutta*), SN IV.391–395 (no. XLIV, x, §7, *Moggallāna*), SN IV.395–397 (no. XLIV, x, §8, *Vaccha*), SN IV.398–400 (no. XLIV, x, §9, *Kutūhala-sālā*), SN IV.400–401 (no. XLIV, x, §10, *Ānanda*), SN IV.401–402 (no. XLIV, x, §11, *Sabhiya*); see also MN I.427–432 (no. 63, *Cūḷamālunkyasutta*).

⁶¹ On the *avyākṛtavastu*, see SN IV.374–403, AKBh_{Pr} 292,8–294,4 (*Kośa* IV.43–48), *Traité* I.153–161 and 423, Collins 1982: 131–139, Oetke 1994 and Walser 2005: 205–207; for other references, see May 1959: 277–278, fn. 1015. In the specific context of the polemic against Pudgalavāda, see especially AKBh_{Pr} 469,9–471,19 / AKBh_{LE} 98,1–114,3 (*Kośa* V.262–270), MAV 250,16–252,2 and Venkataramanan 1953: 168 and 175–176.

⁶² See MN I.429–430.

⁶³ See SN IV.400–401.

⁶⁴ On the *vandhyāputra*, see AKBh_{Pr} 292,19–20; on the hair of a tortoise, see AKBh_{Pr} 469,12 / AKBh_{LE} 98,5; see also AKBh_{Pr} 469,20–21 / AKBh_{LE} 100,3–4 (the mango tree) and Collins 1982: 132–133.

⁶⁵ This seems to be the point made by the Pudgalavādin in TS_i*Sk_t 91,17–20: *nāsty ātmeti bhavato vacanam ayuktam / kasmāt / caturṣu vyākaraṇeṣu caturthaṃ sthāpanīyaṃ vyākaraṇam [...] / yadi paramārthatō nāsty ātmā na syād idaṃ sthāpanīyaṃ vyākaraṇam* /. “Your claim that the self does not exist is ill-founded. – Why? –

following the doxographers Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, this coincides with the most provocative thesis of the Vātsīputrīya and Sāṃmitīya sects: “The *pudgala* is neither the same [as] nor different [from] the *skandhas*.”⁶⁶ As suggested by Priestley, the Vātsīputrīyas are likely to have traced their ancestry (and lineage?) back to Vaccha-gotta/Vatsa(sa)gotra, whom Chinese sources also refer to as Vātsīputra, and who was ordained as a monk by the Buddha himself before reaching the status of *arhat* still during the latter’s lifetime.⁶⁷ And we would even go so far as to hypothesize that the basic views of the Pudgalavādins regarding the self were meant to conform to a specific interpretation of the Buddha’s silence. Whereas most Buddhist schools took it to involve the irrelevance of a question addressing something as nonexistent as the son of a barren woman, it might be that the Vātsīputrīyas and the Sāṃmitīyas interpreted it as pointing to the existence of an ontologically indeterminate *pudgala*. And according to Harivarman’s Pudgalavādin,

The Buddha [only] claimed that there is no self so as to discard the wrong view of those outsiders [who] postulate that there is a self that is [something] over and above the five constituents, permanent [and] characterised as indestructible.⁶⁸

1.1.3.3. Did the Pudgalavādins really claim, as most of their opponents would like them to do, that the *pudgala* ultimately exists, i.e., that it exists as a substantial, independent entity? First, the earliest extant sources (the VK and the KV) do not resort to the dichotomy between

[Because] among the four [types of] questions, the fourth is [the one that is] to remain unanswered. If the self did not exist ultimately, this question would not remain unanswered.” See also Walser 2005: 206.

⁶⁶ Lusthaus 2009: 284; see also Bareau 1955: 115 (Vātsīputrīya), to be compared with Bareau 1955: 123 (Sāṃmitīya). On the relationship between this doctrine and the problem of the whole and its parts, see Bronkhorst 1992: 69–71.

⁶⁷ See Priestley 1999: 34–36.

⁶⁸ TS_i-Sk_t 91,14–15: *pañcaskandhavyatirikto nityo ’vināśilakṣaṇo ’sty ātmeti tīrthikāḥ parikalpayanti / teṣāṃ mithyādrṣṭīvyavacchedāya bhagavān āha nāsty ātmeti /*. See also TS_i-Sk_t 93,18–20. This “cathartic” and “upāyic” interpretation of selflessness echoes similar accounts in the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition. See above, §1.1.2.2.

“designational” (*prajñaptisat*) and “substantial” (*dravyasat*).⁶⁹ Second, it seems that the Pudgalavādins’ replies to their opponents changed in the course of time. More precisely, the Buddhist personalists are likely to have never abandoned the idea of a “true and ultimate” (*saccikatṭha-paramatṭha*) self,⁷⁰ but to have oscillated and probably evolved in their reply strategies:⁷¹ they would have answered that the *pudgala* exists neither substantially nor designatively;⁷² or, that it is substantial;⁷³ or, that the *pudgala* is strictly designational,⁷⁴ thus claiming that something can be at the same time “true and ultimate” and purely designational; and however strange this may look from a “mainstream”

⁶⁹ On the distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat*, see Lusthaus 2009: 276–278. The Pudgalavādin of the KV (1.1.149, 150, 152) clearly claims that his *puggala* (really) exists (*saccikatṭha*, *vijjamāna*, *atthi*), and so does the one of the VK (see La Vallée Poussin 1925: 358).

⁷⁰ The interchangeability of the terms “person” (*pudgala*), “self” (*ātman*), “soul” (*jīva*) and “being” (*sattva*) is clear from passages such as VK 542c24 (see Priestley 1999: 81–82), SNŚ 463a13, 463a18 and 19, 465a25, 465b4 (see Priestley 1999: 82), and 464a10 (see Priestley 1999: 83). Note also TS_i*_{skt} 94,4: *ātmā ca pudgalaḥ* /. *saccikatṭhaparamatṭha* according to KV 1.1.1.

⁷¹ Priestley 1999: 87–88: “That they abandoned the one and adopted the other need not imply any real alteration in their understanding of the *pudgala*; they may simply have decided that its nature could be indicated more effectively by describing it as substantial. The change in their doctrine (if in fact there was one) may represent no more than a modification of their strategy for its exposition and defence.”

⁷² See AKBh_{Pr} 461,19/AKBh_{LE} 40,1.

⁷³ As might be hypothesized from their opponents’ statements, such as MSA 18.92 (see Eltschinger 2010a: 305 and 307–311), MHK 3.92 (see Iida 1980: 175), MAV 6.146 (see Huntington 1992: 175) and TS 349.

⁷⁴ As testified by SNŚ 462b11–15 (see Priestley 1999: 84–85), and especially 465b5–10, which is worth quoting here: “Now, we reply, the synonyms [...] ‘self’ and so on are accepted. As the Buddha said to the *tīrthikas*, ‘Although the self exists, it is conceptual; the self is not substantial. The self is spoken of on the basis of the existing impure aggregates.’ With regard to the *dharma*s that go and come, the Buddha spoke of the self, but it is not a substantial self. As the Buddha said, ‘According to whatever formations [...] it is based on it receives its name.’ Therefore the Buddha spoke of a conceptual self.” Translation Priestley 1999: 85.

Buddhist perspective, this seems to mirror their position.⁷⁵ According to Priestley,

[a]s a conceptual entity it cannot be determined as either the same as the five aggregates or different from them, but as “true and ultimate” it is non-illusory and directly perceptible, and (we might add) has real functions as the agent of its karma and the subject of perception and recollection.⁷⁶

Or, to put it otherwise,

[t]hey maintain that it is “true and ultimate” in the special sense that its existence and functions are not reducible to those of its constituents; its relation to the five aggregates is indeterminate because, although it is not reducible to them, neither is it independent of them. The *pudgala* or self of each individual is thus single, a unity formed by a particular combination of the five aggregates and persisting through all the changes of its impermanent constituents: it is the author of its own deeds and continues as the enjoyer of their results.⁷⁷

What about the cognizability of this ontologically hybrid *pudgala*, then? The Pudgalavādins are likely to have claimed that the person was accessible to all of the six cognitions (*vijñāna*), be it in an indirect manner only⁷⁸ – a claim dismissed by the “orthodox” scholiasts by

⁷⁵ Note SNŚ 464b22: “Since the insubstantial can exist, this assertion that the insubstantial and the non-existent are both alike nonexistent though spoken of as existent is difficult to accept.” Translation Priestley 1999: 96. Priestley (1999: 96) adds: “The position of the SNŚ, then, seems to be that the *pudgala* or self is conceptual and insubstantial, and yet is something that exists.”

⁷⁶ Priestley 1999: 88. Note also Priestley 1999: 98: “The criterion for being ‘true and ultimate’ seems to be causal efficiency.” On the Pudgalavādins’ and especially the Sāṃmitīyas’ understanding of *karman*, see Walser 2005: 199–200.

⁷⁷ Priestley 1999: 101. Note also Lusthaus 2009: 280: “The *pudgala* is on the one hand merely a linguistic construction. On the other hand, it involves something in everyone’s experience about which we can say nothing definitively coherent. It is unreal (merely nominal), but experientially, even soterically, effective.”

⁷⁸ According to TSī*_{Skt} 92,12–14 (*bhavatāṃ śāsana ātmā śaḍvijñānair vijñāyate* /). Note also TSī*_{Skt} 92,15: *ātmā śaḍvijñānavijñēyaḥ*. According to the Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmitīya of AKBh 9 (AKBh_{Pr} 463,10–14/AKBh_{LE} 52,1–7, *Kośa* V.238), the *pudgala* is grasped by all the six *vijñānas*, but in an indirect manner. On the *manovijñāna*, see *Kośa* V.242–243, fn. 3 and, in the context of the perceptibility of the *pudgala*, AKBh_{Pr} 467,1–2/AKBh_{LE} 80,2–3 (*Kośa* V.252) and AKBh_{Pr} 463,10ff./AKBh_{LE} 52,1ff.

pointing to the fact that it was cognizable to none of the six cognitions, whose objects are strictly distinct and delimited.⁷⁹ It is not unlikely that the Pudgalavādins were pressed to renounce this dogmatically difficult position and advocated the existence of a seventh cognition (referred to maybe as **sattvavijñāna*),⁸⁰ or even attempted to include the cognition of the *pudgala* into mind-cognition.⁸¹

(*Kośa* V.238ff.). See also *Traité* II.735–736 and fn. 1. On the cognizability of the *pudgala*, see also below, fn. 150, p. 97.

⁷⁹ See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 370–376.

⁸⁰ VK 543c21–544a28; see La Vallée Poussin 1925: 367–369. The Pudgalavādin claims that the Buddha did in fact know this seventh cognition but refrained from revealing or promulgating it. Was, then, the Buddha ignorant of this seventh *vijñāna* (and thus not omniscient), or did he indulge in *ācāryamuṣṭi*? Here is the dialogue between the Pudgalavādin and the Śūnyatāvādin (VK 544a17–28): “Je n’accuse pas Bhagavat d’ignorance, je ne l’accuse pas de faire le maître qui ferme la main. Bhagavat connaît de son savoir de Bouddha, mais il ne proclame pas. En effet, il a dit dans le *sūtra* de la forêt des *śimśapās* (*Samyutta* V.437): ‘*bhikṣus*, jusqu’au nombre complet des feuilles des forêts de *śimśapās* de cette grande terre, j’ai directement connaissance de ces *dharma*s. Quoique je les sache de mon savoir de Bouddha, je ne les dis pas aux autres.’ C’est ainsi que Bhagavat, connaissant la septième connaissance, ne la proclame pas. Le Śūnyatāvādin doit demander: Le *sūtra* de la forêt de *śimśapās* ne contient-il pas une conclusion? Bhagavat, en fait, continue et dit: ‘Les *dharma*s [que je n’enseigne pas] ne sont pas utiles au salut, au bien, au *dharma*, à la vie religieuse (*brahmacarya*), ils ne produisent pas l’intelligence (*abhiññā*), la *bodhi*, le *nirvāṇa*.’ A supposer qu’existe votre *pudgala*, il n’est pas utile au salut, au bien, au *dharma*, à la vie religieuse, il ne produit pas l’intelligence, la *bodhi*, le *nirvāṇa*: il est sans emploi. Donc le *pudgala* n’existe pas.” Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 369. It is tempting to hypothesize that such a canonical statement (SN V.437–438 [no. LVI, ix, 32, *Simsapā*]) formed the background of Dharmakīrti’s emphasis on (what was to become) the *upayuktasarvajñatā* by contrast with the *sarvasarvajñatā* (knowing the exact number of insects [*kīṭasaṅkhyā*]); see PV 2.29–33.

⁸¹ See MSABh 155,23–26: *upalabdhir hi nāma buddhyā pratipattiḥ / na ca pudgalaṃ buddhyā na pratipadyante pudgalavādināḥ / uktaṃ ca bhagavatā / dṛṣṭa eva dharma ātmānam upalabhate prajñāpayatīti / katham nopalabdho bhavati /*. “[The Pudgalavādin:] But what is called ‘perception’ [also consists in] a cognition by the intellect (*buddhi*). Now, it is not the case that [we] Pudgalavādins do not cognize the *pudgala* through the intellect. Moreover, the Blessed One has said: ‘In this very life, [the living being] perceives an *ātman*, designates [an *ātman*].’ How [then can the *pudgala* be said] not [to be] perceived?” According to MSAVBh *Tsi* D164a1–4/P192b3–7, one cannot claim that only (**kevalam*) that which is cognized (**√drś-*) by the (corporeal) sense organs exists as a real substance (**dravyasat*), for there are things existing as real substances which, though they are not perceived by the

1.1.3.4.1. According to Vasumitra's doxographical account, "[t]he *pudgala* is neither the same [as] nor different from the *skandhas*. It is a *prajñapti* dependent on the *skandhas*, *āyatana*s, and *dhātus*."⁸² The personalists actually developed a sophisticated account of the *pudgala* as a designation. Note, first, that according to Harivarman's TSi, the (or some) Pudgalavādins expanded the traditional dichotomy between conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) factors in order to accommodate their *pudgala*:

The *dharma*s which may be known are called the five categories of *dharma*s: the past, future, present, uncreated and inexpressible *dharma*s. The self is in the fifth [category of *dharma*s].⁸³

(corporeal) sense organs, are cognized by the intellect (**buddhi*), like the mind and the mental factors (**cittacaitta*). Therefore, "perceived" (**upalabdha*) can also refer to things that are grasped by mental cognition (**manovijñāna*). According to the Pudgalavādin, then, insofar as the *pudgala* is made perceptible (**pratyakṣikṛta*) by the intellect, it is grasped by perception (**pratyakṣapramāṇa*) and therefore exists as a real substance. On the cognizability of the self, note also YBhū 131,9–12 (YBhū_{Tib} 77a4–6): *kaccid icchasi yāsau sattva buddhiḥ sā pratyakṣārthagrahikānumānārthagrahikā veti / sacet pratyakṣārthagrahikā tena rūpādayaḥ skandhā eva na sattvaḥ pratyakṣa iti na yujyate / saced ānumānikārthagrahikā tena bāladārakāṇāṃ apy anabhyūhya sahasā pravartata iti na yujyate /*. "Do you accept that this [very] notion of a [substantial] living being grasps an object of perception(/a perceptible object), or that it grasps an object of inference? If it grasps an object of perception(/a perceptible object), then it is impossible, for only the constituents, corporeality, etc., not a [substantial] living being, are perceptible. [But] if it grasps an inferential object, then it is impossible, for [this substantial living being] occurs undeductively [and] immediately (*anabhyūhya sahasā : ma brtags par 'phral la 'jug par*) down to young children (*bāladāraka : byis pa chuñ nu*)."

⁸² SBhUC 16c14–15. Translation Lusthaus 2009: 284.

⁸³ TSi_{Ch} 260c9f. (TSi_{Skt} 95,1–2: *jñeyadharmā yad uta pañca dharmakośāḥ – atītā anāgatāḥ pratyutpannā asaṃskṛtā avaktavyā iti / ātmā pañcamadharmāntargataḥ /*). Translation Priestley 1999: 79, who also quotes (ibid.) MPPU 61a24f.: "The *pudgala* is included in a fifth, inexpressible category of *dharma*s." This doctrine might have a forerunner in KV 1.1.225–226: *puggalo saṅkhato ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ puggalo asaṅkhato ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ puggalo n'eva saṅkhato nāsaṅkhato ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ puggalo n'eva saṅkhato nāsaṅkhato ti / āmantā / saṅkhatañ ca asaṅkhatañ ca ṭhapetvā atth'aññā tatiyā koṭṭi / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ saṅkhatañ ca asaṅkhatañ ca ṭhapetvā atth'aññā tatiyā koṭṭi / āmantā [...]/ aññāṃ saṅkhataṃ aññāṃ asaṅkhataṃ añño puggalo ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ khandhā saṅkhataṃ nibbānaṃ asaṅkhataṃ puggalo n'eva saṅkhato nāsaṅkhato ti / āmantā /*

According to the two Chinese versions of the TDK and the SNŚ, this inexpressible *pudgala* is liable to three *prajñaptis*.⁸⁴ Or, to put it otherwise, there are three kinds of persons according to three different modes of designating them: the *pudgala* as appropriating the present constituents, the *pudgala* as engaged in temporality, and the *pudgala* once freed from appropriation, i.e., experiencing *nirvāṇa*. According to the TDK_S, these three modes of designation respectively dispell the false view of the sentient being as nonexistent (but also as existent, TDK_K), annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*).⁸⁵

1.1.3.4.2. First, the *pudgala* as conceived or designated according to appropriation (*upādāna-* or *upādāya-prajñapti*)⁸⁶ refers to the person as appropriating (as internal, TDK_K), due to past karmic forces (*saṃs-kāra*) and fetters (*saṃyojana*, TDK_K), the present constituents (*skandha*), the eighteen sensory elements (*dhātu*) and the twelve sensory

"[I]s the person conditioned? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Is the person unconditioned? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Is he neither? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I repeat my question. – Yes. Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there another, a third alternative? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I repeat my question. – Yes [...] Are then the conditioned, the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbāna unconditioned, the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned? – Yes." Translation Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 54–55. Note also VK 545b13–19: "Le Pudgalavādin dit: 'Le Pudgala existe [...]' Le Śūnyatāvādin demande: Le Pudgala, faut-il dire qu'il est *saṃskṛta*, qu'il est *asaṃskṛta*? S'il est *saṃskṛta*, on peut dire du Pudgala, comme des autres *saṃskṛtas*, qu'il naît, dure, se transforme, périt; s'il est *asaṃskṛta*, on peut dire du Pudgala, comme des autres *asaṃskṛtas*, qu'il ne naît pas [...]" – Bhagavat a dit: 'Bhikṣu, je dis qu'il y a deux choses, le *saṃskṛta*, l'*asaṃskṛta*: en dehors du *saṃskṛta* et de l'*asaṃskṛta*, il n'y a pas autre chose.' Donc il n'y a pas de Pudgala." Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 369.

⁸⁴ The present section is based on TDK_S 24a29–b7 as translated in Priestley 1999: 56–57 and Lusthaus 2009: 280–281, TDK_K 10a3–29 as translated in Priestley 1999: 57–60 and Lusthaus 2009: 281–283, and SNŚ 466a28–c27 as translated in Priestley 1999: 63–66. On these three *prajñaptis*, see Venkataramanan 1953: 182–195, Chau 1984: 9–11, Chau 1987: 35–39, Priestley 1999: 53–80 (= Chapter 4), Walser 2005: 200–203 and Lusthaus 2009: 280–283.

⁸⁵ See TDK_S 24a29–b8 and Walser 2005: 203 and 207.

⁸⁶ For a discussion of the Indic original, see Priestley 1999: 71–72 and Walser 2005: 324, fn. 34.

bases (*āyatana*).⁸⁷ The SNŚ takes this modality as viewing the (concept of the) person as dependent on its basis:

So it is to be understood that the person [based on] the five aggregates and the twelve spheres in any of the five destinies, or with *asuras* and the intermediate existence, seven destinies, and in the present existence whether *kalala*, *arbuda*, *ghana*, *peśin* or *praśākhā*, as newborn, child, youth, middle aged, or old,⁸⁸ with a mind determined as good or bad, following the rules or transgressing the rules, is called on the basis of the above *dharma*s, and all of the above whether combined or not combined, the person conceived (or designated) according to the basis.⁸⁹

According to the Pudgalavādins, the designation of a person is based on the five constituents (*skandhān upādāya*),⁹⁰ a relation that, at least as early as the KV, was explained by resorting to the image of the tree (*rukkha*) and the shadow (*chāyā*):

Just as the designation of the shadow is based on the tree, in exactly the same way, the designation of a person is based on corporeality [and the four other constituents].⁹¹

But at least from the TDS and the SNŚ, this image seems to have been replaced by that of fire (*agnī*) and fuel (*indhana*):

As the Buddha explained when he spoke to Pāpaya, “Whatever the formations on whose basis it is expressed, from those its name is established.” This is called *upādāyaprajñapti*, as in the example of fire.⁹²

⁸⁷ Here, the TDK_K (10a9, see Priestley 1999: 57–60) adds that the appropriated factors and the *pudgala* are neither the same nor different: “If the living being and the body were the same, [the living being] would be impermanent and [of the nature of] suffering. If they were different, it would be permanent and without suffering.” Translation Priestley 1999: 58. Moreover, if it were impermanent, there could be no interest in the fruit of religious life; but if it were permanent, one would not engage in religious life.

⁸⁸ On this tenfold division of embryonic life (*garbhāvasthā*, items 1–5) and post-embryonic life (*jātāvasthā*, items 6–10), see AKBh_{Pr} 85,12–13 (*Kāśa* I.255–256) and AKVy 198,32–34.

⁸⁹ SNŚ 466b22–26. Translation Priestley 1999: 64–65.

⁹⁰ See, e.g., AKBh_{Pr} 461,19–20 / AKBh_{LE} 40,3–4, quoted below, fn. 135, p. 88, and §1.2.2.

⁹¹ KV 1.1.189: *yathā rukkhaṃ upādāya chāyāya paññatti / evaṃ eva rūpaṃ upādāya puggalassa paññatti* /. See also KV 1.1.171–172.

Or:

The Buddha furthermore explained, “Whatever the formations upon which it depends, from those it receives its name, as a fire receives its name on the basis of its fuel.”⁹³

This image is attested and criticised as early as the TSi and the MSA.⁹⁴ How should we account for these comparisons? Four aspects can be thought of. First, the shadow cannot be said to be identical to or distinct from the tree; in the same way, fire cannot be said to be the same as or other than fuel⁹⁵ (something that the non-Pudgalavādins repeatedly challenge⁹⁶). Second, the shadow and the fire can be said to

⁹² SNŚ 466b4–6. Translation Priestley 1999: 165.

⁹³ SNŚ 467a23f. Translation Priestley 1999: 165.

⁹⁴ On the TDS’ statements regarding fire and fuel, see Priestley 1999: 166. On this analogy, see SNŚ 466b4–6, quoted above (see also Chau 1987: 35, Venkataramanan 1953: 182), SNŚ 467a23f, quoted above, TSi^{*Skt} 94,9–10, MSA 18.95, MSABh 156,13–24 and MSAVBh Tsi D167a2–b1/P196a7–b6 (Eltschinger 2010a: 314–316 and fn. 76–82), AKBh_{Pr} 461,24–462,24/AKBh_{IE} 40,9–48,5 (*Kośa* V.234–237), and especially AKBh_{Pr} 462,1–4/AKBh_{IE} 42,2–6, Duerlinger 1982, Cousins 1995: 88, Buswell 1999: 360, Priestley 1999: 165–186 (= Chapter 11), Walser 2005: 203–204. Cousins (1995: 88) argues that the fire-fuel analogy, which does not occur in the earliest extant sources, might have been borrowed by “later Pudgalavādins” from Nāgārjuna’s MMK, Chapter 10. See also below, §1.2.1.1 and fn. 149, p. 97.

⁹⁵ According to MSAVBh Tsi D167a2–b1/P196a7–b6, fire and fuel exist as real substances (**dravyasat*) but are not distinct things, for once fire has arisen from fuel, they are no longer distinct things; and if they were distinct things, fire could arise even in the absence of fuel; but since one does not observe that fire arises in the absence of fuel, they are not distinct things. Nor are fire and fuel one and the same thing, for fuel is the cause of fire and does not have heat for its nature (**uṣṇatā-svabhāva*), whereas fire is the effect of fuel and has heat for its nature; and if they were one and the same thing, then, as one would not burn oneself when touching (*[sam]√sprś-*) fire, one would burn oneself when touching fuel.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., MSABh 156,17–18: *teṣāṃ ca bhinnam lakṣaṇam ity anya evāgnir indhanāt* /. “Now, since their characteristics are distinct, fire is simply other than fuel.” See Eltschinger 2010a: 315, fn. 77. See also AKBh_{Pr} 462,14/AKBh_{IE} 44,13: *tayor api siddham anyatvaṃ lakṣanabhedāt* /. “Even [so] these two, [fire and fuel] are established to be [mutually] other, because they have different characteristics.” As explained by TSi^{*Skt} 94,10–11, MSABh 156,17, AKBh_{Pr} 462,12–14/AKBh_{IE} 44,11–13 and AKVy 700,21–24, fire consists in the element fire (*tejodhātu*) while fuel consists in the remaining three elements (*śeṣāṇi bhūtāni*, MSABh 156,17), i.e., water (*ap*, think of sap or oil), earth (*pr̥thivī*, think of wood) and wind (*vāyu*, think of gas).

exist, albeit in a less determinate way as the tree and the fuel. Third, there is no more shadow without tree than there is fire without fuel (something the non-Pudgalavādins would qualify⁹⁷), which seems – fourth – to point to a causality relationship between the causes that are the tree and the fuel and the effects that are the shadow and the fire. To sum up, y is not reducible to x; y exists; y does not exist without x; and y is caused by x.

1.1.3.4.3. The Pudgalavādins' second mode of designation corresponds to the person as conceived according to the past, i.e., on the basis of past constituents, bases and elements (TDK_s), or to "approach" (TDK_k), or to "transition" (SNS) – the latter two referring to the person in the

Now, these elements have different characteristics. According to MSAVBh *Tsi* D167b5–6/P197a3–5 (see also MSAVBh *Tsi* D168a2–4/P196b2–4), fire has heat for its characteristic (**uṣṇatālakṣaṇa*), whereas earth, water and wind have respectively for their characteristics solidity (**kharalakṣaṇa*), fluidity (**snehalakṣaṇa*) and mobility (**īraṇalakṣaṇa*). See AK 1.12cd, AKBh_{Pr} 8,18–25 and *Kośa* I.22–23; see also above, fn. 44, p. 57. This idea seems to find an echo in PVSV 147,12 (see below, fn. 180 and 181, p. 104) although Dharmakīrti's main argument is much more encompassing (see below, fn. 149, p. 97).

⁹⁷ On the existence of fire in the absence of fuel, see MSABh 156,20–21: *vinā punar indhanenāgnir astīti katham idaṃ vijñāyate / upalabdheḥ* [= MSA 18.95d₁] / *tathā hi vāyunā vikṣiptaṃ dūram api jvalat paraiti / athāpi syād vāyus tatrendhanam iti* /. "[The Pudgalavādin:] But how is it known that fire [also] exists without fuel? [Answer:] Because one perceives [that fire can exist without fuel], for [when it is] flung by the wind, [fire can] even go a long way while [still] ablaze. [The Pudgalavādin:] But in this case, the wind [itself] might [well] be the fuel!" This is reminiscent of SN IV.399: *seyyathāpi vaccha aggi sa-upādāno jalati no anupādāno / evam eva khvāham vaccha sa-upādānassa upapattim paññāpemi no anupādānassā ti / yasmim pana bho gotama samaye acci vātena khittā dūram pi gacchati / imassa pana bhavaṃ gotamo kim upādānasmim paññāpeti ti / yasmim kho vaccha samaye acci vātena khittā dūram pi gacchati / tam ahaṃ vātupādānam vadāmi vāto hissa vaccha tasmim samaye upādānaṃ hoti ti* /. "Just as, Vaccha, a fire with fuel blazes up, but not without fuel, even so, Vaccha, do I declare rebirth to be for what has fuel, not for what is without fuel. – But, master Gotama, at the time when a flame, flung by the wind, goes a very long way, as to fuel what says the master Gotama about this? – At the time when a flame, Vaccha, flung by the wind goes a very long way, I declare that flame to be supported by the wind. At that time, Vaccha, the wind is the fuel." Translation Woodward 1972: 280–281. The Buddha explains next that in the case of rebirth, craving is the fuel.

past, (and/or) in the future, (and/or) in the present,⁹⁸ as in the following expressions: “In the past, I was King Kuśa,” “In the future you will have the name Ajita,” “In the present I am a prominent merchant.”⁹⁹ This second kind of *prajñapti*, which points to the person “who has not yet appropriated [...] or who has already appropriated” the constituents (TDK_K), refers to that which underlies the rebirth stories (*jātaka*) of the (future) Buddha¹⁰⁰ and

⁹⁸ The problems pertaining to this second kind of designation are nearly insuperable. First, whereas the TDK_S has it refer to the past only, both the TDK_K and the SNŚ have it refer to the three times. According to Priestley (1999: 73), “[t]he only obvious explanation is that the doctrine initially recognized only conception according to the past and was later expanded when it was noticed that the person could also be conceived according to future and present. Perhaps the original intention was to explain and justify the Buddha’s references to his own previous existences [...] With the expansion of the doctrine to include conception according to future and present, a more general term for these three forms of temporal conception of the person would have to be found. In the *Sī ēhānmù chāojiě* [= TDK_K, VE/IR] it was ‘conception according to approach’; in the SNŚ, ‘conception according to transition.’” Do these two Chinese expressions, *fāngbiàn* (方便) and *dù* (度) respectively, render one and the same Indic original? According to Priestley, this original might be either *upāya* (see Priestley 1999: 73) or, more probably, *upacāra* (see Priestley 1999: 74–75). Note, in this connection, Lusthaus’ (2009: 281) translation as “heuristics for metaphorical devices.” Note also that the SNŚ (466b27–28, see Priestley 1999: 63–66) seems to take “transition” at its face value: “What is the person conceived (or designated) according to transition? At the time when it is passing over to another existence, it is described by the Buddha as ‘a being in transition.’” Translation Priestley 1999: 65.

⁹⁹ According to Lusthaus 2009: 283; to be compared with Priestley 1999: 58–59.

¹⁰⁰ The *Jātakas* (i.e., *Jātaka* I.42, King Mahāsudarśana) are indeed resorted to by Hari-varman’s Pudgalavādin in TS_i*Sk_t 90,20–91,4. Note thesis no. 3 of the Vātsīputrīyas (according to Vasumitra and Bhavya): “*dharmas*, if apart from the *pudgala*, cannot move on from a previous lifetime to a subsequent lifetime. On the basis of the *pudgala*, one can say there is transference (*saṅkrānti*).” Translation Lusthaus 2009: 284; see also Bareau 1955: 116. However, as the SNŚ strongly insists, the *pudgala* is *never* (until the *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) without a set of *skandhas*, and this is the reason why the Pudgalavādins strongly advocated the existence of intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). See thesis no. 33 of the Vātsīputrīyas (according to Vasumitra) in Bareau 1955: 119, and thesis no. 10 of the Sāṃmitīyas (according to the KV) in Bareau 1955: 124. Note also Venkataramanan 1953: 187 (and 195): “Therefore leaving the body of the five *skandhas*, when all that is extinct, the person moves on from this life to another. Hence it is said that there is the person who

explains (i) how personal continuity, being an uninterrupted flow of psycho-physical phenomena, not only flows in the present, but has its source in the past and continues to flow into the future, and (ii) how personal karmic responsibility is possible, such that Buddhism is no longer susceptible to the charge that it is nihilistic and immoral.¹⁰¹

Chau's statement cannot be accepted without qualification, however, for the Pudgalavādins, in keeping with what they thought had been the Buddha's attitude, proved rather cautious about issues of moral responsibility and personal identity in *saṃsāra*. Consider the following excerpt from the KV:

Does (a person or) soul run on (or transmigrate) from this world to another and from another world to this? – Yes. Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this world to another and from another world to this? – Nay, that cannot be truly said [...] Then, is it a different soul who transmigrates? – Nay, that cannot be truly said.¹⁰²

A similar dialogue occurs in the VK on the question whether the transmigrating *pudgala* is the same or different, say, in its successive destinies (*gati*) as a hungry ghost (*preta*) and as an animal (*tiryagyonī*), or whether the stream-enterer (*srotaāpanna*) is the same as or different from the one who obtains the fruit of this condition.¹⁰³ Consider, then, the following dialogue of the KV:

Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences the effect? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I repeat my question. – Yes. Then, are happiness and misery self-caused? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Is the doer a different [person] from the enjoyer [of the effect]? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I

leaves the five *skandhas* of this state (viz.) *upapattibhava* and takes up the five *skandhas* of the *antarābhava*."

¹⁰¹ Chau 1984: 11, to be compared with Chau 1987: 37. See below, §1.1.3.5.

¹⁰² KV 1.1.158: *puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṃ lokaṃ parasmā lokā imaṃ lokan ti / āmantā / so puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṃ lokaṃ parasmā lokā imaṃ lokan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ añño puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṃ lokaṃ parasmā lokā imaṃ lokan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe /*. Translation Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 26.

¹⁰³ See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 359–360.

repeat my question. – Yes. Then, are happiness and misery caused by another? – Nay, that cannot truly be said.¹⁰⁴

Here again, a similar passage can be traced in the VK.¹⁰⁵ Thus on the issue of the identity of the agent (*kattar*, *karṭr*) of deeds and the experiencer (*paṭisaṃvedin*, *bhokṭr*) of pleasant and unpleasant results, the Pudgalavādins seem to have remained true to what they regarded as the Buddha's attitude, i.e., did not commit themselves beyond claiming that they were neither the same nor different.

¹⁰⁴ KV 1.1.212: *so karoti so paṭisaṃvedetīti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ so karoti so paṭisaṃvedetīti / āmantā / syaṃ kataṃ sukhadukkhan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvedetīti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe [...]/ añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvedetīti / āmantā / paraṃ kataṃ sukhadukkhan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe /*. Translation Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 47–48. This refers back to canonical passages such as SN II.22: *kiṃ nu kho bho gotama sayāṅkataṃ sukhadukkhan ti / mā hevaṃ timbarukāti bhagavā avoca / kiṃ pana bho gotama parakataṃ sukhadukkhan ti / mā hevaṃ timbarukāti bhagavā avoca /*. “Now then, Master Gotama, is pleasure and pain brought about by one's self? – Not so verily, Timbaruka, said the Exalted One. Well then, are they brought about by another? – Not so verily, Timbaruka, said the Exalted One.” Translation Rhys Davids/Woodward 1972: 17–18. SN II.20: *sa karoti so paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho kassapa ādito sato sayāṅkataṃ dukkhanti iti vadaṃ sassataṃ etam pareti / añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho kassapa vedanābhittunassa sato paraṅkataṃ dukkhanti iti vadaṃ ucchedam etam pareti / ete te kassapa ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti / avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā / saṅkhārāpaccayā viññānaṃ /*. “‘One and the same person both acts and experiences [the results]’: this, Kassapa, which you called at first ‘suffering self-wrought,’ amounts to the Eternalist theory.’ ‘One acts, another experiences [the result]’: this, Kassapa, which to one smitten by the feeling occurs as ‘suffering caused by another,’ amounts to the Annihilationist theory.’ To you, Kassapa, the Tathāgata, not approaching either extreme, teaches the Norm by a middle [way]: conditioned by ignorance activities come to pass, conditioned by activities consciousness.” Translation Rhys Davids/Woodward 1972: 16.

¹⁰⁵ VK 542c24ff. See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 364–366. Here is the position of the Pudgalavādin before the debate starts: “Il y a un moi (*ātman*), un être (*sattva*), un vivant (*jīva*), un être qui naît (*jantu*), un être qui se nourrit (*poṣa*), un mâle (*puruṣa*), un *pudgala*. Parce qu'il y a un *pudgala*, on fait des actions ou agréables à sentir [dans leur rétribution] (*sukhavedaniya*), ou désagréables à sentir, ou ni-désagréables-ni-agréables à sentir. Ayant fait des actions agréables à sentir, on éprouve des sensations agréables; ayant fait des actions désagréables à sentir, on éprouve des sensations désagréables; ayant fait des actions ni-désagréables-ni-agréables à sentir, on éprouve des sensations ni-désagréables-ni-agréables.” Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 364.

1.1.3.4.4. Let us add a few words concerning the third kind of designation, viz. the *pudgala* conceived according to cessation:

When that has ended, with no [further] appropriating, no seizing as another or oneself, [the one who is] at rest without remainder, having passed over from here to the further bank, is conceived (or designated) according to cessation.¹⁰⁶

This mode is seen at work in statements such as: “The Fortunate One has attained *parinirvāṇa*,”¹⁰⁷ “appropriation is exhausted,” “no [further] appropriation [will occur],”¹⁰⁸ “There is no further case of his taking up the aggregates.”¹⁰⁹ The *pudgala* as designated by cessation points to the end of appropriation. Its purpose is

to demonstrate that the Tathāgata or an arahant after attaining the *nirvāṇa* without remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) [...] is the liberated person *par excellence* [referred to as *uttama*° or *paramapuriso*], dwelling in beatitude.¹¹⁰

1.1.3.5. As we have seen, the Pudgalavādins are likely to have resorted to the self in order to account for *functions* that, in their opinion, could not be explained satisfactorily in terms of the mere constituents, bases and elements, i.e., were felt not to be reducible to the existential basis.¹¹¹ What are these functions? The MSABh presents us with the following Pudgalavādin objection:

¹⁰⁶ TDK_K 10a18–20, translation Priestley 1999: 59. Here again, the TDK_K (10a23–24, see Priestley 1999: 57–60) adds: “If he were different [from the aggregates], he could not have attained *parinirvāṇa*; if he were not different, he could not have attained *parinirvāṇa*.” Translation Priestley 1999: 59.

¹⁰⁷ Priestley 1999: 56.

¹⁰⁸ Lusthaus 2009: 283.

¹⁰⁹ Priestley 1999: 66.

¹¹⁰ Chau 1984: 11.

¹¹¹ The *ātmavāda* section of the YBhū’s *śāvitarkādibhūmi* (see Shukla 1967: 36–37) contains a very interesting series of objections against (a strong version of) selflessness. Although the *Ātmavādin* is presented here *inter alia* as *ito bāhyas tīrthyah* (YBhū 129,7), there are good reasons to believe that he is a Buddhist Pudgalavādin. The passage starts with a definition of *ātmavāda* (YBhū 129,6–9 [YBhū_{Tib} 76a7–b1]): *ātmavādaḥ katamaḥ / yathāpīhaikaṭyaḥ śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇa evaṇḍṣṭīr bhavaty evaṇvādī / tadyathā / ito bāhyas tīrthyah / satyataḥ sthitita ātmā vā sattvo vā jīvo vā poṣo vā pudgalo vetyādi / sa kasmād evaṇḍṣṭīr bhavaty evaṇvādī /*.

“What does the doctrine of self consist of? – For example, in this [world], an ascetic or a *brāhmaṇa* has such a view, holds such a discourse, i.e., [is] an outsider who is exterior to the [Buddhist religion]: a self, a [substantial] living being, a life principle, an individual, or a person really (*satyatas*) [exists], steadily (*sthititas*) [exists]. – Why does this [person] have such a view, hold such a discourse?” As an answer, the author(s) of the passage suggest(s) that the doctrine of self stems from both scripture (*āgama*) and reason(ing) (*yukti*, YBhū 129,9 [YBhū_{Tib} 76b1]). The reasons adduced for it are as follows (YBhū 129,11–130,14 [YBhū_{Tib} 76b2–77a5]): *dvābhyāṃ kāraṇābhyāṃ / abuddhipūrvam ca sati sattvabuddhipravṛtṭyupalabdhitāḥ / buddhipūrvam ca ceṣṭopalabdhitāḥ / tasyaivam bhavati / sa ced ātmā na syāt pañcabhir ākāraiḥ pañcavidhavastudarśane saty ātmabuddhir na pravarteta / rūpākṛtiṃ drṣṭvā rūpabuddhir eva pravarteta na sattvabuddhiḥ / sukhaduḥkhāvadīrṇaṃ saṃskāraṃ drṣṭvā vedanādibuddhir eva pravarteta / na sattvapātito cchritabuddhiḥ / nāminaṃ nāmasambaddhaṃ saṃskāraṃ drṣṭvā sañjñābuddhir eva pravarteta / na kṣatriyo vā brāhmaṇo vā vaiśyo vā śūdro vā buddhadatto^b vā guṇamitro veti sattvabuddhiḥ / śubhāśubhaceṣṭāsambaddhaṃ saṃskāraṃ drṣṭvā saṃskārabuddhir eva pravarteta / na bālapaṇḍitasattvabuddhiḥ / viśaye vijñānānuvṛttiṃ^c drṣṭvā cittabuddhir eva pravarteta / nāhaṃ paśyāmītyevamādisattvabuddhiḥ / yataś caivam abuddhipūrvam eṣu pañcasu vastuṣu pañcākārāḥ sattvabuddhir eva pravarteta na saṃskārabuddhiḥ / tasmād abuddhipūrvam tāvad^d asya drṣṭvā sattvabuddhipravṛtṭy^eupalabdhitā evaṃ bhavaty asty ātmeti / tasyaivam bhavati / sa ced ātmā na syān na saṃskāreṣu buddhipūrvā ceṣṭopalabhyeta / ahaṃ cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi drakṣyāmi paśyāmi drṣṭavān / na vā drakṣyāmītyevam [...] yathā darśana evaṃ śrotagrahṇājihvākāyamaṇaḥsu veditavyam / evaṃ kuśalakarmābhisamskāre kuśalakarmānirvṛttān akuśalakarmābhisamskāre ‘kuśalakarmānirvṛttān ityevamādikā buddhipūrvā ceṣṭā nopalabhyeta / na caiśā saṃskāramātre yujyate / tasmād evaṃ bhavaty asty ātmeti / . [a vedanābuddhir eva pravarteta em. (Tib.) : sañjñābuddhir eva pravarteta na sattvapātito cchritabuddhiḥ / vedanādibuddhir eva pravarteta / Ed. ^b buddhadatta em. (Tib.; YBhū 135,8–12) : brahmadatta Ed. ^c Note Tib. ‘jug pa, *(pra)vṛtti? ^d Tib. with no equivalent of tāvat. ^e °pravṛtṭy° em. (Tib. ‘jug pa) : °praty° Ed. ^f Note Tib. dge ba’i chos, *kuśaladharmā. “For two reasons: [first,] because one observes that the notion of a [substantial] living being occurs unconsciously (*abuddhipūrvam*) with regard to a real (*sat*) [thing/event], and [second,] because one observes [that] a [given cognitive or ethical] behaviour (*ceṣṭā*) [is made] consciously (*buddhipūrvam*) [i.e., entails an ‘I’ awareness. Regarding the first reason,] it occurs to the [person given to reason(ing)] in the following way. If the self did not exist, the fivefold (*pañcabhir ākāraiḥ*) notion of a self would not occur upon perceiving the [following] five [real] things. [To wit:] (1) When one perceives the [physical] shape (*ākṛti*) of [something] corporeal (*rūpa*), only the notion of [this] corporeal [thing] would occur, not the notion of a [substantial] living being. (2) When one perceives a conditioning factor involving (*avadīrṇa* : *gyo ba*) pleasure or pain, only the notion of an [affective] sensation, etc., would occur, not the saddened or exalted notion of the [substantial] living being (*sattvapātito cchritabuddhi* : *sems can la dams pa*² *dañ mthos pa’i blo*) [who experiences it]. (3) When one perceives a condi-*

tioning factor with a [specific] name [and] connected with a [specific] name, only the notion of [this verbal] designation would occur, not the notion of the [substantial] living being [who bears it] in the form: [he is] a *kṣatriya*, a *brāhmaṇa*, a *vaiśya*, a *śūdra*, [the person named] Buddhadatta or Guṇamitra. (4) When one perceives a conditioning factor connected with a meritorious or demeritorious behaviour, only the notion of [this] conditioning factor would occur, not the notion of a stupid or a wise living being. (5) When one perceives the occurrence of the [bare] cognition (*vijñāna*) of an object, only the notion of the [cognizing] mind (*citta*) would occur, not the notion of a [substantial] living being [acting as a cognizer] in the form ‘I perceive.’ And since it is so, [it is] only the fivefold notion of a [substantial] living being [that] occurs unconsciously with regard to these five [real] things, not the notion of a [mere impersonal] conditioning factor. Therefore the [person given to reason(ing)], seeing [it] first because (s)he observes that the notion of a [substantial] living being occurs unconsciously [with regard to something real], thinks that the self exists. [And second,] this occurs to him/her as follows: If the self did not exist, one would not observe, regarding the conditioning factors, a conscious[ly personal] behaviour in forms such as: ‘I shall see, I see, I have seen [these] visible [things] through [my] eyes (*cakṣuṣā*),’ or: ‘I shall not see [them].’ Note that [this occurs] with audition (*śrotra*), olfaction (*ghrāṇa*), taste (*jihvā*), tactile (*kāya*) and mental (*manas*) [cognition] just as it [does] with vision (*darśana*). In the same way, one would not observe a conscious[ly personal] behaviour such as ‘[I have] done a good action’ (*kuśalakarmaṇirvṛttau*) when a good action has been performed, or ‘[I have] done a bad action’ when a bad action has been performed. Now, such a conscious[ly personal] behaviour is impossible if there are only [impersonal] conditioning factors[, and no self]. Therefore, it occurs to the [person given to reason(ing)] that the self exists.” According to this passage, the notion of a self (*ātmabuddhi*, *sattvabuddhi*) arises both unconsciously (*abuddhipūrvam*) and consciously (*buddhipūrvam*). It arises unconsciously when, upon perceiving a real thing or event (*vastu*), we grasp (different modalities of) a living being instead of the bare constituent (*skandha*) which, according to the normative Buddhist scheme, is supposed to be responsible for this apprehension. Now according to the (Buddhist) Ātmavādin, this would not be the case if the self did not really exist. As for the notion of a self that arises consciously, it is the one involved in our cognitive and ethical activities, which entail personal awareness and moral responsibility. In other words, the constituents alone do not provide a satisfactory account of social interaction, cognition and ethics, which all imply the notion of a living being, of self and other(s). The YBhū passage ends with the following remarks (YBhū 136,9–137,7 [YBhū_{Tib} 81a6–b4]): *api tu pāramārthikam ātmalakṣaṇaṃ vakṣyāmi / dharmesv ātmaprajñaptiḥ / sa tebhyo ’nyānanyatvenāvaktavyo mā bhūd asya dravya-sattvam iti / teṣāṃ vā dharmāṇāṃ ātmalakṣaṇatvam / sa punar anityalakṣaṇaḥ / adhrualakṣaṇaḥ / anāśvāsikalakṣaṇaḥ / vipariṇāmalakṣaṇaḥ / jātīdharmalakṣaṇaḥ / jarāvyaādhimaraṇadharmalakṣaṇaḥ / dharmamātralakṣaṇaḥ / duḥkhamātra^alakṣaṇaḥ / tathā hy uktaṃ bhagavatā / ita ime bhikṣo dharmā ātmānityas te bhikṣo ātmādhruvo ’nāśvāsiko vipariṇāmadharmako bhikṣo ātmety evamādi / api ca^b caturbhiḥ*

The *pudgala*, which is the seer, [and this] up to the cognizer, the agent, the experiencer, the knower and the one who liberates himself, does simply exist.¹¹²

In other words, the Buddhist personalist seeks to establish an agent (*kartr*) of cognitions, an experiencer (*bhoktr*) of the pleasant and unpleasant results of good and bad deeds, and a person partaking in liberation (*moktr*). The *pudgala* as an agent of deeds and an experiencer of their fruit appears as early as the VK and the KV, as we have seen.¹¹³ Its being a knower of the *dharmas* is recorded in the *Vibhāṣā* and the AKBh.¹¹⁴ And the *Vibhāṣā* also presents the *pudgala* as providing a basis for recollection.¹¹⁵ To sum up:

kāraṇaiḥ saṃskāreṣu sattvaprajñaptir veditavyā / sukhasaṃvyavahārārtham / lokā-nuvṛttyartham / sarvathā sattvavastu nāstīty uttrāsaprahāṇārtham ca / ātmani paratra ca vyapadeśato guṇasattvadoṣasattvasampratyayotpādanārtham ca /. [^a °mātra° with no Tib. equivalent. ^b *api ca* em. (Tib.) : *api* Ed.] “Moreover, I am going to state the ultimately valid definition of the self: [it is nothing but] the designation of the factors as self. [Now] this [self] can/must not be described as either different or the same as these [factors] lest it exist as a [real] substance. Or, it is these [very] factors that are the definition of the self. And this [self] is characterized as impermanent, non-enduring, unreliable, [subject to] change, having the property of being born, of ageing, illness and death, [and] of [consisting of] the factors and suffering only. For the Blessed One has said: ‘Therefore, O monk (Tib. *dge sloṅ dag*), these factors are your (Tib. *khyod kyī*) self[, and it is] impermanent; your self, O monk (Tib. *dge sloṅ*), is non-enduring [and] unreliable; [your] self, O monk, is subject to change (*vipariṇāmadharmaka*),’ and so on. Furthermore, note that the designation of the conditioning factors as self owes to four reasons: [first,] in order to facilitate [linguistic] transactions (*sukhasaṃvyavahārārtham* : *tha sñad la bde bar bya ba*); [second,] in order to comply with the [usage of the] ordinary world(/beings); [third,] in order to eliminate the terror [inspired by the fact] that something like a [substantial] living being (*sattvavastu*) exists in no way; and [fourth,] in order to arouse certainty(/confidence) (*sampratyaya*) in the presence of good qualities and defects by pointing [them] out in [one’s] self and other [persons].”

¹¹² MSABh 156,24–157,2: *asty eva pudgalo ya eṣa draṣṭā yāvad vijñātā kartā bhoktā jñātā moktā ca /*. Sthiramati (MSABh *Tsi* D168b4–7/P198a5–b2) characteristically takes this objection as of non-Buddhist provenance (see Eltschinger 2010a: 317, fn. 83). To be compared with YBhū 134,20 (*sa bhoktā vā kartā vā moktā veti*), 135,2–3 (*moktā kartā moktātmeti*), 134,4 (*draṣṭṛādilakṣaṇaḥ*) and 130,18–19 (*rūpādiṣu viṣayagrāhaka ātmā*).

¹¹³ See above, §1.1.4.3 and fn. 102–105, pp. 77–78.

¹¹⁴ *Vibhāṣā* 42c19ff. Note thesis no. 15 of the Vātsīputrīyas: “La personne (*pudgala*) connaît (*jānāti*) les choses (*dharma*).” Translation Bareau 1955: 118. This seems to be at stake in VK 543b7–9: “Le Pudgalavādin dit: Il y a un *ātman*, un *sattva*, un *jīva*,

Thus the *pudgala*, with its three designations, is an ineffable (*avaktavya*) that avoids the two extremes: annihilation (*uccheda*) and eternity (*śāśvata*). The *pudgala* is the agent of knowledge, memory, the rebirth process, the ripening of actions (*karmavipāka*), and, after eliminating its obstacles, dwells in beatitude.¹¹⁶

But, strange as it may look on account of their being constantly blamed for indulging in the false view of the self, the Pudgalavādins clearly had

un *jantu*, un *poṣa*, un *puruṣa*, un *pudgala*. Parce qu'il y a un Pudgala, relativement aux *dharma*s vus, entendus, sentis, connus, il y a acquisition, recherche, considération mentale." Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 366.

¹¹⁵ *Vibhāṣā* 55a18–21. These three features appear in the personalist's objection of MPPU 148b14–18: "2^e Argument. – S'il n'y a pas d'*ātman* intérieur (*adhyātma*), [étant donné que] la connaissance des couleurs naît et périt d'instant en instant (*kṣaṇotpannaniruddha*), comment distingue-t-on et connaît-on la couleur bleue (*nīla*), jaune (*pīta*), rouge (*lohita*) ou blanche (*avadāta*)? 3^e Argument. – S'il n'y a pas d'*ātman*, et puisque les connaissances humaines actuelles (*pravṛttivijñāna*), naissant et périssant toujours à nouveau, disparaissent avec la vie du corps, qui donc a partie liée avec les actes – péchés (*āpatti*) ou mérites (*punya*)? Qui endure la douleur (*duḥkha*) ou le bonheur (*sukha*)? Qui est libéré (*vimukta*)?" Translation *Traité* II.736–737.

¹¹⁶ Chau 1984: 11. SNŚ 465a17–465b1: "Now we reply, the Buddha said that there is the concept (or designation) of the person; therefore this is its concomitant. If non-self were really the non-existence of the self, there could not be any killing of a living being or one who kills or anyone who is killed. Neither would there be theft, and so also for sexual misconduct, lying and drinking intoxicants. Neither would there be any doer or any deed, or any consequences [...] Thus the Four Noble Truths also would not exist. If the Four Noble Truths did not exist, there would also be no Buddha teaching the Four Noble Truths. If there were no Buddha, there would also be no Saṅgha. Thus if the person did not exist, the Three Jewels and the Four Truths would also be non-existent. But such statements are utterly unreasonable. Thus if the person did not exist, the above errors would be established and further errors would also be produced. But if the person exists, if the self exists, there are errors as stated above. One should understand truly according to the *sūtras* spoken by the Buddha. Therefore in reality the self exists." Translation Priestley 1999: 85–86; see also Chau 1987: 42–43 and Venkataramanan 1953: 177–178. The passage left untranslated by Priestley is as follows (in Chau's translation): "[S']il n'y avait pas d'acte, de résultat, il n'y aurait ni naissance, ni mort. Mais les êtres vivants, à cause des actes et de leurs résultats, transmigrent dans le cycle de la naissance et de la mort (*saṃsāra*). S'il n'y avait ni naissance, ni mort, il n'y aurait pas de cause (*hetu*) de la naissance et de la mort. S'il n'y avait pas de cause, il n'y aurait pas de cessation de cause. S'il n'y avait pas de cessation de cause, il n'y aurait pas d'orientation vers la voie (*mārga*)."

their own version of this *dṛṣṭi*. According to the SNŚ, the view of the self consists in one's taking either one or all constituents as the self; the view of a separate self consists in one's holding the appropriating self to be different from the appropriated constituents. But to consider that there is no self, i.e., to regard the self as merely another name for the constituents, is no less a false view.¹¹⁷

1.1.3.6. According to most of the rare extant Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmitīya sources, the doctrine of the *pudgala* was meant to provide a satisfactory account of Buddhism as a middle way between the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. This seems at least to be the meaning of the personalists' statement to the effect that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be either the same as or distinct from the five aggregates. For if the *pudgala* is the same as the *skandhas*, it will be as conditioned and hence momentary as they are, and one can no longer account for recollection, continuity and moral responsibility. But if the *pudgala* is independent from the *skandhas*, it will be as eternal and unconditioned as the non-Buddhists' *ātman*, and then any relationship with psychophysical reality and need for religious life will be lost. By claiming that their *pudgala* was neither an eternal and independent entity nor something purely impermanent reducible to the psychophysical constituents, the Pudgalavādins expected not only to provide the middle way with a doctrinal foundation, but also to disclose the rationale behind the Buddha's refusal to answer the question whether the soul is identical to or different from the body. Whether their attempt accounted better than mere dependent origination for the middle way is a question that was solved in the most uncompromising way by their coreligionists.

1.1.3.7. Whatever the historical circumstances of their rise, the Buddhist personalist sects had to face sustained criticism on the part of self-proclaimed orthodox Sthaviras(/Theras) and Sarvāstivādins from a very early date. Indeed, both the KV and Devaśarman's VK¹¹⁸ reflect a

¹¹⁷ See Priestley 1999: 64 and 67 and Walser 2005: 202. Note also TSi^{*Skt} 92,18–19: *bhavān āha – nāsty ātmetīyaṃ mithyādrṣṭir iti /*.

¹¹⁸ The relevant section of the KV is 1.1, pp. 2–69. For a translation, see Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 8–63; for a summary, see McDermott 1996: 266–272; see also Collins 1982: 178–182. The relevant section of the VK is 537a27–547c5. For a translation,

lively and already well formed controversy in terms and arguments whose close similarity already stroke La Vallée Poussin.¹¹⁹ What is striking about the KV and the VK is their lack of any hint at the non-Buddhists' accounts of the self. In other words, the polemical scope of these early testimonies is purely intra-Buddhistic; the polemic rests on shared dogmatic, terminological and scriptural assumptions. Here, the Pudgalavādin is always brought, through scripturally- and dogmatically-based arguments, to contradict the word of the Buddha. No less interestingly, several among the issues that were to become key components of the later controversies against the non-Buddhists are already present: is the supposedly transmigrating *pudgala* one and the same in two successive destinies, say as a *preta* and as a human being? Is the one who acts the same as the one who experiences the fruit of action? Is there an agent of cognitions, sensations and actions? How is the *pudgala* to be cognized? In other words, certain Buddhists labelled as personalists did not await the non-Buddhist Ātmavādins in order to assume a somehow real person behind the flux of momentary psycho-physical events. Nor did their opponents wait for the hot disputes against the non-Buddhists in order to shape arguments against these elaborations. And in spite of Sthiramati's statements to the contrary,¹²⁰ the same can be assumed of the chronologically next significant anti-personalist tracts, YBhū 129,6–136,4, MSA 18.92–103 and MSABh 154,27–160,6.¹²¹ Even a rapid glance at the extant Pudgalavāda

see La Vallée Poussin 1925: 358–376; for a summary, see Potter 1996: 369–374 and Willemen/Dessein/Cox 1998: 200–201.

¹¹⁹ See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 345 and *Kośa* I.xxxiv–xxxv (“le pudgalaskandhaka présente avec Kathāvatthu, i, 1, des analogies étroites qui vont jusqu’à l’identité des formules”), and Frauwallner 1964: 92. According to McDermott (1996: 265, summarizing Bareau’s views as expressed in the typescript [Paris 1951] of the latter’s French translation of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*), “Bareau thinks that some verses of the work [KV, VE/IR] or its prototype may have been read at Pāṭaliputta during Aśoka’s reign, and that *Kathāvatthu* and *Vijñānakāya* may stem from the same prototype.” On the relationship between the KV and the VK, see Bronkhorst 1993b, where Bronkhorst shows that, contrary to the VK’s, the controversy as it is reflected in the KV is certainly no more than a purely scholastic exercise with no real confrontation. See also Watanabe 1983: 154–208.

¹²⁰ See above, fn. 112, p. 82.

¹²¹ See Eltschinger 2010a and Kishi 2011. YBhū 129,6–137,8 might have inspired the author(s) of the MSA(Bh). On the *ātmavāda* section of the YBhū, see Shukla 1967.

sources is enough to make sure that these texts' polemics are purely intra-Buddhistic. The same remark applies to the nearly contemporary MPPU¹²² and to Harivarman's TSi,¹²³ which rely on the same scriptural sources – those advocated by the Pudgalavādins – and analogous arguments. One can certainly argue that the “orthodox” or “mainstream” Buddhists never lost sight of the fact that their Pudgalavādin opponents came dangerously close to the outsiders' accounts of the self, and often resorted to the latter as a criterion or “limit-case” in assessing their “coreligionists'” degree of orthodoxy. But just as numerous Mahāyānasūtras simply mention the outsiders' views although they target the Śrāvakayānists alone (found guilty of misunderstanding the law and/or to indulge in mundane, purely institutional affairs), these sources seem never to take the *tīrthikas'* conceptions into consideration. The non-Buddhists' *ātman* seems to first enter the scene in the first decades of the fifth century CE: with Vasubandhu's *Paramārthasaptatikā* (directed against the views of the Sāṅkhya master Vindhya-vāsin), of which at least one stanza targetted a Sāṅkhya argument in favour of the self,¹²⁴ with AKBh 9, the last section of which is dedicated to a critical examination of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika views on the self,¹²⁵ and with a commentary on Āryadeva's ŚŚ ascribed to Vasu(bandhu?), where the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika *alone* are criticised.¹²⁶ But as was to be expected from the sixth-century Buddhist philosophers' conspicuous shift in polemical targets and ambitions,¹²⁷ things changed with Dignāga and those indebted to him. As far as our knowledge goes, Dignāga contented himself with criticising the Sāṅkhya argument already criticised in the *Paramārthasaptatikā*;¹²⁸ Dharmapāla turned his polemic against the outsiders' self; Dharmakīrti, who devoted several

¹²² MPPU 148b3–150a25; see *Traité* II.735–750.

¹²³ TSich 259c8–260c26 (translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva in 412 CE) and TSi*SkT 90,17–95,15 (= section 35); see Sastri 1978: 69–74.

¹²⁴ On the *Paramārthasaptatikā*, see below, fn. 138, p. 159.

¹²⁵ On AKBh 9, see, e.g., Stcherbatsky 1970, *Kośa* V.230–302, Duerlinger 1982, 1989a, 1989b, 2003a and 2009, Oetke 1988: 195–242, Mejer 1999, Anacker 1999, Kapstein 2001: 77–111 and Goodman 2009.

¹²⁶ See above, fn. 74, p. 17.

¹²⁷ See Eltschinger 2010b: 398–400 and 432–433, Eltschinger forthc. b (§2.2).

¹²⁸ See above, fn. 124, p. 86.

arguments to the refutation of Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya conceptions, criticised his coreligionists' *pudgala* without explicitly mentioning it;¹²⁹ as for Bhāviveka, he had no more than three verses to dedicate to the *pudgala*;¹³⁰ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla confine their critique of the Pudgalavāda to the concluding section of their nearly all-inclusive *Ātmaparīkṣā*.¹³¹ Here again, the only exception is Candrakīrti's MAV, the sixth chapter of which contains a long and learned but, let us say, not very innovative critique of the *pudgala*.¹³² Let us now turn to Dharmakīrti's original contribution against Buddhist personalism.

1.2. CONTEXT AND ARGUMENTS OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S CRITIQUE

1.2.1. The Immediate Context and Doctrinal Background of PVSV 147,2–148,5

1.2.1.1. To the best of our knowledge, Dharmakīrti alludes nowhere explicitly to the *pudgala*. How to make sure, then, that PVSV 147,2–148,5 is directed against the (or at least one version of the) Pudgalavāda? Let us distinguish here between external and internal criteria. External criteria exhaust themselves in the fact that Dharmakīrti's commentators Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin are unanimous in regarding this passage as a piece of polemic against the *pudgala*. Besides their introductory objection,¹³³ both of them consistently explain Dharmakīrti's anaphoras (*tad*, etc.) as referring either to the *pudgala* or the *skandhas*

¹²⁹ See below, §§1.2.2–3, and Eltschinger/Ratié 2010.

¹³⁰ MHK 3.90–93; see Iida 1980: 173–175.

¹³¹ TS 336–349, TSP_K 125,16–131,9/TSP_S 159,16–166,18; see Schayer 1931–1932 and Naito 1985.

¹³² MAV 244,1–288,9 (and especially vv. 146–151); see Tauscher 1981: 36–39, Fenner 1983: 19–22 and Huntington 1992: 171–177; for a general presentation of the MAV's critique of the self, see Fenner 1983. This is reminiscent of Candrakīrti's strategy while criticising the “naturalization” of the caste-classes. In his CŚV ad CŚ 4.21–23 (see Eltschinger 2012: 71–81), the Mādhyamika scholar presents an “old-style” critique based on traditional, mainly canonical arguments, but shows no awareness of the renewal of the problematic in the hands of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti.

¹³³ See below, fn. 162, p. 102.

(quite often: *rūpādi*). Among the internal criteria, let us mention first that significant parts of Dharmakīrti's terminology are reminiscent of traditional discussions about the *pudgala*. Thus the word *avācya* (PVSV 147,6, 7, 15, 148,4), highly characteristic – especially in the context of the treatment of identity (*tattva*) and otherness (*anyat[t]va*) –, clearly echoes the Pudgalavādins' *avaktavya/avācya*;¹³⁴ so does the allusion to *upādāna* (PVSV 147,23), which is to be interpreted in a sense closer to the notion of *upādāyaprajñapti* ("designation-on-the-basis-of") than to that of *upādāna* as "material cause" found in the Abhidharmic theory of causality.¹³⁵ Moreover, the opponent's recourse to causality (PVSV

¹³⁴ On the Pudgalavādins' thesis that the *pudgala* cannot be said (*avaktavya, avācya*) to be either the same as or other than the constituents (or that it is inexpressible insofar as it cannot be described either in terms of identity or otherness with respect to the *skandhas*), see above, §1.1.3.4; see also, e.g., Chau 1984: 11, Chau 1987: 42, Chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Lusthaus 2009: 279–280, MSA 18.93ab (stating that the *pudgala* is *ekatvānyatvato 'vācyaḥ*: see below, fn. 147, p. 96; see also MSA 18.94–95), MSAVBh Tsi D163a1–4/P191b2–6 (quoted in Eltschinger 2010a: 307, fn. 53), AKBh_{Pr} 464,4/AKBh_{LE} 58,3: *atha rūpapudgalavat tadupalabdhyor apy anyānanyatvam avaktavyam*. "But if [the Pudgalavādin replies that] just as visible shape and the *pudgala* [cannot be said to be other than or identical to each other], their [respective] perceptions as well cannot be said (*avaktavya*) to be other than or identical to [each other]." On the meaning of *rūpa* in this context, see below, fn. 182, p. 105. The idea is found again in TS 337: *skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo nānyas tīrthadṛṣṭi-prasaṅgataḥ / nānanyo 'nekatādyāpteḥ sādhvī tasmād avācyatā //*. "The *pudgala* is neither other than the constituents – for [otherwise] the outsiders' [false] view [of a permanent self] would ensue – nor the same [as them], for [otherwise its] multiplicity would follow; as a consequence, [its] being inexpressible (*avācyatā*) [in terms of identity or otherness with regard to the constituents] is well [established]." See also below, fn. 147, p. 96.

¹³⁵ On the probable meaning of *upādāna/upādāya* (both as "basis"/"on the basis of" and as "appropriation"/"after appropriating") in *pudgalavāda*, see above, §1.1.3.4.2 and, e.g., Chau 1987: 36, Cousins 1995: 89, Priestley 1999: 71–72. AKBh_{Pr} 461,19–20/AKBh_{LE} 40,3–4 ascribes to the Pudgalavādin the assertion that the *pudgala* is designated on the basis of (*upādāya*) the constituents: *ādhyātmikān upātān vartamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñāpyate / tad idam andhavadanān anumīlitārthaṁ na budhyāmahe / kim idam upādāyati //*. "[Objection:] The *pudgala* is designated on the basis of the constituents that are internal, appropriated [as belonging to oneself and] existing [when the *pudgala* is designated. Answer: As for us,] we do not understand this obscure statement the meaning of which [you have] not made clear: what does this [mean], 'on the basis of'?" (Cf. PVSV 147,23: *ko 'yam upādānārthaḥ //*. "[But] what is the meaning of 'basis'?"") The greater part of the *pudgala* critique in the AKBh is then devoted to the refutation of this thesis (see,

147,5–12) as a means of demonstrating that a certain entity (the effect) cannot be said to be either identical to or different from another one (the cause) is certainly reminiscent of the MSA(Bh)'s and the AKBh's lengthy digressions on the relationship between fuel (*indhana*, etc.) and fire (*agni*, etc.), an explanatory metaphor frequently resorted to in extant Pudgalavāda literature.¹³⁶ We take it for granted, then, that PVSV 147,2–148,5 is to be interpreted as a critique of the (or a version of the) Pudgalavāda. Yet the passage shows significant differences with respect to previous attempts to refute personalism.¹³⁷ A brief summary of its context and structure may be of help in understanding how Dharmakīrti's strategy in the *pudgala* controversy departs from that of his predecessors.

1.2.1.2. The discussion over the *pudgala* occurs in the context of the inference of the fact that things perish at every single moment (*vināśītvā-numāna*).¹³⁸ While explaining the reason of this inference, i.e., the fact that things' destruction is spontaneous or causeless (*ahetuka*), Dharmakīrti specifies that stating this reason does not amount to seeing destruction as a property which would come to belong to the perishing entity. When saying that a thing's destruction is causeless (a formula seemingly implying that the thing and its destruction are ontologically distinct), the proponent of causeless destruction only makes use of an artificial distinction so as to make clear that there is no cause for destruction,¹³⁹ for the use of an expression such as "the x of y" does

e.g., the quotations of the AKBh below, fn. 150, p. 97, where both *upādāya* and *upādāna* appear).

¹³⁶ On the fuel-fire metaphor, see above, §1.1.3.4.2, and fn. 94, p. 74, and below, fn. 149, p. 97.

¹³⁷ For instance the KV, the VK, the TSi and the MSABh devote much of the discussion over the *pudgala* to the examination of the exegetical problems (various levels of contradiction with scripture) that a personalistic doctrine entails (on the *yukti/āgama* structure of the MSABh argument, see Eltschinger 2010a: 298) and so does the AKBh (from AKBh_{Pr} 464,25/AKBh_{LE} 64,1 onwards it mainly deals with scriptural matters), whereas this aspect of the problem is conspicuously absent in PVSV 147,2–148,5 (but also, interestingly enough, in YBhū 129,6–136,8).

¹³⁸ On this inference see Eltschinger 2010b: 423–424 (§12b).

¹³⁹ PVSV 145,11–20 (together with PV 1.276): *kathaṃ tarhīdānīm ahetuko vināśo bhavatyūcyate / naśyan bhāvo 'parāpekṣa iti tajjñāpanāya sā / avasthā'hetur uktāsyā bhedaṃ āropya cetasā // na bhāvo jāto 'parasmān nāsaṃ pratilabhate / tathābhū-*

tasyaiva svayaṃ jāter ity aparāpekṣadharmāntarapratīṣedhārtham tatsvabhāvajñāpanenārthāntaram iva dharmīṇo dharmam cetasā vibhajya tanmātrajijñāsāyām svabhāva eva tathocyate / tad etan mandabuddhayaḥ kvacit tathādarśanād ghoṣamātravipralabdā nāśam guṇam tasya ca bhāvam āropya sahetukam ahetukam vā pratiṣṭhitatattvayā bhāvacintayātmānam ākulayanti / “[Objection:] Now[, if there is nothing called ‘destruction’], then in what sense do [you] say that destruction is causeless? [Answer:] An entity does not depend on [anything] else [i.e., a cause of destruction,] while perishing. Therefore in order to indicate this [i.e., the fact that it does not depend on a cause of destruction, we] say [that] this state [of destruction] is without a cause. [And this we do] after having [erroneously] construed through [conceptual] thought a [purely artificial] distinction between this [state of destruction and the destroyed entity itself] (PV 1.276). An entity, once produced, does not receive [its] destruction from [anything] else [i.e., from any cause of destruction], for it is produced itself as being exactly such [i.e., as possessing a transient nature]. Thus when one wishes to know just this [i.e., when one wonders whether the destruction of an entity comes from something else or not],^a by indicating the [transient] nature of this [entity] in order to negate a distinct property [i.e., destruction,] that [would] depend on [something] else, it is [in fact nothing but this] nature that [we] describe in those terms (*tathā*), [but this we do] after distinguishing through [conceptual] thought a property [i.e., destruction,] from a property-bearer as if [this property were] something [really] distinct [from it. And] this is precisely what (*tad etat*)^b dull-witted [people erroneously] construe (*āropya*) as a [distinct] property [consisting in] destruction, [subsequently construing] its existence as well [and its being] either with or without a cause, [as these people are] led astray by the mere words[: ‘The entity’s destruction occurs’] because they have seen, in a certain [other] case [i.e., in such words as ‘the king’s servant,’^c that it is] so, [i.e., that such a statement refers to two distinct entities. In so doing] they perplex themselves with [idle] ontological considerations (*bhāvacintā*) of unfounded truth.” [^a According to PVT *Je* D323a5/P395a6–7 ≈ PVSVT 521,28–29: *bhāvasyānyasmāt kiṃ vināśo bhavati na veti** **veti* em. (PVT *’gyur ram ’on te*) : *ceti* Ed. ^b Note PVT *Je* D323a6/P395a8–b1 ≈ PVSVT 521,31–522,10: *tad etad [...]* *bhāvād** *avyatiriktaṃ nāśitvaṃ tattvato vyavasthāpitam*. **bhāvād* em. (PVT *dños po las*) : *abhāvād* Ed. “Precisely that destruction that has been determined as not being really distinct from the [perishing] entity [itself].” ^c PVT *Je* D323a7/P395b2 = PVSVT 522,12–13: *rājñāḥ puruṣa ityādaṃ vyatirekavibhakti*prayoge tathādarśanāt sambandhinor vibhāgarśanāt /* *Note PVT *tha dad pa’i rten can rnam par dbye ba*, “case-endings that possess a distinct basis.” “Because they have seen, in a use of the case-endings [conveying] a distinction, such as ‘the king’s servant,’ [that it is] so [i.e., that there is] a distinction between the two correlates.” On the use of the genitive *vyatireka-vibhakti* when there is no real difference, see below, fn. 140, p. 91.

not necessarily imply that *x* and *y* are distinct real entities.¹⁴⁰ The opponent objects that Dharmakīrti, who has repeatedly stated that an

¹⁴⁰ PVSV 32,18–33,5 (together with PV 1.60): *nanu ca vācyaviśeṣābhāvāt saṅketabhedo 'py ayukto dvayor ekābhīdhānāt / tathā ca vyatirekiṇyā vibhakter ayogas tasyā bhe-dāśrayatvāt / dvayor ekābhīdhāne 'pi vibhaktir vyatirekiṇī / bhinnam artham ivā-nveti vācye leśaviśeṣataḥ // na vai śabdānām kācid viśayasvabhāvāyattā vṛttir icchāto vṛttyabhāvaprasaṅgāt / te yathā vyatirikte 'vyatirikte vā prayoktum iṣyante tathā niyuktās tam artham apratibandhena prakāśayanti / tena gaur gotvam ityēkā-rthābhīdhāne 'pi kasyacid viśeṣasya pratyāyanārthaṃ kṛte saṅketabhede vyatirik-tārthā vibhaktir arthāntaram ivādarśayanti pratibhāty anarthāntare 'pi tathāprayoga-darśanābhyāsāt / na tāvatā sarvatra bhedaḥ / anyatrāpi puruṣecchāvaśāt pravṛt-tasya pratibandhābhāvāt / yathaikaṃ kvacid ekavacanena khyāpyate tadaviśeṣe 'pi gauravādikhyāpanārthaṃ bahuvacanena /* “Objection: Since the [thing] signified [by the two words ‘property’ and ‘property-bearer’] is the same, even a distinct convention is improper, for these two [words] refer to one [and the same thing]. And thus[, since the property and the property-bearer are not distinct things according to you], a [genitive] case-ending conveying a distinction^a is improper, because [the use of] this [case-ending] presupposes (°āśraya) a [real] distinction. [Answer:] Even though the [two words expressing the property and the property-bearer] refer to one [and the same thing], the [genitive] case-ending, which [usually] conveys a distinction, shows (anveti, gl. darśayati) the object as [if it were] distinct because of the slight difference [brought] into the signified [by a distinct convention, and not because of any real difference]. (PV 1.60) The reference of words is certainly never (na [...] śabdānām kācid [...] vṛtṭiḥ) based on the [intrinsic] nature of the [external] objects, for it would follow that reference would not be [made] arbitrarily. These [words are] employed in the way one wishes to use [them, be it] with regard to [something] distinct[, as when one says: ‘The king’s servant,’] or with regard to [something that is] not distinct[, as when one says: ‘It is the self that is the seer of the self,’ and they] manifest this object without any restriction (apratibandhena). Therefore, even though the [two words] ‘cow’ [for the property-bearer and] ‘cowness’ [for the property] refer to one [and the same] thing, when a specific convention is made in order to make known a certain difference,^b the [genitive] case-ending whose object is [usually] distinct appears and [ipso facto] presents [the property] as [if it were] something different [from the property-bearer] although it is not something different; [and this occurs] because of [our] habit of observing [the genitive case-ending] being used in this way [i.e., when there is a real distinction. But] for all this [i.e., due to the mere use of this case-ending], there is not a [real] distinction in every case, because there is nothing to prevent a [word conveying a distinction from being] used according to human arbitrariness in another case as well [i.e., when there is no real difference]. For example, one [thing] is expressed in a certain [context] with the singular [tvam, and in another context] with the plural [yūyam] in order to express respect, etc., even though [this thing] does not differ with regard to its [oneness].” [^a Note PVSVT

entity *x* is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to an entity *y*,¹⁴¹ must admit that destruction is either distinct from the entity that perishes (but then destruction should be perceived as a distinct entity, which is not the case) or identical to it (but then nothing can happen to this entity that is destruction itself): whatever the case, how can the entity ever perish?¹⁴² Dharmakīrti an-

146,11: *vyatirekiṇyā iti vyatirekābhīdhāyinyā gor gotvam iti śaṣṭhyā* / (“conveying a distinction,’ i.e., a genitive indicating a distinction in the form: ‘the cow’s cowness’) and PVSVT 146,15: *vibhaktir vyatirekiṇi vyatirekasya vācikā śaṣṭhi* / (“a case-ending conveying a distinction [i.e.,] a genitive expressing distinction”).^b PVSVT 146,25–26: *agovyāvṛttinimittasya gotvasya prakāśanārtham / agovyāvṛttimātram gotvaśabdena pratipādyam ity evaṅkṛte (saṅketabhede)* [...] /. “When a specific convention is made as follows: with a view to manifesting that cowness is the criterion of the exclusion of [one thing] from non-cows, the mere exclusion [of this thing] from non-cows must be indicated by the word ‘cowness.’” On the issues of the genitive case-ending and distinction/non-distinction in the context of the refutation of the *pudgala*, see also MAV 6.143 (Huntington 1992: 174–175).

¹⁴¹ PVSV 75,21–22: *svabhāvo hi svabhāvān na tattvam anyatvaṃ vā laṅghayati / rūpa-syātadbhūtasyaṇyatvāvyatikramāt* /. “[And] indeed, a [real] nature [*x*] does not avoid being either identical to or other than a [real] nature [*y*], for a [real] nature [*x*] that is not *y* does not elude being other [than *y*].” PVSV 117,18–20: *vastu [...] niyamena [...] bhedābhedaṇ nātivartate / rūpaṃ hi vastu / tasyātattvam evānyattvam ity uktam* /. “Necessarily, a [real] entity [*x*] does not transgress [the alternative between] distinction and non-distinction, for a [real] entity is a nature. [Now, we have already] said [above in PVSV 75,21–22] that otherness is nothing but *x*’s not being *y*.” PVSV 118,23–24: *na ca bhedābhedaṇ muktva vastuno ’nyā gatiḥ / tasya rūpalakṣaṇatvāt / rūpasya caitadvikalpānativṛtteḥ* /. “And for a [real] entity [*x*], there is no other possibility than being distinct or not [from an entity *y*], because this [real entity] is defined as a nature, and because a nature does not escape this alternative [between distinction and non-distinction].” PVSV 144,11: *tasmāt sato rūpasya tattvānyattvāvyatikramāt* /. “Therefore [it is so] because a [really] existing nature [*x*] does not escape [the alternative between] being identical to or other than [*y*].” See also PVSV 64,3–7.

¹⁴² PVSV 145,21–25 (together with PV 1.277ab): *svato ’pi bhāve ’bhāvasya vikalpaś ced ayaṃ samaḥ / nanv aparabhāvitve ’pi vināśasya svata eva bhāvasya bhavato ’yaṃ tattvānyattvavikalpas tulyaḥ / tadā kim arthāntarabhāve bhāvo na drśyate / anarthāntaratve ’pi tad eva tad bhavati / tan na kiñcid asya jātam iti katham vinaṣṭo nāma* /. “[Objection:] Even if [one admits with you that] non-existence [i.e., destruction,] exists by itself [i.e., is causeless, you have to face] the same alternative [between identity and otherness] (PV 1.277ab). But even if [destruction] is not due to [anything] else, [you have to face] the same alternative as to whether an entity’s destruction existing only by itself is the same [as the entity itself] or other [than it].

swers that in fact the alternative between identity and otherness only applies to the arising of something real possessed of a distinct nature. As a consequence it cannot concern destruction itself, for the proponent of causeless destruction does not assert the existence of a distinct property called “destruction” but only the fact that the entity itself does not exist.¹⁴³ Destruction only appears to be endowed with a nature of

Then if [this causeless destruction] exists as something distinct, why don't [we] perceive this [distinct] entity?^a [But] again, in case [this causeless destruction] is not something distinct, it is the [entity itself, say a pot,] that is what [is called 'destruction']. Therefore since nothing happens to the [entity], how [can it be called] 'destroyed' [at all]?" [^a PVT Je D323b5/P396a2: *ci'i phyir mi snañ ste / snañ ba ñid du 'gyur ro /*. "Why don't [we] perceive this entity? [We] should perceive [it]."] Here does *bhāvaḥ* refer to destruction (which should be perceived if it is a distinct entity) or to the entity such as the pot (which remains unaffected by destruction if destruction is something distinct from it, so that it should be perceived)? The interpretation of *tan na kiñcid asya jātam iti* depends on the answer given to this question. In the first hypothesis, this conclusion concerns *anarthāntaratve 'pi tad eva tad bhavati*. In the second hypothesis, it concerns both members of the alternative.

¹⁴³ PVSv 145,25–146,1 (together with PV 1.277cd): *nanv atra / na tasya kiñcid bhavati na bhavaty eva kevalam ity uktam / na hy ayaṃ vināśo 'nyo vā kaścid bhāvasya bhavati āha / kiṃ tarhi / sa eva bhāvo na bhavati / yadi hi kasyacid bhāvaṃ brūyāt / na bhāvo 'nena nivartitaḥ syāt / tathā ca bhāvanivṛttau prastutāyām aprastutam evoktaṃ syāt / na hi kasyacid bhāvena bhāvo na bhūto nāma / tadā na bhūto yadi svayaṃ na bhavet /*. “[Answer:] But haven't [we] said in this regard: this [entity] possesses no [particular property called 'destruction,' be it distinct or not from itself]: it simply does not exist (PV 1.277cd). For the [proponent of causeless destruction] does not say that destruction or any other [property like continued existence and transformation]^a belongs to the entity, but rather that it is the entity itself that does not exist. For if he stated[, with the word 'destruction,'] the existence [i.e., the rise,]^b of a certain [property], the [existence of this property]^c would not make the entity cease to exist (*nivarteta*). And thus, since the cessation of the entity is the subject under discussion, [he] would only be stating [something] irrelevant [by positing another distinct thing],^d for an entity [can]not be said not to exist [merely] because of the existence of something [else]. Then [an entity can only be said] not to exist if it itself does not exist.” ^a According to PVT Je D323b7–324a1/P396a6–7 = PVSvT 523,6–7 (*anyo vā sthityanyathātvādiko dharmah*). ^b According to PVT Je D324a1–2/P396a8 = PVSvT 523,10 (*bhāvaṃ utpādam*). ^c Against PVT Je D324a2/P396a8 = PVSvT 523,10 (*anena vādinā*). ^d According to PVT Je D324a2/P396b1 ≈ PVSvT 523,12 (*arthāntarasyānyasya vidhānād* aprastutam*). *Note PVT *brjod pa'i phyir* for *vidhānāt*). ^e The text of the PVSv is not well established here: (1) PVSv_{Tib} D346b3/P509a7–8 reads: *'jig pa zes bya ba* (**na bhūto nāma?*), which echoes the reading of the MS A (*svayaṃ na bhūto nāma bhavet /*).

its own when we say that it *is* causeless, but the activity (*vyāpāra*) expressed by any verbal root¹⁴⁴ (i.e., here, the activity consisting in existing) can only belong to an entity endowed with functionalities, so that destruction cannot be considered the real agent of the verb “to be.” Thus when we say that a hare’s horn *is* a non-existence, far from asserting the hare’s horn existence, we actually intend to deny the existence of the hare’s horn; accordingly, the statement “destruction *is* causeless” is not the affirmation that destruction exists as a real entity but the negation of its having a cause. Dharmakīrti concludes that only a real entity *x* (i.e., only an entity possessing a nature of its own, which is not the case of destruction) is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to *y*.¹⁴⁵

(2) PVS_V_{Tib} D346b3/P509a8 and PVT_{Je} D324a3/P396b2 read: *gañ gi tshe* (**yadā*).

(3) PVS_V_{Tib} D346b3/P509a8 reads: *yod pa med pa* (**na bhavati?*), clearly more satisfactory than *bhavet*.

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., Cardona 1974.

¹⁴⁵ PVS_V 146,11–147,2 (together with PV 1.278ab): *tasmād yasya nāśo bhavatīty ucyate sa svayam eva na bhavatīty uktaṃ syāt / na vai ghoṣasāmyād viṣayāntaraḍṣṭo vidhiḥ sarvatra yojanām arhati / na hi gardabha iti nāmakaraṇād bāleyadharmā manuṣye ‘pi saṃyojyāḥ / tathā na caitrasya putro bhavatīty atra ḍṣṭo vidhir nāśe ‘pi virodhāt / evaṃ cābhīdhāne ‘pi prayojanam āveditam eva / ataḥ / bhāve hy eṣa vikalpaḥ syād vidher vastvanurodhataḥ / bhāvo ‘vaśyaṃ bhavantaṃ apekṣate / sa ca svabhāva eva / niḥsvabhāvāsya kvacid vyāpāre samāveśābhāvāt / vyāpāra iti hi tathābhūtasvabhāvotpattiḥ / sā niḥsvabhāvāsya katham syāt / katham idānīm bhavaty abhāvaḥ śaśaviṣāṇam ityādivyavahāraḥ / na vai śaśaviṣāṇam kiñcid bhavatīty ucyate / api tv evam asya na bhavatīti bhāvapratīṣedha eva kriyate / api ca / vyavahartāra evaitad evaṃ vyāpāravād iva samāropyādarśayanti prakaraṇena kenacit / na tu tat tathā / sarvārthavivecanaṃ hi tatra tattvaṃ na kasyacit samāveśaḥ / na khalv evaṃ vināśo vastuni tadbhāvāt / asāv api yadi vaktṛbhir evaṃ khyāpyate na tu svayaṃ tathā tadā na kiñcid bhavatītiṣṭam eva / tasmāt svayaṃ bhavan svabhāvo vikalpadvayaṃ nātivartate tattvaṃ anyattvaṃ iti /* “Therefore one must say that it is the [entity] the destruction of which is said to ‘exist’ that does not exist itself. It is certainly not the case that, on the grounds of a [mere] similarity in wording, the affirmation (*vidhi* : *bya ba*) observed in another case [such as: ‘Caitra’s son’] can be applied to every case [i.e., to ‘the thing’s destruction’ too]. Indeed, the properties of an ass (*bāleya*) cannot be applied to a human being as well [merely] on the grounds that [a certain person] is named ‘Gardabha (= ass)’; in the same way, the affirmation (*vidhi* : *bya ba*)^a which is observed in the [statement]: ‘Caitra’s son *exists*’ (*caitrasya putro bhavatīti*) [does] not [apply] to [the case of] destruction as well,^b because it is contradictory. And although the [verbal] expression is [grammatically] the same (*evam*), [its real] purpose (*prayojana* : *dgoñs pa*) has been presented

[above].^c Therefore: this alternative [between identity and otherness] can [only] concern the [coming into] existence [of something real], because activity (*vidhi*) necessarily belongs (*anurodha*) to something real (PV 1.278ab). [Coming into] existence necessarily requires [something] that comes into existence, and this [can] only [be] a nature, for that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity (*vyāpāra*). For [what we call] an ‘activity’ is [nothing but] the arising of such a nature; [but] how could this [arising] pertain to [something] that lacks a nature [i.e., destruction]? [Objection:] Now, [if that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity,] how [do you explain] a usage such as ‘a hare’s horn is a non-existence’? [Answer:] One certainly does not say that a hare’s horn is something; rather, [when] thus [stating that a hare’s horn is a non-existence,] one simply negates the existence of this [hare’s horn by saying] that [it] does not exist. Moreover, it is the speakers who, according to the context [of discussion such as: ‘Is the hare’s horn non-existence or is it not?’ erroneously] construe and present this [hare’s horn] thus [i.e., as the agent of existence in the sentence: ‘The hare’s horn is a non-existence’] as if it had an activity; but it is not so.^d Being devoid of [the nature of] any object is the true nature of this (*tatra*) [hare’s horn, and] nothing [unreal] engages in [an activity such as coming into existence.^e But our opponent] certainly does not [admit] destruction [to be] such [i.e., characterized as void of the nature of any object, like a hare’s horn or the son of a barren woman], because [according to him] this [property] exists [i.e., arises,] in the entity. Even though (*yadi [...] tu*) the [ordinary] speakers present this very [destruction that our opponent considers thus] in the same way [as having an activity when they say that it ‘exists,’ they] do acknowledge that it itself is not so [i.e., that it does not have arising as a property],^f [and] therefore that it is nothing. Therefore if it exists by itself [i.e., in a non-superimposed way],^g the nature [of an entity] cannot escape these two [mutually] exclusive options (*vikalpadvaya*), i.e., [either] identity [or] otherness.” ^a PVSVT 525,23: *vidhir arhāntarasya putrasya vidhānam* /. “Affirmation, i.e., the position of a son who is something distinct.” In spite of the Tibetan rendering of *vidhi* as *bya ba* (a usual equivalent of Skt. *vyāpāra*), here the meaning of *vidhi* seems more likely to be “affirmation,” although from the next verse onwards it obviously means *vyāpāra* (in the sense of the grammatical agent’s activity). ^b PVSVT 525,24: *na bhāvasya nāśo bhavatīty atrāpi bhāvād vyatireko nāśo vidheyah* /. “In the [statement:] ‘There is a destruction of the entity’ as well, destruction is not to be posited as distinct from the entity [itself].” Note that PVT Je D325a6/P397b7 explicitly refers here to the genitive (**śaṣṭhī*) case-endings (*de ltar na nag pa’i bu zhes bya ba’i nag ’di la tha dad pa’i rten can gyi drug pa [*vyatirekavibhaktiśaṣṭhī] sbyar ba dag*). ^c I.e., in PVS 145,16–17 according to PVT Je D325a5/P398a2–3 = PVSVT 525,28–29. ^d I.e., pseudo-things like a hare’s horn or the son of a barren woman (*vandhyāsuta* in PVT Je D325b3/P398b2–3 = PVSVT 526,23) do not have a *vyāpāra* (**vyāpāravat* PVT Je D325b6/P398b6, *vyāpārayukta* PVSVT 526,30) simply because of linguistic usage (*vyavahāramātreṇa*, PVT Je D325b6/P398b6 = PVSVT 526,29). ^e Note PVT Je D325b6/P398b7–8: [...] *gyi dños por gyur pa’i bya ba ’ga’ žig dan ldan pa ni ma yin no* /. “But it does not have any real activity.” ^f As a justification for this, PVT Je

1.2.1.3.1. The Pudgalavādin enters the stage at this point,¹⁴⁶ objecting that the *pudgala* is not subjected to this alternative since it is neither the same as nor other than the constituents.¹⁴⁷ It is not identical to them because its nature is distinct from theirs, but it is not other than them because it is causally related to them and because otherness is a mere lack of relation (*apratibandha*). Dharmakīrti criticizes his opponent's notion of causality (which entails that a cause and its effect are neither identical nor mutually other) while relying on his own analysis of relation (according to which a relation can be either of identity or of causality, the latter obtaining between entities that have distinct natures).¹⁴⁸ He then puts forward his own definition of otherness as the fact that two natures remain unmixed. As a consequence, if, as the Pudgalavādin contends, the *pudgala* and the constituents do not have the same nature, there can be no relation between them (except a causality relation that the Pudgalavādin cannot accept since it concerns entities that are mutually other) and they have distinct properties, so that they must be mutually other. The opponent attempts to rescue the

D326a2/P399a3 = PVSVT 527,13 add: *nīrūpatvād asya* /. ^g According to PVT *Je* D326a3/P399a4 = PVSVT 527,15 (*svayam anadhyāropitenākāreṇa*).

¹⁴⁶ See below, fn. 162, p. 102.

¹⁴⁷ On the Pudgalavādins' contention that the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor other than the constituents, see, e.g., Bareau 1955: 115 (Vātsīputriya), Chau 1987: 40, Chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Eltschinger 2010a: 294. The thesis is presented in the following way in MSA 18.93: *ekatvānyatvato 'vācyas tasmād doṣadvayād asau / skandhātmavaprasaṅgāc ca taddravyavaprasaṅgataḥ* //. "This [*pudgala*] cannot be said (*avācya*) to be either one [and the same] with or distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e., from the five constituents], because of the two faults [that would ensue]: for [if the constituents and the *pudgala* were one and the same,] the constituents would be the self, and [if the constituents and the *pudgala* were distinct,] the [*pudgala*] would be a [real] substance." See Eltschinger 2010a: 330; see also AKBh_{Pr} 462,3–4/AKBh_{LE} 42,5–6: *na cānyaḥ skandhebhyaḥ śakyate pratijñā-tum śāśvataprasaṅgāt / nāpy ananya ucchedaprasaṅgāt* /. "And this [*pudgala*] cannot be asserted [to be] other than the constituents, because [if it were other than them its] eternity would ensue; nor [can it be asserted to be] the same, because [then its] annihilation would ensue." See also above, §§1.1.3.4.1–2, and fn. 134, p. 88.

¹⁴⁸ On the two types of relation acknowledged by Dharmakīrti, i.e., identity (*tādātmya*), which concerns two conceptually extracted properties of one and the same entity, and causality (*tadutpatti*), which regards two distinct entities, see Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 (§10c) and below, fn. 151, p. 98.

thesis of a relation between the constituents and the *pudgala* by explaining that this relation does not lie in a causal connection between them but in some sort of invariable connection between their respective cognitions. Dharmakīrti replies by showing that there is no such connection and by arguing that the *pudgala*, which is not known through a distinct cognition but, according to the Pudgalavādin himself, “on the basis” of the constituents, has no nature of its own: if it did it would necessarily appear in a distinct way as an object of cognition.

1.2.1.3.2. Dharmakīrti thus follows the gist of the MSABh or AKBh arguments insofar as he too attacks the Pudgalavādin’s contention that the *pudgala* is designated on the basis of the constituents by showing that the causal relation assumed between the constituents and the *pudgala* does not stand critical examination¹⁴⁹ and that the *pudgala* is not perceived on the basis of the constituents.¹⁵⁰ However, he does so with ar-

¹⁴⁹ Both the MSABh and the AKBh criticize the view that causally related elements can be said neither to be identical nor to be mutually other: they endeavour to show that in fact an effect and its cause are mutually other, most notably because they have different characteristics (see above, fn. 96, p. 74). This idea seems to find an echo in PVSV 147,12 (see below, fn. 180 and 181, p. 104) but Dharmakīrti’s main argument is much more encompassing: instead of merely pointing out the distinct characteristics of fire and fuel (or those of the *pudgala* and the *skandhas*), he shows that the Pudgalavādins’ thesis, which equates the causality relation with inexpressibility in terms of identity or otherness, ends up diluting the very notion of causality to the point that everything can be considered a causal condition while nothing can be said to be other than anything else.

¹⁵⁰ The MSA(Bh) rejects the *pudgala*’s existence as a substantially existing (*dravyasat*) nature on the grounds of its not being perceived (see MSA 18.92: *prajñāptyastitayā vācyaḥ pudgalo dravyato na tu / nopalambhād viparyāsāt saṅkleśāt kliṣṭa hetu-taḥ* //). “The *pudgala* must be said to exist as a [mere] designation, but not as a [real] substance, because one does not perceive [it] (*nopalambha*), because [our pseudo-perception of the *pudgala*] is [nothing but] a wrong notion, because it is a pollution, because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled.” Translation Eltschinger 2010a: 305; on the form *nopalambha*, see Conze 1967 s.v.). The AKBh, examining the relation between the awareness of the constituents and that of the *pudgala*, points out that the designation (*prajñāpti*) *pudgala* rests either on the perception of the constituents (but then the unperceived *pudgala* is nothing but a designation for the perceived constituents) or on the perception of the *pudgala* itself (but then the *pudgala* differs from the constituents since it can be perceived by itself). See AKBh_{Pr} 463,3–6 / AKBh_{LE} 50,1–5: *yadā ca pudgalaḥ prajñāpyate kiṃ tāvat skandhān upalabhya prajñāpyata āhosvit pudgalam / yadi*

guments that appear profoundly renewed insofar as they rest on important innovations of his own system: while his criticism of the relation between the *pudgala* and the constituents rests on his definition of the so-called natural relation (*svabhāvapratiḥbandha*),¹⁵¹ his analysis of

tāvat skandhāṃs teṣv eva pudgalaprajñaptiḥ prāpnoti / pudgalasyānupalambhāt / atha pudgalaṃ katham asya skandhān upādāya prajñaptir bhavati / pudgala eva hi tasyā upādānaṃ prāpnoti / “And when the *pudgala* is designated, is it designated when perceiving the constituents or the *pudgala* [himself]? On the one hand, if [it is designated when perceiving] the constituents, then the designation *pudgala* concerns only these [constituents], since the *pudgala* is not perceived (*anupalambha*); on the other hand, [if it is designated when perceiving] the *pudgala*, how could the [*pudgala*] be designated on the basis of (*upādāya*) the constituents [as the *Pudgala-vādin* claims]? For then the basis (*upādāna*) of this [designation] concerns the sole *pudgala*.” See also *AKBh_{Pr}* 463,25–464,2/*AKBh_{LE}* 56,8–13: *atha rūpāṇy upalabhamānaḥ pudgalaṃ upalabhate / kiṃ tayaivopalabdhhyopalabhata āhosvid anyayā / yadi tayaiva / rūpād abhinnavabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ prāpnoti / rūpa eva vā tatprajñaptiḥ / idaṃ ca rūpam ayaṃ pudgala iti^a katham idaṃ paricchidyate^b / athaivaṃ na paricchidyate / katham idaṃ pratijñāyate rūpam apy asti pudgalo ‘py astīti / upalabdhivaśena hi tasyāstitvaṃ pratijñāyeta^c /* [^a *AKBh_{LE}* *iti* : *AKBh_{Pr}* *om. iti.* ^b *AKBh_{LE}* *paricchidyate* : *AKBh_{Pr}* *gamyate.* ^c *AKBh_{LE}* *pratijñāyeta* : *AKBh_{Pr}* *pratijñāyate.*] “If [the opponent explains that] one perceives the *pudgala* when perceiving visible things (*rūpa*), does one perceive [the *pudgala*] through the same perception [as that of the visible things] or through another one? If [it is] through the same [perception], the *pudgala* must have the same nature [as the visible things], or [rather,] the designation [*pudgala*] only regards the visible things, and [thus] how could [we] make this distinction: ‘This is the visible thing, this is the *pudgala*’? Now if [we] cannot make such a distinction, how could [we] admit that both the visible thing and the *pudgala* exist? For it is due to perception (*upalabdhi*) that the existence of this [*pudgala*] could be admitted.” On the cognizability of the *pudgala*, see above, §1.1.3.3.

¹⁵¹ Thus Dharmakīrti’s opponent considers that related entities cannot have natures that are completely alien to each other; accordingly, in PVSV 147,3–4 he defines the otherness of two given entities as a lack of relation between their natures (*svabhāvapratiḥbandha*). However, according to Dharmakīrti, relation cannot be understood as the merging or mixture (*miśrībhavana*) of the relata’s natures: real entities remain unmixed with one another (see, e.g., SP 5: *tau ca bhāvau tadanyaś ca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ / ity amiśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā //* “And the two [so-called related] entities as well as [their relation, which is supposedly] distinct from [them,] all rest in themselves; as a consequence, entities remain unmixed [*amiśra*] in themselves: it is conceptual thought that mixes them.”). According to Dharmakīrti, otherness is precisely this fact that entities’ natures do not merge or their mutual exclusiveness (*parasparam ananugamaḥ*, PVSV 147,8–9; cf. PVSVṬ 528,15–16, which explains it as *amiśrībhavanam*: see below, fn. 174, p. 103).

the *pudgala*'s alleged perception, which shows that the *pudgala* is no real entity, rests on his elaboration of the notion of *anupalabdhi*¹⁵² and more importantly, on the equation between existence and functionality (*arthakriyā*)¹⁵³ and on the idea that any existing entity must have the minimal efficacy consisting in producing a cognitive appearance of itself:¹⁵⁴ the *pudgala* is not a real entity precisely because it is devoid of such a power.

1.2.1.3.3. Here the Pudgalavāda's critique is instrumental in establishing Dharmakīrti's own version of the identity principle (according to which a real entity *x* must be either the same as or other than a real entity *y*), or rather, it is instrumental in establishing that this principle only applies to real entities (so that the opponent of the causeless destruction thesis cannot claim that destruction must be subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to the perishing entity). However, it is worth noting that the TSP adopts the reverse strategy: there the *pudgala*'s ontological status is no longer used to establish the scope of the identity principle; rather, it is the scope of the identity principle that determines the *pudgala*'s ontological status. Thus Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla endeavour to show that because the identity principle only applies to real entities, the *pudgala*, which escapes the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to

Indeed, Dharmakīrti acknowledges one relation besides that of pure and simple identity, namely, the causality relation, but he shows that the natures involved in it remain heterogeneous (see Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 [§10c]. The Pudgalavādin, by claiming that the *pudgala* is related with the constituents, is thus confronted with the very alternative between identity and otherness that his *pudgala* supposedly escapes: either the *pudgala*'s relation with the constituents is one of pure and simple identity, or it is one of causality (and therefore of otherness). In order to get away from this alternative he has to acknowledge the lack of relation (*apratibandha*) between the *pudgala* and the constituents, but by doing so he is doomed to accept their otherness since he himself defines otherness as *apratibandha* (PVSV 147,12; see below, fn. 179, p. 104).

¹⁵² See Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e) and below, fn. 186, p. 106.

¹⁵³ See Eltschinger 2010b: 402–403 (§5b). Cf. TS 347ab, quoted below, fn. 211, p. 113.

¹⁵⁴ PVSV 149,27–150,2: *jñānamātrārthakriyāyām apy asāmarthyē vastv eva na syāt / tathā hi tallakṣaṇaṁ vastv iti vakṣyāmaḥ* /. "If [something] lacks the ability to perform the functionality that is a mere cognition, it is no real entity at all; for we will say that a real entity has as its characteristic this [functional efficacy]." See, e.g., Yoshimizu 1999: 145 and 149.

the constituents, cannot be a real entity.¹⁵⁵ Saying that only a real entity cannot escape the alternative between identity and otherness is tantamount to claiming that something that cannot be stated in terms of identity or otherness can only be unreal or is a pseudo-entity (*avas-tu*), and such is (one among) the Buddhist epistemologists' criteria for the old Abhidharmic distinction between "substantially real" (*dravya-sat*) and "designatively real" (*prajñaptisat*) so constantly at stake in all the traditional accounts of the *pudgala* controversy.¹⁵⁶ How to establish the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the two properties *tattvānyatvāvā-cyatva* and *avastutva*? This is what Śāntaraksita is up to in TS 338–342. The argument is formulated as follows in TS 338a₂d:

¹⁵⁵ Candrakīrti had already adopted a somewhat similar strategy (on this strategy, see Duerlinger 1984: 264 and 270). Candrakīrti spells out the anti-Personalist's classic argument as follows (MAV 6.147): *gaṇ phyir gzugs las sems brjod med mi rtogs // dños yod brjod med rtogs pa ma yin ñid // gal te bdag 'ga' dños por grub gyur na // sems ltar grub dños brjod du med mi 'gyur //*. "[The difference or identity of] mind with respect to form is not conceived of as inexpressible, and in fact, no existing (*vastusat*) is considered inexpressible. It follows that if the self is an established entity, then, like 'mind,' which is [also] an established entity, [its difference or identity with respect to psychophysical aggregates] would not be inexpressible." Translation Huntington 1992:175. The full version of the argument in contraposed form appears in MAV 6.148: *gaṇ phyir khyod bum dños por ma grub pa'i // ño bo gzugs gaṇ phuñ po las brjod med 'gyur te // rañ gis yod par grub par rtogs mi bya //*. "According to our opponent, a jug is not by nature an established entity precisely because [its difference or identity] with respect to form, for example, is inexpressible. Likewise, the relationship of the self to the psychophysical aggregates is also inexpressible, and therefore one ought not conceive of the self as intrinsically existent." Translation Huntington 1992: 175.

¹⁵⁶ Note TSP_K 127,17/TSP_S 115,15: *evaṃ tāvad avācyatvābhyupagame prajñaptisat-tvam pudgalasya prāptam iti pratipāditam /*. "Thus, it has been shown first that if one accepts that the *pudgala* cannot be said [to be either identical to or different from the constituents,] it follows that it [only] exists as a designation." On Vasubandhu's distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat*, see Katsura 1976; on the Pudgalavādins' understanding of *prajñapti*, see above, §§1.1.3.3–4. Surviving evidence regarding theories of the *pudgala* indicates that the Pudgalavādins themselves regarded the *pudgala* as a *prajñapti* (see, e.g., Chau 1987: 42–43, Buswell 1999: 354, Lusthaus 2009 and Eltschinger 2010a: 294–295).

A real *pudgala* does not exist, because it cannot be said to be either identical to or other than [another entity], like a water-lily in the sky.¹⁵⁷

Kamalaśīla reformulates his master's argument in the following "formal" application (*prayoga*):

[*Vyāpti*:] Whatever cannot be said to be either the same as or other than a [given] entity is not a [real] entity, like a water-lily in the sky. [*Pakṣadharmatā*:] Now, the *pudgala* cannot be said [to be either the same as or other than another entity. The logical reason involved in the present argument] is the non-perception of the pervader.¹⁵⁸

According to TSP_K 126,17/TSP_S 114,22, TS 340–342 are aimed at demonstrating this pervasion:

Since the alternative between difference and identity has a [real] entity as its basis, the [pseudo-things] that are without a nature [of their own] are not [to be] designated as identical to or other than [other things], etc., but [this is] not [the case of] a [real] entity. For the negation [to which one resorts when saying:] "[x] is not y [i.e., does not have y for its nature]" entails (°*vat*) [the affirmation of] another entity. [Therefore] one obviously states [its] otherness with regard to y.¹⁵⁹ And to negate that [x] does not have y for its nature amounts to saying that [x] is identical [to y]. Therefore a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] identity and difference with regard to a [real] entity [y].¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ TS 338a₂d: *pudgalo naiva vidyate pāramārthikaḥ / tattvānyatvādyavācyatvān nabhaḥkokanadādivat //*.

¹⁵⁸ TSP_K 126,14–15/TSP_S 114,19–20: *yad vastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatvābhyāṃ vācyam na bhavati na tad vastu / yathā gagananilanam / na bhavati ca vācyāḥ pudgala iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //*.

¹⁵⁹ According to TSP_K 127,7–8/TSP_S 115,5 (*svabhāvāntaravidhināntarīyakatvād vastu-no vastvantarabhāvanīṣedhasya //*). According to TSP_K 127,5/TSP_S 115,3, this answers the question: *katham punar gatyantarābhāvaḥ //*.

¹⁶⁰ TS 340–342: *bhedābhedavikalpasya vastvadhiṣṭhānabhāvataḥ / tattvānyatvādy-anirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣu yujyate //* *na vastuni yad etad dhi tan neti pratiṣedhanam / tad vastvantaravat tasmād vyaktam anyatvam ucyate //* *atadbhāvanīṣedhaś ca tattvam evābhidhīyate / nātikrāmati tad vastu tattvam bhedaṃ ca vastunaḥ //*. Kamalaśīla concludes (TSP_K 127,16/TSP_S 115,13–14): *iti siddhā vyāptir maulasya hetoḥ //*. "Thus, the principal reason's pervasion is established."

As a consequence, the *pudgala* is not a real entity. Equivalently, the *pudgala* is nothing but an entity of designation, which coincides perfectly with the MSA(Bh)'s and Vasubandhu's conclusions.

1.2.2. PVSV 147,2–148,5:¹⁶¹ Annotated Translation

¹⁶²A [certain real] nature [x]'s being other [than y] is nothing but its not being y, ¹⁶³for visible shape's (*rūpa*) and taste's being reciprocally other, too, is nothing else [than each one's not being the other one].¹⁶⁴ Objection: [Although x does not have the nature of y, still it cannot be said to be other than y, for] otherness [actually] consists in [their] natures' lacking a [mutual] relation (*pratibandha*).¹⁶⁵ [Answer:] What does this so-called relation [between x and y] consist of, so that [x] would be neither this [i.e., of the nature of y,] nor of a nature other [than y]? Objection: [This relation consists in x's] being born (*janman*)

¹⁶¹ Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's commentaries appear in PVT *Je* D326a4–Ñe 1b3/P399a6–Ñe 1b5 and PVSVT 527,18–530,22.

¹⁶² Introduction, PVT *Je* D326a4–5/P399a6–7 ≈ PVSVT 527,18–20: *rūpādiskandhasvabhāvaḥ pudgalo na bhavaty atha ca^a rūpādibhyo nānyaḥ / tasmāt^b tattvānyattvam ativartata eva svabhāva iti cet / tan na / yasmāt [...]* /. [^a Note PVT *de lta na yañ* (**tathāpi?*). ^b *tasmāt* em. (PVT *de bas na*) : *tasma* Ed.] “Objection: The *pudgala* does not have as its nature the constituents such as corporeality, and yet it is not other than corporeality, etc. Therefore it is the case that a [real] nature escapes [the alternative between] identity and otherness. [Answer:] This is not [the case], because [...]” On the Pudgalavādin's thesis that the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor other than the constituents, see above, §1.1.3.4, fn. 134, p. 88 and 147, p. 96.

¹⁶³ Introduction, PVT *Je* D326a5/P399a8 = PVSVT 527,21: *yadi pudgalo 'pi na skandhasvabhāvas tadā skandhebhyo 'nya eva / yataḥ [...]* /. “If the *pudgala* itself does not have the constituents as its nature, then [it can] only [be] other than the constituents, because [...]”

¹⁶⁴ Conclusion, PVSVT 527,22–23: *atatsvabhāvatvam evānyattvam / tac ca pudgale 'py astīti so 'pi skandhebhyo 'nya eveṣṭavyaḥ* /. “[x's] being other [than y] is nothing but [its] not having y as its nature. Now, since this is the case of the *pudgala* too, [you] have to admit that it is [simply] other than the constituents.”

¹⁶⁵ Conclusion, PVT *Je* D326a6–7/P399b1–2 = PVSVT 527,24–26: *sa ca pratibandhaḥ pudgalasya skandheṣv asti / tato 'tatsvabhāvatve 'pi nānyattvaṃ skandhebhyo pudgalasyeti* /. “Now, there is a [mutual] relation between the *pudgala* and the constituents. Therefore even though the *pudgala* does not have the constituents as its nature, it is not other than them.”

[of y].¹⁶⁶ [Answer: If it were because x is the effect of y that it could not be said to be either y or other than y, then] no cause and no effect¹⁶⁷ could [ever] be said [to be either identical with or other than] one another; and so¹⁶⁸ everything [would be] somehow¹⁶⁹ [causally] useful (*upayogin*) to everything, therefore¹⁷⁰ nothing would be other than anything. And thus even [someone using the word] “inexpressibility” (*avācyatā*)¹⁷¹ [defined in the afore-mentioned way] would merely express a causality relation with another word without [conveying] a different meaning.¹⁷² ¹⁷³[As for ourselves] however, we define (*brū-maḥ*) otherness as the exclusiveness (*ananugama*) of [two real] natures [i.e., as the fact that they do not mix with each other¹⁷⁴]. Now,

¹⁶⁶ Conclusion, PVT *Je* D326b1–2/P399b4 ≈ PVSVT 528,10: *evaṃ sati kāryatvāt skandhebhyaḥ pudgalasya tattvānyattvenāvācyatvam iṣṭam* /. “This being the case, since [the *pudgala*] is an effect [of the constituents, we] admit that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be either the same as or other than the constituents.” (Note that the PVT treats this as the conclusion of the objection whereas the PVSVT seems to understand it as the beginning of Dharmakīrti’s rebuttal). On the Pudgalavādins’ contention that the constituents and the *pudgala* stand in a causal relation comparable to that of fuel and fire, see above, §1.1.3.4.2, fn. 136, p. 89, and 149, p. 97.

¹⁶⁷ Note that PVS_S 527,7, PVS_{Tib} D346b6/P510b1 and PVT *Je* D326b2/P399b5 read *sarvakāryakāraṇānām* (*rgyu dan’bras bu thams cad*), against PVSVT 528,11 (*sarvakāraṇānām*) and according to Gnoli (*a silentio*), MSS A and B. We have read: *sarvakāryakāraṇānām*.

¹⁶⁸ Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b2/P399b6 = PVSVT 528,11: *tathā ceti kāryatvād avācyatve*. “And so, i.e., if [it is] because [the *pudgala*] is an effect [of the constituents that it] cannot be said [to be either identical to or other than them].”

¹⁶⁹ Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b2–3/P399b6–7 ≈ PVSVT 528,12: *kathañcid iti sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa ca*.^a [^a PVT reads *vā.] “‘Somehow,’ i.e., in a direct or indirect manner.”

¹⁷⁰ Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b3/P399b7 = PVSVT 528,12–13: *iti sarvatra kāryakāraṇa-bhāvāt*. “Therefore [i.e.,] because a causality relation [would thus obtain] with respect to everything.”

¹⁷¹ See above, §1.1.3.4, fn. 134, p. 88, and 147, p. 96.

¹⁷² On this refutation of the opponent’s view of causal relation, see above, fn. 149, p. 97.

¹⁷³ Introduction, PVT *Je* D326b4/P400a1 = PVSVT 528,15: *anyattvaṃ tu na niṣid-dham / yasmāt* [...] /. “But [according to us, their] otherness is not discarded [for all that], because [...]”

¹⁷⁴ PVT *Je* D326b4–5/P400a1–2 = PVSVT 528,15–16 explain *parāparam ananugamam* as *amśrībhanam*.

since [all entities] possessing a [real] nature are mutually [exclusive, they] have to be [mutually] other.¹⁷⁵ And [between entities that are not identical,¹⁷⁶] no[thing] except the natural relation consisting in causality [can be] called a “relation,” for it is not contradictory that [something which is causally] independent¹⁷⁷ [from something else] may deviate [from the latter].¹⁷⁸ [Both] because of this [lack of relation¹⁷⁹] and because [x and y have] distinct properties [i.e., inexpressibility-as and expressibility-as respectively],¹⁸⁰ x and y] are [simply] other.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁵ Introduction, PVT *Je* D326b5–6/P400a3–4: *gal te skye ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi rag lus pas phuñ po dag las gañ zag gžan ñid du yod pa ni ma yin mod kyi 'on kyañ rag lus pa gžan ñid du yod do že na /*. “Objection: [True,] it is not thanks to a relation defined as causality (**janmalakṣaṇapratibandha*) that the *pudgala* is other than the constituents; there are, however, other [kinds of] relations.”

¹⁷⁶ The causality relation (*tadutpattī*) is the only one possible in the case of discrete entities, and the only one left open for the Pudgalavādin, for whom an identity-type (*tādātmya*) relation is ruled out by his insistence on the fact that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be the same as the constituents. See Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 (§10c), and above, fn. 151, p. 98.

¹⁷⁷ Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b7/P400a5 ≈ PVSVT 528,19: *anāyattasya tadutpattyā ta-trāpratibaddhasya*. “Independent [i.e.,] not related to y through causality.”

¹⁷⁸ On this reasoning see above, fn. 151, p. 98.

¹⁷⁹ According to PVT *Je* D327a1/P400a7 ≈ PVSVT 528,20, *tataḥ* provides the first of two reasons: *tato 'pratibandhāt pudgalasya skandhebhyo 'nyattvam /*. [^a PVT reads **yathoktād apratibandhāt*.] “Because of the [afore-mentioned_{PVT}] lack of relation, the *pudgala* is other than the constituents.” See above, fn. 151, p. 98.

¹⁸⁰ See PVSVT 528,20–21: *tathā hy avācyatvaṃ pudgalasya dharmāḥ skandhānām tu parasparam vācyatvaṃ iti dharmabhedaḥ /*. “To explain: the *pudgala* has the property of being inexpressible (*avācyatva*) [in terms of identity or otherness] whereas the constituents [have the property of] being expressible (*vācyatva*) [in these terms] with respect to one another, so [the *pudgala* on the one hand and the constituents on the other hand] have distinct properties.” Cf. TSP_K 127,27/TSP_S 115,25 (following the statement that two real entities determined as having mutually contradictory properties are distinct from each other): *vācyatvāvācyatvādiparasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitau ca skandhapudgalau*. “Now, the constituents and the *pudgala* have mutually contradictory properties such as expressibility and inexpressibility.”

¹⁸¹ Explanation, PVT *Je* D327a2–3/P400a8–b2: *'di la yañ sbyor ba gñis su 'gyur te / gañ žig gañ la rag lus pa med pa de ni de las gžan pa yin te / rta las ba lañ (D : lañ dañ P) lta bu'o // phuñ po dag la gañ zag kyañ rag lus pa med pa žes bya ba ni rañ bžin gyi gtan tshigs so // gañ žig gañ las chos tha dad pa de ni de las gžan yin te / dper na rta las ba lañ lta bu'o // phuñ po dag las gañ zag kyañ chos tha dad pa yin no žes bya ba*

Objection: The relation [between x and y] is a matter (*kṛta*) of cognition[, not of causality]. Suppose the following be urged (*syād etat*): Because x, the cognition of which is invariably connected to the cognition of y, necessarily appears [in cognition] when y is cognized[, their relation is a matter of cognition, and due to this cognitional relation], x cannot be said [to be other than y] although it does not have the nature of y.¹⁸² [To this, let us answer as follows:] No, [the cognition of x is not invariably connected to the cognition of y,] because x is devoid of [any]

ni rañ bẓin gyi gtan tshigs ñid do //. “And there are two [formal] applications in this [connection: (1)] An x that is not related to a y is other than y, as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the *pudgala* is not related to the constituents. [The logical reason involved here] is a *svabhāva*hetu. [(2)] An x whose properties differ from y’s is other than y, as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the *pudgala* has properties different from y’s. [The logical reason involved here] is a *svabhāva*hetu.”

¹⁸² Explanation, PVT Je D327a6–7/P400b6–8: *gzugs la sogs pa gzuñ ba ñid kyis kyañ gañ zag kyañ gzuñ ba yin te / de ni mig la sogs pa’i rnam par śes pas śes par bya ba ñid yin pa’i phyir ro // de bas na gzugs la sogs pa rtogs pa med na mi ’byuñ ba yañ* (P : D om. *yañ*) *gañ zag rtogs pa yin pa de ltar na gañ zag phuñ po’i rañ bẓin ma yin du zin kyañ phuñ po dag las gẓan ñid du brjod par bya ba ma yin ze na /*. “It is [indeed] due to [our] grasping of [objects] such as visible things that the *pudgala* too is grasped,^a for this [*pudgala*] can be cognized (**jñeya*?) through a visual cognition, etc.^b Therefore, the cognition of the *pudgala* is invariably connected with the cognition of [objects] such as visible things. [And] thus, although the *pudgala* does not have the nature of the constituents,^c it cannot be said to be other than the constituents.”^d [^a To be compared with PVSVT 528,26–27: *tathā hi rūpaśabdādigrahaṇaiva pudgalagrahaṇam iṣyate /*. “For [you] accept that [it is] due to [our] grasping of [objects] such as visible things and sounds [that] the *pudgala* is grasped.” ^b To be compared with PVSVT 528,27: *cakṣurādivijñānavijñeyatvāt pudgalasyeti /* (where *pudgalasya* is simply substituted for **(t)asya*). ^c = PVSVT 528,29: *askandhasvabhāvam api /*. ^d = PVSVT 528,28: *skandhebhyo ’nyatvenāvācyaṃ*.] How to interpret *gzugs* = *rūpa* in this explanation? The commentators’ allusion to *cakṣurvijñāna* as well as Karṇakagomin’s reference to *śabda* suggest that the objects (*viśaya*) of the different sensory cognitions are meant (cf. the shift of meaning of the term *rūpa* in the AKBh when the discussion moves to the *pudgala* as an object of knowledge, *jñeya*, from AKBh_{Pr} 463,1/AKBh_{LE} 48,6 onwards). Remember, however, that these *viśayas* are instances of the *rūpaskandha* (as *dhātus/āyatana*s no. 1–5). Thus, the *pudgala* would be cognized when one cognizes (through *indriyapratyakṣa*) visible things, sounds, etc., i.e., objects belonging to the realm of corporeality, and/or when one cognizes (through *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*) affective sensations (*vedanāskandha*), perceptual identifications (*sañjñāskandha*), cognitions (*vijñānaskandha*), etc. On the cognizability of the *pudgala*, see above, §1.1.3.3 and fn. 150, p. 97.

nature of its own (*svayam*) [i.e., independently of the nature of y,] for its nature is nothing but that which appears [in cognition in the form of y, and this for two reasons: ¹⁸³first] because if x were endowed with a nature [of its own, i.e., if it were not simply of the nature of y], then it would appear (*pratibhāsaprasaṅga*) [separately in cognition], as [does] y;¹⁸⁴ [and second,] because [something] perceptible¹⁸⁵ does not exist if it does not appear [in cognition].¹⁸⁶ [And] since even if [x] were [held to be] imperceptible, the cognition [still] would not have this form [i.e., the aspect of x],¹⁸⁷ what is it the cognition of[, and] related to what?¹⁸⁸

¹⁸³ Introduction, PVT *Je* D327b1/P401a3 ≈ PVSVT 529,10: *athārūpādisvabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ / tadā [...]* /. “If the *pudgala* does not have the constituents as its nature, then [...]”

¹⁸⁴ Conclusion, PVT *Je* D327b2/P401a4 ≈ PVSVT 529,11: *na ca pratibhāsate^a / tato nāsty eva pudgalaḥ* /. [^a PVT reads **prthak pratibhāsate*.] “Now, it does not appear [separately_{PVT}]. Therefore the *pudgala* simply does not exist.”

¹⁸⁵ Explanation, PVT *Je* D327b2–3/P401a4–5: *snañ du ruñ ba ste dmigs pa’i mtshan ñid kyir gyur pa*. “Perceptible, i.e., for which the [causal] characteristics for a perception have been attained (**upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*).” On *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*, see Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e).

¹⁸⁶ Explanation, PVT *Je* D327b3/P401a5: *’dis ni gañ zag med par bsgrub pa’i phyir rañ bžin mi dmigs pa bśad pa yin no* //. “With this, [Dharmakīrti] resorts (**ukta*) to the non-perception of a thing/nature (**svabhāvānupalabdhi*) in order to demonstrate that the *pudgala* does not exist.” On *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, see Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e).

¹⁸⁷ Explanations. (1) PVT *Je* D327b3/P401a6: *de’i ño bo śes pa ste gañ zag gi rañ bžin ’dzin pa’i śes pa ma yin pa*. “The cognition would not have this form, i.e., the cognition would not grasp the nature of the *pudgala* (**pudgalasvabhāvagrāhaka?*).” (2) PVSVT 529,13: *na tadrūpaṃ jñānaṃ na pudgalākāraṃ jñānaṃ*. “The cognition would not have this form, i.e., the cognition would not have the *pudgala* as its mode of apprehension.”

¹⁸⁸ Conclusion, PVT *Je* D327b4/P401a7 = PVSVT 529,14–15: *na rūpādijñānanāntarīyakaṃ pudgalajñānaṃ ity arthaḥ / tathā ca na jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti bhāvaḥ* /. “The cognition of the *pudgala* is not invariably connected to the cognition of [constituents] such as corporeality: this is the meaning. And thus, the relation is not a matter of cognition: this is [Dharmakīrti’s] idea.” Here Dharmakīrti’s reply rests on the principle that if the *pudgala* were a real entity endowed with a nature of its own it would necessarily produce a distinct cognitive appearance of itself (see above, fn. 154, p. 99).

¹⁸⁹Moreover (*ca*), if the [perceptual] cognition of a [real entity] *x* depends on [something else, say] *y*, it is certainly not the case that the nature of *x* ceases to appear (*pratibhāsa eva naśyati*) [in cognition when *y* appears], as [the nature] of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which depends on light[, does not cease to appear when light appears in cognition].¹⁹⁰ Or what does *x*'s close connection (*pratyāsatti*) to *y*¹⁹¹ consist of, so that *x* itself is [also] manifest (*pratyupatiṣṭhate*) when one cognizes *y* [although this *y*] lacks *x*'s own nature? For [if it were] so there would be an absurdity.¹⁹² Objection: [This close connection consists in] the fact that [the *x*] that is being cognized has *y* for its basis (*upādāna*).¹⁹³ [Answer: But] what is the meaning of "basis"? [First,] a causality relation [between *x* and *y* can]not [be intended] since it is not accepted. Or, if one accepts [a causality relation between *x* and *y*, still one does not necessarily perceive *x* when one perceives *y*, for] the effect and the cause do not manifest (*pratyupasthāpana*) a cognition of

¹⁸⁹ Introduction, PVT *Je* D327b4–5/P401a7–8 = PVSVT 529,16: *rūpādyāyattapratīti-tvād eva prṛthak pudgalo na pratibhāsata iti cet* /. "Objection: It is because [its] cognition depends on [constituents] such as corporeality that the *pudgala* does not appear separately [in cognition]."

¹⁹⁰ Explanation, PVSVT 529,19–20: *yathā nilāḍinām ālokapratibaddhajñānānām āloke pratibhāsamāne 'pi svapratibhāso na naśyati / ālokavyatirekeṇa teṣāṃ pratibhāsānāt / tadvat pudgalasyāpi syāt* /. "For example, the own [cognitive] appearance of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which is related to light, does not cease when light appears [in the cognition], because these [colours] appear distinctly from light [in the cognition]. Now, the *pudgala* too should likewise have [a distinct appearance when light appears]."

¹⁹¹ As testified by PVSVTib D347a4/P511a1 (*de la ni* [P : D om. *nī*] *don de ñe ba gañ yin* /) and the commentaries (PVT *Je* D327b6/P401b3: *phuñ po de la gañ zag ces bya ba'i don de ñe ba ste 'brel pa gañ yin* /). PVSVT 529,21: *kā vā tasya pudgalasya pratyāsattiḥ sambandhas tatra skandhe* /), *tatra* (PVS 147,21) belongs to this sentence. We have read: *kā vā tasya pratyāsattis tatra / yat* [...] /.

¹⁹² Explanation, PVT *Je* D327b7–328a1/P401b4–5 ≈ PVSVT 529,24–26: *apratibaddhe pratibhāsamāne yadi niyamena pudgalaḥ pratibhāseta / tadā yasya kasyacit pratibhāsane 'nyo 'py atyantāsambaddhaḥ pratiyeta^a ity arthaḥ* /. [^a *pratiyeta* em. (PVT *rtogs pa ñid du 'gyur ro*): *pratiyeta* Ed.] "If the *pudgala* necessarily appeared when [something] unrelated [to it appears], then, when whatever appears [in cognition], all [things] other [than that, although] utterly unconnected [to it], would appear: this is the meaning."

¹⁹³ On this term see above, §1.1.3.4.2, and fn. 135, p. 88.

each other [in a reciprocal way].¹⁹⁴ Objection: It is the cognition [of x, not x itself,] that is invariably related to y[, and their] close connection [consists in this invariable relation. Answer:] Has it not been [already] said [above] that this very [invariable relation of a cognition] is impossible in the absence of a relation [between x and y themselves]?¹⁹⁵ Now, [we have already] said [many times] that [there is] no relation between [things] that are not effect and cause [of one another. What has been said,¹⁹⁶ i.e., that] “[an x] the cognition of which is invariably related to the cognition of y, etc.,” [this] also would be [true] provided there were a cognition of x [distinct from y. Now, there is no such cognition,] because there is no cognition of that x which does not appear in cognition in its own form, independently (*asamsargeṇa*) of [anything] heterogeneous (*asvarūpa*). And for want of such a [cognition], defining the nature of an object [such as x] as inexpressible [as being identical to or other than y] is illegitimate (*na sidhyati*). A really existing [thing] must therefore be possessed of either identity or otherness[, for there is no other possibility for a real entity].¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ Explanation, PVSVT 529,30–530,10: *yathā kāryāt kāraṇapratītiḥ tathā na kāraṇāt kāryapratītiḥ bhavaty arthaḥ* /. “Contrary to the cognition of the cause through the effect[, which is legitimate], there is no cognition of the effect through the cause.” On this point, see Eltschinger 2010b: 415–416 (§10d).

¹⁹⁵ Introduction, PVT Je D328a4–5/P402a2–3 = PVSVT 530,15: *akāryakāraṇayor api pudgalarūpādyaḥ pratibandho bhaviṣyatīti ata āha* [...]. “[Dharmakīrti] says [what follows] in order to [meet the present objection]: Although they [do] not [enter a relation of] effect to cause, the *pudgala* and [constituents] such as corporeality will [certainly] have a relation.”

¹⁹⁶ According to PVT Je D328a5/P402a4 ≈ PVSVT 530,17 (*yatpratipattināntarīyakam yajjñānam ity api yad ucyate* [...]), in PVS 147,13–15.

¹⁹⁷ PVS 147,2–148,5: *atattvam eva svabhāvasyānyattvam / na hi rūparasayor apy anyad eva paraspam anyattvam / svabhāvāpratibandho 'nyattvam iti cet / ko 'yam pratibandho nāma yena sa ca na syāt / nānyasvabhāvaś ca / janmeti cet / sarva-kāryakāraṇānām^a paraspam avācyatā syāt / tathā ca sarvaḥ sarvasya kathañcid upayogīti na kaścit kutaścid anyāḥ syāt / evaṃ cāvācyatety api kāryakāraṇabhāva eva śabdāntareṇoktaḥ syāt / nārthabhedāḥ / svabhāvānugamam^b tv anyattvam brūmaḥ / sa ca svabhāvavatām^c paraspam asty evety^d anyattvam eva / na ca tajjanmalakṣaṇāt svabhāvāpratibandhād anyāḥ pratibandho nāma / anāyattasya vyabhicārāvirodhāt / tato dharmabhedāc cānyattvam / jñānakṛtāḥ pratibandha iti cet / syād etat / yatpratipattināntarīyakam yajjñānam tadgatau nīyamena tatpratibhāsanāt tad atadrūpam apy avācyam iti / na / tasya niḥsvabhāvatvāt svayam / sa eva hi tasya svabhāvo yaḥ pratibhāti / svabhāvavattve 'sya tadvat pratibhāsapra-*

1.2.3. On PV 2.202–204

Dharmakīrti's second argument against the *pudgala* occurs at the very end of his treatment of the truth of cessation (*nirodhasatya*) in PV 2. Here, as in PVS 147,2–148,5, Dharmakīrti does not allude to the *pudgala* in any explicit way, so that this interpretation relies on the immediate context (a discussion of the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and the eschatological consequences of one's adhering to a self),¹⁹⁸ on terminology (*avācya* in PV 2.203a and c) and on the (almost) unanimous explanation of these stanzas as a critique of the Pudgalavāda by his successors (Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Manorathanandin).¹⁹⁹

It is well-known that, at least from Vasubandhu onwards, the Yogācāra intellectuals developed a model of causality that denied permanent entities such as God or the self any functionality and therefore any real existence, for only impermanent entities can bring about an ef-

saṅgāt / apratibhāsamānasya ca dṛśyasyābhāvāt / adṛśyatve 'pi na tadrūpaṃ jñānam iti kasya kimāyattā pratipattiḥ / na ca yad yadāyattapratītikaṃ tasya svabhāvapratibhāsa eva naśyati / prakāśāyattapratītinām iva nilādīnām / kā vā tasya pratyāsattis tatra /^e yat tasminn anātmārūpe pratīyamāne sa svayaṃ pratyupa-tiṣṭhate / atiprasaṅgo hy evaṃ syāt / pratīyamānasya tadupādānateti cet / ko 'yam upādānārthaḥ / na kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'nabhyupagamat / abhyupagame vā na kāryakāraṇe 'nyonyapratītipratyupasthāpane / pratīter eva tannāntarīyakatā praty-āsattir iti cet / nanu saivāsati pratibandhe na yuktety ucyate / nākāryakāraṇayoḥ kaścit pratibandha iti cōktam / yatpratipattināntarīyakaṃ yajjñānam ity api taj-jñāne sati syāt / na hi yo vijñāne svarūpeṇāsvarūpāsaṃsargeṇa na pratibhāsate tasya kiñcij jñānam / tadabhāvān na sidhyaty^f avācyaṭālakṣaṇam artharūpasya / tad bhavatā vastutas tattvānyatvabhājā bhavitavyam /. ^a See above, fn. 167, p. 103. ^b *svabhāvānanugamam* PVS_{MS}: *svabhāvānanugamaṇam* Ed. ^c *svabhāvavatām* : *svabhāvavatām* Ed. ^d *evety* : *eva ity* Ed. ^e See above, fn. 191, p. 107. ^f *na sidhyaty* : *na sidhyati* Ed.

¹⁹⁸ On Dharmakīrti's views regarding *satkāyadṛṣṭi* = *avidyā*, see Introduction, §0.1. On PV 2.200–201 and Dharmakīrti's views on the *pratītyasamutpāda*, see Eltschinger 2009a: 173–175 and Eltschinger 2010c: 28–48.

¹⁹⁹ Here as elsewhere, Prajñākaragupta is an exception, as is testified to by his introduction to PV 2.203. PVA 141,8–9: *athāpi syāt – na nitya ātmā pūrvoktadoṣān nāpy anityo 'prekṣāpūrvakriyāprasaṅgāt / ato nityatvānityatvābhyām avācyaḥ / tad api na yuktam /*. “But if [the following] were [urged]: ‘The self is neither permanent, because of the afore-mentioned fault, nor impermanent, because an irrational action would follow; therefore it cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent’ – this too is incorrect.”

fect.²⁰⁰ To put it briefly, a permanent entity, the causal capacity of which is complete and unimpeded and therefore does not depend on the circumstantial intervention of a cooperating factor, can bring about an effect neither gradually (*krameṇa*) nor simultaneously (*yaugapadyena*). It cannot bring it about gradually, because nothing prevents this entity from producing its effect entirely at once. But it cannot bring about its effect at one time only, since if it is permanent, no change can occur in its nature and it cannot become inactive once it has started producing. Provided that these authors' criterion for existence is functionality, only impermanent entities can be regarded as existent, whereas permanent entities, which do not meet this requirement, are held to be nonexistent.

Interestingly enough, the issue of the causality of permanent entities had already been touched upon in the MSA(Bh)'s critique of the *pudgala*. Suffice it to quote here MSA 18.99–100:

Because the [*pudgala*] would no [longer] be an agent, because [its exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this *pudgala*'s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen. Neither a [*pudgala*] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [*pudgala*] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this *pudgala*] would [*ipso facto*] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a *pudgala* that would be neither permanent nor impermanent].²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ See above, Introduction, §0.2.2, and below, Chapter 2, §2.4; see also Yoshimizu 1999.

²⁰¹ For the Sanskrit of MSA 18.99–100, see above, fn. 95, p. 27. On these stanzas and Vasubandhu's commentary, see Eltschinger 2010a: 320–322. We are not aware of any parallel argument in Vasubandhu's AKBh. Note also YBhū 132,1–3: *kaccid icchasy anityaś ceṣṭāhetur nityo veti / saced anityaḥ savikāra ātmā ceṣṭata iti na yujyate / sacen nityo nirvikāras tena nirvikāraś ceṣṭata iti na yujyate* /. “Do you accept the cause of action (*ceṣṭā*) [i.e., the self.] as impermanent or permanent? If it is impermanent, it undergoes change, [and] it is impossible that [such] a [changeable] self acts. [But] if it is permanent, it is unchangeable, [and] therefore it is impossible that [something] unchangeable acts.”

Now, the causality of permanent entities also provides the doctrinal background of PV 2.202, a stanza most likely to be interpreted as targetting a permanent self:²⁰²

[There can be neither bondage nor liberation for something permanent.] Being the cause of the arising of suffering is [what we call] “bondage”: [since what is permanent is devoid of the capacity to bring about anything,]²⁰³ how [could this belong] to [something] permanent? [And] being the cause of the non-arising of suffering is [what we call] “liberation”: how [could this belong] to [something] permanent?²⁰⁴

But at least according to Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, Dharmakīrti’s target in the next stanza has shifted to the Pudgalavādin (which Manorathanandin takes to be a Vaibhāṣika²⁰⁵): if only impermanent entities are able to perform functionalities, then the *pudgala*, which cannot be said to be impermanent according to the personalist opponent, is no more able than the permanent self to act as a cause of bondage or liberation.²⁰⁶ And such is indeed the intent of the objection that opens Devendrabuddhi’s commentary on PV 2.203:

²⁰² As PVP D86a6/P99a6 testifies: *g’zan yañ bdag ñid kyi ’chiñ ba dañ thar pa ni yod pa ma yin no //*. “Moreover, a [permanent] self has neither bondage nor liberation.”

²⁰³ According to PVP D86a7/P99a7 (*’ga’ žig la yañ nus pa med pa’i phyir*).

²⁰⁴ PV 2.202: *duḥkhotpādānahetutvaṃ bandho nityasya tat kutaḥ / aduḥkhotpādāhetutvaṃ mokṣo nityasya tat kutaḥ //*. Note PVP D86b2–3/P99b2–3: *de dag ni rañ gi sde pa bstan bcos mdzad pa g’zan gyis mañ du bśad zin pa’i phyir ma spros so //*. “Since the [impossibility, for permanent entities, to bring about an effect] has [already] been dealt with extensively by other coreligionists (**svayūthya*) who have authored treatises (**śāstrakāra*) [on that topic], we shall not expatiate [upon it here].”

²⁰⁵ PVV 80,17–19: *syād etat / na nityasya hetutvam / bandhamokṣau ca yuktāv iti / nityatvānityatvābhyām avācyasya pudgalasya tau bhaviṣyata iti manvānaṃ vaibhāṣikaṃ praty āha [...]* / “Suppose the following be urged: [Something] permanent is not [their] cause, and [thus] bondage and liberation are justified. Both will belong to a *pudgala* that cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent. Against a Vaibhāṣika who thinks in this way, [Dharmakīrti] says [...].” Note, however, that Vācaspatimiśra also ascribes *pudgalavāda* to the Vaibhāṣikas in his NVTI (456,18–19: *so ’yaṃ vātsīputrāṇām* [sic] *vaibhāṣikānām siddhāntaḥ* /).

²⁰⁶ That the *pudgala* would not be able to experience bondage (or *saṃsāra*) and liberation is also the focus of Bhāviveka’s MHK 3.90: *na pudgalaḥ saṃsarati mucyate naitva tattvataḥ / prajñāpyatvād yathā veśma vācyatvād vāpi gandhavat //*. “Neither does the *pudgala* really transmigrate nor is it really liberated, because it is [merely]

Let us admit that [something] permanent [like the outsiders' self] has neither bondage nor liberation. [As for ourselves,] however, [our position is not flawed] since we acknowledge that the *pudgala*, which cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent, [experiences] bondage and liberation.²⁰⁷

Dharmakīrti's answer runs as follows:

For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything, [so that] even in the case of [something] that cannot be said [to be impermanent], bondage and liberation cannot be experienced in any way.²⁰⁸

While explaining Dharmakīrti's stanza, Devendrabuddhi discards the Pudgalavādin's objection as follows:

This is not the case, for there [can] be no [real] entity lacking one of the two aspects, since [the two properties of being] permanent and [being] impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory. [This is] because, for a [real] entity, being excluded (**vyavaccheda*?) from one [of these two] is invariably connected to possessing the other one, and possessing one [of these two] is invariably connected to being excluded from the other one. Now, this *pudgala* can be either momentary or non-momentary. To begin with, if it is non-momentary, then it is permanent, because such is the state of [that which] exceeds [one single] moment. Therefore it would be contradictory if [something] permanent could not be said to be permanent.²⁰⁹

to be designated[, but not ultimately real], like a house, and also (*vāpi*) because it can be expressed, like a smell." See also Iida 1980: 173. The YBhū and MSA (see, e.g., MSA 18.96–100 and Eltschinger 2010a: 306) already set forth arguments to the effect that the *pudgala* cannot be an agent (*karṭṛ*), hence not an agent of liberation (*mokṭṛ*). On the notions of *karṭṛ*, *draṣṭṛ* and *mokṭṛ*, etc., see above, fn. 112, p. 82.

²⁰⁷ PVP D86b3/P99b3–4: *gal te rtag pa la (P : las D) 'chiñ ba dañ thar pa yod pa ma yin pa de ltar ni 'dod pa ñid yin mod kyi / rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa ñid du brjod du med pa'i gañ zag bcñs pa dañ thar par khas len pa'i phyir ro že na /*.

²⁰⁸ PV 2.203: *anīyatvena yo 'vācyaḥ sa hetur na hi kasyacit / bandhamokṣāḥ avācye 'pi na vidyete kathaṇcana /*.

²⁰⁹ PVP D86b3–6/P99b4–7: *de ni ma yin te / gñi ga'i rnam pa (P : par D) ma yin pa'i dños po med pa'i phyir ro // rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa dag ni phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid can yin pa'i phyir ro // dños po la gcig rnam par gcad (D : bcad P) pa dañ yoñs su gcod pa dag ni de las gžan yoñs su gcod pa dañ rnam par gcad pa med na mi 'byuñ ba ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // gañ zag de yañ skad cig ma 'am skad cig ma ma yin par 'gyur grañ na / re žig gal te skad cig ma ma yin pa de'i tshe skad cig ma las*

However, the most detailed treatment of this stanza (to be more precise, of PV 2.203ab) is to be found in Kamalaśīla's commentary on TS 347, which is much indebted to Devendrabuddhi's above-quoted explanation of PV 2.203. Kamalaśīla introduces his master's stanza as follows:

It is not only because it cannot be said to be either identical to or other than [the constituents] that one shows that the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity; it is also because [the *pudgala*] cannot be said to be impermanent that [it] is a non-entity. In order to show this, [Śāntarakṣita] states [TS 347].²¹⁰

As we can see, this statement provides us with an interesting transition between Dharmakīrti's two lines of argument, i.e., between the critique of the *pudgala* as *tattvānyatvāvācyā* and the critique of the *pudgala* as *anityatvenāvācyā* – and here as in the previous argument, the notion of *arthakriyā* plays a pivotal role. Śāntarakṣita spells this out as follows:

Moreover, the capacity to [perform] functionalities is the [only] definition of existence, [and this capacity] is limited to momentary [things] only. Thus [something] that cannot be said [to be momentary] is not a [real] entity.²¹¹

Let us now quote Kamalaśīla's explanation in full:

Indeed, the definition of existence, [i.e.,] the nature of a [real] entity, amounts to this only: the capacity to [perform] functionalities, because not being a [real] entity is defined as [being] devoid of any [functional] efficacy. Therefore being a [real] entity is indirectly defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities. Now, this functionality is limited to momentary [things] only.

phyi ma'i gnas skabs ñid yin pa'i phyir rtag pa yin no // de bas na rtag pa ni rtag pa ñid du brjod par bya ba ma yin no źes bya ba 'gal lo //. In the parallel passage of the TSP (see below, fn. 213, p. 115), *tyāga* and *parigraha* correspond to the PVP's *ṛnam par gcad pa* and *yoñs su gcod pa*. Now if **vyavaccheda* can be interpreted in the sense of *tyāga*, the same cannot be said of **pariccheda* and *parigraha*. The meaning of *pariccheda(ka)* remains obscure. Of course, one cannot rule out the hypothesis that the Sanskrit manuscript(s) used by the Tibetan translators already read *pariccheda* instead of *parigraha* (due to scribal error).

²¹⁰ TSP_K 128,13–14/TSP_§ 116,6–7: *na kevalaṃ tattvānyatvābhyām avācyatvād avastu pudgalo 'yam iti pratipāditam / ito 'py anityatvenāvācyatvād evāvastv iti pratipādayann āha [...]* /.

²¹¹ TS 347: *arthakriyāsu śaktiś ca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam / kṣaṇikeṣv eva niyatā tathā'vācye na vastutā //*.

[Śāntarakṣita's] implicit idea is: it implies (*vyāpta*) momentariness. [And this is] because it is contradictory that [something] permanent [may perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time. As a consequence, the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity [if it] cannot be said to be momentary in this way, because in this case one negates momentariness, which is implied by [functionality], as one negates a [property] such as being a *śiṃśapā* when one negates [the property of] being a tree. As [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.203ab]: "For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything." Suppose the following be urged: If the *pudgala* were permanent, then it would be contradictory for it to [perform] a functionality either gradually or simultaneously. [But] insofar as (*yāvata* [...] *ataḥ*) it [cannot be said] to be permanent any more than it can be said to be impermanent, its efficacy in [performing] a functionality is not contradictory at all. [We reply:] This is incorrect, for an entity lacking both aspects cannot be a [real] particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), because [the properties of being] permanent and impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory (*anyonyavṛttiparihāsthita*), since, for a [certain real] entity, lacking (*tyāga*) one aspect is invariably connected to possessing the other one, [and] possessing (*parigraha*) [one aspect is invariably connected to] lacking [the other one]. Indeed, we do not refuse the application of the word *avācya* to the *pudgala*, because nobody can negate [something that, like any other verbal designation, is] based on mere free will, but this [*pudgala*] is [unfortunately] presented here as having the nature of an entity. Does the nature of this entity called *pudgala* always exist or not? If it [always] exists, then it is simply permanent, for what is called "permanent" is nothing else; rather, one calls "permanent" a nature that lasts forever [and] does not perish, as [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.204ab]: "Wise [people] call 'permanent' that nature which does not perish."²¹² But in the hypothesis that [its nature] does not [always] exist, then again it is simply impermanent, because [being] impermanent is defined as [having] a nature that does not last. As a consequence, since there is no other possibility than [being] momentary or non-momentary, and since it is contradictory that [something] non-momentary [may perform] a functionality either gradually

²¹² PV 2.204: *nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati / tyaktvemāṃ hrepaniṃ dṛṣṭim ato sa nitya ucyatām* //. "Once they have got rid of the embarrassing false view [that superimposes a *pudgala* whose nature is neither permanent nor impermanent], wise [people] call 'permanent' that nature which does not perish. Therefore this [*pudgala* whose nature does not perish] must be called 'permanent.'"

or at one time, existence, which is defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities, implies momentariness. It is therefore established that one negates existence when one negates momentariness.²¹³

As we can see from the immediate context and the purport of PV 2.202–204, Dharmakīrti's critique of the *pudgala* has obvious soteriological implications, for giving credence to the existence of such a pseudo-entity threatens one's progression along the Buddhist path toward salvation. First and foremost, Pudgalavāda is nothing but a characteristic instance of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* (in its *parikalpita*, "speculative" form, the one eliminated with the *darśanamārga*, the "path of vision"²¹⁴), i.e., nescience (*avidyā*), the very origin of suffering according to Dharmakīrti. And by negating the impermanence of the *pudgala*, the Pudgalavādin also denies it any functionality, i.e., deprives it of any agency over transmigration and liberation.

²¹³ TSP_K 128,17–129,8/TSP_S 116,10–29: *idam eva hi vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam vastusvabhāvo yad utārthakriyāsu śaktiḥ / sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvād avastutvasyeti sāmāthyād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇam eva vastutvam avatiṣṭhate / sā cārthakriyā kṣaṇikeṣv eva niyatā / kṣaṇikatvenaiva vyāpteti yāvat / nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt / atas tathā kṣaṇikatvenāvācye pudgale vastutā nāsti / tatra tadvyāpakasya kṣaṇikatvasya nivṛtter vṛkṣatvanivṛttau śiṃṣapātvādinivṛttivad iti / yathoktam – anityatvena yo 'vācyaḥ sa hetur na hi kasyacid iti^a / syād etat – yadi pudgalo nityaḥ syāt tadā tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhaḥ syāt / yāvatā yathāsāv anityatvenāvācyaḥ tathā nityatvenāpīty ato 'rthakriyāsāmarthyam asyāviruddham eveti / ^btad asamyak / na hy ubhayākāravīnirmuktaṃ vastu svalakṣaṇam yuktam / nityānityayor anyonyavṛttiparihāraśthitalakṣaṇatvāt / vastuny ekākāratyāgaparigrahayos tadaparākāraparigrahatyāganāntariyakatvāt^b / na hy asmābhir avācyaśabdaniveśanam pudgale pratiṣidhyate / svatantrēcchāmātrādhīnasya^c kenacit pratiśeddhum aśakyatvāt kintv idam iha vasturūpaṃ nirūpyate / kim asau pudgalākhyasya vastunaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadāsty āhosvīn nāstīti / yady asti tadā nitya evāsau / na hi nityo nāmānya eva kaścīd api tu yaḥ svabhāvaḥ sadāvasthāyī na vinaśyati sa nitya ucyate / yathoktam – nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāmso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyatīti^d / atha nāstīti pakṣas tadāpy anitya evāsau / anavasthāyīsvabhāvalakṣaṇatvād anityasya / ataḥ kṣaṇikā kṣaṇikavyatirekeṇa gatyantarābhāvād akṣaṇikasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt kṣaṇikatvenārthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇam sattvaṃ vyāptam iti pudgale kṣaṇikatvanivṛtttau sattvanivṛttiḥ siddhā / .^a = PV 2.203ab. ^b Cf. PVP D86b3–6/P99b4–7, quoted above, fn. 209, p. 112. ^c °ādhīnasya TSP_S: °ānītasya TSP_K. ^d = PV 2.204ab.*

²¹⁴ On the distinction between *sahajā* ("innate") and *vi-* or *pari-kalpita* *satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ*, see Introduction, §0.2.1, and Eltschinger 2009a: 172–173.

1.3. CONCLUSION

To the best of our knowledge, Dharmakīrti remained entirely silent on the *buddha*-nature. To be more precise, if *tathāgatagarbha* patterns of thought are discernible in his works (most conspicuously in PV 1.221, PVSV 110,23–111,10 and PV 2.208ab²¹⁵), Dharmakīrti seems never to criticise this strand of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism on account of its strong substantialist overtones – and the same applies to Vasubandhu and the whole Buddhist epistemological tradition. What Dharmakīrti does criticise is Buddhist personalism. However, his arguments are brief and implicit, so that their identification *as* targetting Buddhist Pudgalavāda owes much to his commentators' explanations, to terminology and to context. Note also that, in stark contrast with his "mainstream" predecessors' controversy, Dharmakīrti never touches upon issues of scriptural exegesis and heterodoxy. Thus whereas the KV, the VK, (the YBhū,) the MSA(Bh), the TSi and the AKBh directed lengthy arguments against their "coreligionists'" personalism (leaving the non-Buddhists' *ātman* mostly out of consideration) and made scriptural exegesis an important if not dominant issue, Dharmakīrti concentrated his arguments on the non-Buddhists' versions of the self and (therefore) left the ground of the traditional *yukti-cum-āgama* method of argumentation. We may surmise that here, as in his critique of the outsiders' self, Dharmakīrti strongly relied on his predecessors' critiques and spared himself the trouble of repeating them. But Dharmakīrti is also to be credited for the development of an entirely new line of argument against the *pudgala*, one that was consonant with his own elaborations on causal efficiency and the two types of relation. Here as elsewhere, Dharmakīrti's focus and methodology most certainly reflect a polemical agenda directed against the non-Buddhists as well as a strong concern with leaving internecine quarrels as implicit as possible.

²¹⁵ On PV 1.221/PVSV 110,23–111,10, see Eltschinger 2007: 232–235; on PV 2.208ab, see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 437, Franco 1997: 88–89 and Eltschinger 2005: 184–197. In the present state of our understanding, however, we are inclined to believe that if *tathāgatagarbha* structures and terminology do appear in these passages, Dharmakīrti's way of interpreting them frontally contradicts the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings as they can be found, e.g., in the Mahāyānist MPSū, the ŚMDSNSū and the RGV(V).